A WHITEHEADIAN SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

By

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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

A WHITEHEADIAN SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

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Madden and Hare present the challenge which is the immediate occasion for this dissertation.[1] They hold that the thought of Alfred North Whitehead is not able to make sense of the facts of evil in the world. It is my thesis that Whitehead perceptively criticizes traditional solutions to the problem of evil and then offers a solution which effectively meets these criticisms and in principle reconciles the facts of evil in the world with the concept of a totally good God.

Whitehead makes the following criticisms of philosophical and theological ideas bearing on the problem of evil. Most earlier systems hold that what is involved in process and becoming is not quite real. Idealistic and monistic thought is not able to account for the rise of evil. Materialistic philosophy cannot explain the rise of the good. Idealistic philosophy in which the good is at rest tends toward a renunciation of committed action in the world. Much Christian and Jewish theology has described a God who is a despotic tyrant. When God is made omnipotently to determine every event, he is made responsible

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[1] Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare, Evil and the Concept of God (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1968), 142 pp.

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for all evil. There is historical evidence suggesting that holding a concept of a despotic God tends to produce despotic people.

Whitehead's di-polar conception of God and the processive character of all real entities makes it possible for his system to meet these criticisms. He can explain process and becoming so that it is real. He shows how evil arises without making God responsible for any evil which cannot be justified. Excess evil which cannot be justified results from the wrong use of responsible freedom. His conception of composite good makes it possible to explain the emergence of the good and account for relativity and quantum phenomena. The system furnishes a basis for individual and cooperative human effort to overcome evil in the world. God is not a coercive despot but the persuasive source of all good.

A chapter deals with representative criticisms of Whitehead's thought made by Ely, Madden and Hare, Gilkey, Mascall, Pols, and Hartshorne. Evidence is presented which suggests that Whitehead's God is totally good, more powerful than the traditional God who omnipotently determined every event, and more available for the purposes of worship because he really responds to man's commitment. Features of Whitehead's concept of freedom which are superior to those of Pols are noted. It is argued that Whitehead's concept of eternal objects is superior to the alternative position of Hartshorne.

Differences of opinion among Whitehead scholars in the areas of freedom and creativity suggest that these topics should be given high priority in future research. I would like to see a refinement in his system so that it is easy to see that God is the ground of being. As it stands his di-polar conception of God makes a great advance over

traditional conceptions and seems to me to be the best available basis for future development of the solution to the problem of evil.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is appropriate for me to express gratitude to a few of those who have helped make my graduate learning experience an adventure of ideas. I am deeply grateful to Graham Maxwell who as a college teacher inspired me to pursue truth because it makes men free. Later as the Director of the Division of Religion at Loma Linda University he arranged financial support, time off, and reduced teaching responsibilities so that I could pursue my studies.

Two features of Whitehead's concept of God speak particularly to my condition. They are God as the ordered source of order and gentle persuasiveness in the context of freedom. In John Cobb these principles are lived as well as taught. The orderliness and clarity of his exposition and criticism were matched by his patience and gentleness when I could not seem to follow. He encouraged me to 4
listen carefully to criticism and then to follow my own convictions.

I am also grateful to the other members of my committee for their unique contributions to this learning adventure. Donald Rhoades presented helpful guidance in solving the problems of religious knowledge. Through the analysis of nineteenth century thinkers Jack Verheyden guided me into seeing the need for a God with truly divine power. Although David Griffin was not on my committee, his suggestions and criticisms as visiting examiner were extremely helpful and it is to be hoped that they will continue as I pursue process studies in the future.

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Through the years of my graduate study Marjorie Nelson has made invaluable contributions. She has felt the pressure of deadlines, protected me from needless interruptions, and typed this as well as many other manuscripts.

Duane, Yvonne, Cheryl, and Barbara have supported this adventure in ways that can only be compared with our common rejoicing.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The immediate occasion for this thesis is the challenge to process thought presented by Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare in their book Evil and the Concept of God.[1] The process thought represented by Whitehead and Hartshorne is included in their thesis "that neither theism nor quasi-theism is able to make sense of the facts of evil and that this incompetence constitutes a good reason for rejecting each one of them." This challenge was shocking to students of Whitehead's thought who have found that he does make sense of the facts of evil.

The problem of this dissertation is: Does the thought of Alfred North Whitehead make sense of the facts of evil in the world? It is my thesis that Whitehead perceptively criticizes traditional solutions to the problem of evil and then offers a solution which effectively meets these criticisms and in principle reconciles the facts of evil in the world with the concept of a totally good God.

The Need for the Study

The first need for the study arises from the manner in which Whitehead deals with the problem of evil in his writing. There is no

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[1] Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare, Evil and the Concept of God (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1968), 142 pp. Hereafter cited as ECG.

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systematic treatment of this topic. Evil is mentioned incidentally in the course of discussion of other problems. It would be difficult for a thinker who is not familiar with Whitehead's thought to locate the many places where aspects of the problem of evil are discussed. An attempt to locate and organize references to the problem of evil in Whitehead should be helpful for such students.

Hare and Madden have called attention to the fact that very few recent philosophical studies of the problem of evil have discussed process thought in any depth.[2] This neglect of process thought may be due to the difficulty of locating references or it may spring from simple ignorance of the cogency of Whitehead's criticisms and the superiority of his solution. It may be that a thesis on the topic will call attention to the values to be found in Whitehead's thought for the solution of the problem.

The complexity of Whitehead's thought and the absence of a systematic treatment suggest that more than one treatment of Whitehead's solution of the problem of evil could be helpful. Different aspects of the problem in the focus of attention of the interpreter lead to a selection of different aspects of Whitehead's solution for emphasis. The problem of evil is of sufficient existential urgency and there is such richness and variety in Whitehead's thought that several approaches are warranted.

Survey of Prior Studies

The first major study of the problem of evil in Whitehead was

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[2] Peter H. Hare and Edward H. Madden, "Evil and Persuasive Power," Process Studies 2 (Spring 1972): 44.

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a dissertation comparing the thought of Hocking and Whitehead. It was presented to the Divinity School of the University of Chicago by Edmund Jabez Thompson the same year that Adventures of Ideas appeared.[3] The University of Chicago Press published the study two years later.[4] Thompson found the treatment of the problem of evil in Whitehead generally superior to that of Hocking with regard to the adequacy of the nature of evil and its causes. Thompson's "thesis may be stated as follows: Good and evil are descriptive adjectives which may be applied to processes in accordance as those processes support or obstruct the ingression of the most comprehensive systems of patterns or eternal objects."[5] He thinks that the use of the terms good and evil as nouns implies that there is something totally good and another something totally evil in the universe. He is critical of Whitehead for occasionally indulging in such "inaccurate use of the terms."[6] He defines evil as "a purpose towards elimination"[7] getting the expression from Religion in the Making.[8] He emphasizes the process character of Whitehead's thought which provides for freedom and moral responsibility. His study does not profit from the later discussions by Whitehead of strength of beauty and divine persuasion. There is considerable emphasis on the value of Whitehead's thought for the homiletic interpretation of the gospels and the teachings of Jesus.

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[3] Edmund Jabez Thompson, "An Analysis of the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead and William Ernest Hocking Concerning Good and Evil" (Ph. D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1933).

[4] E. J. Thompson, An Analysis of the Thought of Whitehead and Hocking Concerning Good and Evil (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1935).

[5] Ibid., p. 103. [6] Ibid., p. 104. [7] Ibid., pp. 57, 59, 97, 104.

[8] Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 95. Hereafter cited as RM.

Thompson has given a sympathetic and basically accurate description of Whitehead's treatment of the problem as far as he goes. I agree that Whitehead wants to avoid a dualism in which there is "a Something absolutely and completely good and another Something which is absolutely and completely evil,"[9] but I think that it is better to retain the use of the word evil as both a noun and an adjective. The differentiation between intrinsic and extrinsic evil is better able to handle the problem with which he is concerned than the refusal to use the noun. The basic themes of Thompson's study need to be deepened and expanded with the use of more of Whitehead's discussion in the early works and the material in his later writing.

In 1942 Stephen Ely published The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God: A Critical Analysis.[10] The treatment of the problem of evil is a major feature of this book. Ely believes that Whitehead's God is not adequate for religious purposes because he is not good enough and not powerful enough. He charges that this God is not good because he lures occasions in the world into actions which may be evil for themselves but which increase God's own strength of beauty.[11] Ely says that Whitehead's God "does not care anything about individuals, except as they promote intensity of feeling--in him."[12] This God is not "all-powerful" because he "cannot repeal fundamental metaphysical laws."[13] "He did not create the metaphysical basis of all being, and he cannot modify it. He, too, has to obey the fundamental rules of the metaphysical game."[14] God's metaphysically given primordial nature drives him to transform the evil in the world into his own good but this does not change the situation in the world. There is a question whether prayer to such a God is of any assistance in overcoming evil. "No reason is given to suppose that he would or could take any interest in either the prayers of men or the rites of Churches. Emphatically he is not, according to Whitehead, 'available for religious purposes.'"[15]

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[9] Thompson, op. cit., p. 103.

[10] Stephen Lee Ely, The Religious Availability of Whitehead's God: A Critical Analysis (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1942). Hereafter cited as RAWG.

[11] Ibid., pp. 39, 41, 47, 51. [12] Ibid., p. 32; cf. p. 50.

The dramatic and fast moving style of Ely makes for the easy availability of his concepts to the reading public. It would be interesting to know how many people are acquainted with Whitehead's thought primarily through this source. Ely's description of the concept of God in Whitehead diverges in significant points from the concept of God that I understand Whitehead to advocate. The chapter on Whitehead's criticism of traditional philosophical and theological positions related to the problem of evil will show that he objected to a static conception of God because such a God could not respond to the changing situation in the world. God needs to experience the novel evil in the world in order to select from his primordial nature those forms of ideality which will most effectively overcome that evil. The God described in Chapter VI of this dissertation is religiously available because he can and does respond to worshippers so as to overcome evil. There will be some discussion of Ely's criticisms in Chapter VIII.

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[13] Ibid., p. 24. [14] Ibid., p. 25. [15] Ibid., pp. 11-12.

Drew University student Lee Underhill presented his dissertation entitled "The Problem of Evil in the Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead" in 1957. He states his thesis as follows:

> Whitehead's view of the becoming and perishing of individual actual entities leads him to define evil as partial realization, and individuality thereby becomes a momentary experience possessing a momentary self for which the only destructive evil is the passing of the present moment.[16]

One chapter each is devoted to the problem of evil in Whitehead's metaphysics, axiology, aesthetics, and philosophy of history. Metaphysically evil is defined as "deprivation (Incomplete Actuality), which makes Process possible, but this definition necessitates that individuality be considered as a momentary experience possessing a momentary self, and makes evil necessary to actuality."[17] It is true, as we shall see, that for Augustine movement and restlessness are impelled by deficiency which is evil. It seems to me that Underhill recognizes the process character of the universe but wishes to retain a static God and a static substantial self. Perhaps this basic presupposition influenced the way he understood Whitehead. If process were impelled by a defect and if process is pervasive, then evil is required.

In the chapter on the problem of evil in Whitehead's axiology, evil is defined as "triviality (Partial Value), which is a phase in the process of achieving higher value, but this definition limits individuality to momentary duration and gives evil an axiological status."[18] I do not see the logical connection between evil as triviality and the limitation to a momentary self. In surveying this section Underhill says, "A trivial entity has value to the extent that it has actuality. Therefore, evil is good, though admittedly imperfect."[19]

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[16] Lee Underhill, "The Problem of Evil in the Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead" (Ph. D. dissertation, Drew University, 1957).

[17] Ibid., p. 9.

[18] Ibid., p. 99.

Aesthetically evil is defined as "discord (partial harmony), which is being resolved, but this definition resolves individuality and gives evil an aesthetic status."[20] He seems to mean by this that evil in the world is received into the consequent nature where each occasion loses its individuality as it is resolved into the good of the whole. He says that in this process "the individual is lost in the blended whole."[21]

In the chapter on the philosophy of history evil is defined as "perpetual perishing (Partial Loss), which makes Perceptual Novelty Possible, and also makes Evil Necessary for advancement, but this definition means that nothing is ultimately lost, except individuals and their societies."[22] He explains that the ultimate evil of perishing is required in order for novel actualization to occur. He holds that this principle "fails to recognize any radical nature in evil or any effects of evil on subjective individuality, because it does not recognize the existence of abiding subjects experiencing series of events."[23]

Underhill summarizes his thesis with the following comments:

> The weakness that Whitehead's process philosophy reveals in its struggle with the problem of evil, is that subjective individuality has only momentary significance. Unity is achieved by resolving individuality. Continuity of process is achieved by denying the continuity of the self. The elimination of evil is achieved by the elimination of the individual. Evil is partial realization which is necessary if there is to be process, value, aesthetic experience, or history.
>
> The strength of Whitehead's process philosophy lies in: (1) its metaphysical emphasis upon dynamic inter-relatedness,

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[19] Ibid., p. 5. [20] Ibid., p. 135. [21] Ibid., p. 6.

[22] Ibid., p. 170. [23] Ibid., p. 7.

> interdependence, and change; (2) its axiological emphasis that evil is unstable and that God is promoting the actualization of the good; (3) its aesthetic emphasis that feeling is fundamental in all experience; and (4) its emphasis that history is the interpretation of the present.[24]

The primary value of Underhill's work is found in his bibliography. He has fifty pages of careful annotation summarizing and critically comparing Whitehead's writing in every period of his life and on all subjects. He also includes a helpful analysis of books that deal with Whitehead and lists a large number of secondary articles. I did not find the substance of the dissertation very helpful. His definition of evil does not show sufficient fidelity to Whitehead or sufficient inner coherence to be useful. He did not present his major criticism of Whitehead in a way that clarified the issue or advanced the discussion. He charges that Whitehead does not provide for self-identity of human beings through time. He does not systematically refer to Whitehead's references to this problem or analyze discussions of the topic in secondary sources.

In 1960 a thesis was completed which should perhaps be mentioned because it failed to include Whitehead in its scope. Richard Besancon studied the way that the concept of God and the concept of evil condition each other in the thought of several thinkers in his thesis entitled "The Problem of God and Evil in the Thought of Representative Contemporary Philosophers."[25] He selected Brightman to represent personalism, Wieman for naturalism, Hocking for absolute

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[24] Ibid., p. 198.

[25] Richard Besancon, "The Problem of God and Evil in the Thought of Representative Contemporary Philosophers" (Th.D. dissertation, Northern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1960), 276 pp.

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idealism, Nels F. S. Ferré to represent Realism of the Agape-school, Edwin Lewis to represent Realism of the Neo-orthodox type, and Joad to represent rationalism. It is to be hoped that Whitehead's process thought will become so well known that such a representative list could not exclude him.

Ralph Norman proposes that theodicy is more a program of action than a theoretical explanation, in his Yale thesis, "Theodicy and the Form of Redemption: An Essay in the Christian Understanding of Evil With an Examination of the Notion of Redemptive Order in Josiah Royce and Alfred North Whitehead."[26] He says that his study is "an attempt to characterize the context out of which Christian thinking about evil and its redemption is carried on." The major thesis is "that such thinking is (a) actualistic, in that it attempts no explanations and is content to exhibit the form of redemption in its relation to evil experienced; (b) a function of the Christian's active self-disposition within this form."[27] He refers to theodicy as actualism and atonement[28] as if in some way each new actual entity gathers up and atones for past evil by making good out of it. "The servant, the interpreter, the man of Peace bent on major Beauty have permission to receive evil as they believe God to receive it and to have received it in the work of the Christ."[29] The development of new good out of the old evil is only possible when the old has perished. "In one important way it tells the old story over: no cross, no crown."[30]

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[26] Ralph Vernon Norman, Jr., "Theodicy and the Form of Redemption: An Essay in the Christian Understanding of Evil With an Examination of the Notion of Redemptive Order in Josiah Royce and Alfred North Whitehead" (Ph. D. dissertation, Yale University, 1961), 358 pp.

[27] Ibid., p. i. [28] Ibid., p. 297. [29] Ibid., p. 347.

Norman's dissertation selects for emphasis those aspects of the problem of evil which are related to atonement and redemption. He conveys a mood of hope and courage because atonement produces new good out of old evil. "Theodicy as program is our postulate that God will not be defeated by any givenness and that therefore under God we cannot treat that givenness accidentally--as if it did not and could not belong to us, and belong to us for the final glory of God, in his own time and ours."[31] His emphasis on theodicy as act makes theodicy as "recital" more of a poetic celebration with words and concepts conditioned by accidental circumstances than an attempt to describe the way things are in the cosmos. He has not given much attention to the complex details of Whitehead's cosmology. This study will give more attention to Whitehead's description of the experienced character of the universe and what this experience implies about the nature of God and man.

Charles Hartshorne published an essay in 1966 in a volume honoring Curt John Ducasse entitled "A New Look at the Problem of Evil."[32] Most of the arguments advanced in the article are common to Whitehead. He takes the position that evil is caused by creaturely freedom, freedom is common to all organisms not just conscious rational organisms, God is not omnipotent in the sense of determining every event in the universe, God's supremacy consists in his freely setting limits within which creaturely freedom occurs and in his freely evaluating the results of creaturely freedom for inclusion in his consequent nature, and God suffers with his creatures. The distinctly Hartshorne feature is that the problem of evil is a "pseudo-problem" because the evidence which raises the question about the existence of God on the basis of evil is empirical. That God exists is an *a priori* necessity. "No empirical evidence can negate a necessity."[33] There are few references to Whitehead and no citations in the article. Many of the basic arguments used by Hartshorne will appear in this study of Whitehead.

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[30] Ibid., p. 348. [31] Ibid.

[32] Charles Hartshorne, "A New Look at the Problem of Evil," in Current Philosophical Issues: Essays in Honor of Curt John Ducasse, ed. Frederick C. Dommeyer (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1966), pp. 201-212.

It may be of some interest to notice that preceding Hartshorne's article in the Ducasse volume is an essay by Edward H. Madden entitled "The Riddle of God and Evil."[34] Madden makes no reference to a process solution to the problem of evil in this article. In December of that year Madden and Hare teamed up to treat the problem of evil, taking process thought into account.[35] With revisions and supplementations the substance of both of these articles later appeared in their book *Evil and the Concept of God*.[36] Some of their criticisms of the process solution to the problem of evil will be considered in Chapter VII of this dissertation.

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[33] Ibid., p. 201.

[34] Edward H. Madden, "The Riddle of God and Evil," in *Current Philosophical Issues: Essays in Honor of Curt John Ducasse*, ed. Frederick C. Dommeyer (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1966), pp. 185-200.

[35] E. H. Madden and P. H. Hare, "Evil and Unlimited Power," *The Review of Metaphysics* 20 (December 1966): 278-289.

[36] Edward H. Madden and Peter H. Hare, *Evil and the Concept of God* (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1968), 142 pp.

Lewis Ford published an article entitled "Divine Persuasion and the Triumph of God" the next year responding to Madden and Hare.[37] His article frequently cites Whitehead and seeks to explain the implication of his thought for the problem of evil. As the title indicates, the contrast between persuasion and coercion as it is related to God is given emphasis. The general themes of this article have been a major influence in this dissertation. His definition of evil[38] was particularly helpful.

In 1969 John B. Cobb, Jr. published the substance of a paper which had been presented at a conference two years earlier. The published version is the chapter "Evil and the Power of God" in his book God and the World.[39] Cobb's ideas put into semi-popular form in this chapter have been the dominant influence on this dissertation aside from the writings of Whitehead.

Approach Used in This Study

The question may be asked why a study on Whitehead's solution to the problem of evil is needed when there are already three dissertations and major essays by recognized authorities in the field. The approach in this study attempts to bring together the helpful contributions made by each of these studies, fill in gaps where they can be recognized, clarify issues where they differ, and direct attention to problems which need further study.

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[37] Lewis S. Ford, "Divine Persuasion and the Triumph of God," originally published in The Christian Scholar, 50 (Fall 1967). Now available in Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr., and Gene Reeves, eds., Process Philosophy and Christian Thought (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971), pp. 287-304. Hereafter cited as PPCT.

[38] PPCT, p. 294.

[39] John B. Cobb, Jr., God and the World (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969), pp. 87-102. Hereafter cited as GW.

There has been an attempt to locate in a detailed manner every recognizable reference to the problem of evil and make these available in some type of systematic arrangement. Thompson's thesis did not have all of Whitehead's writing available. Underhill organized his citations around an interpretation which diverged so far from recognized interpretations as to make it of doubtful value. Norman dealt with only a portion of the total problem of evil. The essays by Hartshorne, Ford, and Cobb make no attempt to organize a comprehensive set of citations to the problem of evil in Whitehead. At the risk of some tedium multiple references supporting a position will be given. It is to be hoped that such listing will make it easier for future students of the problem of evil in Whitehead to find applicable references and solve outstanding problems.

The fact that Whitehead did not write an essay dealing only with the problem of evil and that he made many references to the subject in a variety of contexts tends to encourage a variety of interpretaitons. The striking variation in the definition of evil noticed in the studies already mentioned is an example of this problem. Where alternative interpretations of a statement by Whitehead are possible, one should choose the one most consistent with the rest of his system. If one interpretation is consistent with certain aspects of his writing and another interpretation is consistent with other aspects, the interpretation that is consistent with the most central features of his thought should be selected. If the alternative interpretations are consistent with features of roughly equal importance, it would seem legitimate to choose that interpretation which would most effectively meet criticisms that have been made of his thought. I have made some selections of this latter type, and I will try to notify the reader so that he can make a judgment of his own regarding the validity of my selection. I usually try to cite references that seem to support the alternative interpretation and try to explain how they can be understood to be consistent with the interpretation I have chosen. I recognize that many of these selections are debatable.

As a Seventh-day Adventist I am deeply rooted in and consciously committed to a strong doctrine of God as creator with a linear conception of history moving toward an eschatological culmination. It should be no surprise that I have difficulty harmonizing Whitehead's concepts of creativity and objective immortality in the consequent nature of God with these commitments. The members of my committee and especially Dr. John Cobb have been generous with me as they have tried to help me work out the relationship between commitment and academic accuracy.

Although creativity is discussed in this dissertation, it has seemed wise to narrow the scope so as to exclude a comprehensive analysis and criticism of the various interpretations held by Whitehead authorities. The wide diversity among leading Whitehead scholars on the interpretation of the concept of creativity suggests that this is an area which is in need of attention. Since my own interpretation of Whitehead's concept of creativity is unsettled, I have decided to withhold a critical evaluation.

Organization and explanation of Whitehead's treatment of the cause of evil, the responsibility for its origination, and the means by which evil in the world is overcome have given ample scope for a dissertation without dealing with the problem of the ultimate triumph over evil. My omission of a thorough treatment of the ultimate evil of perishing and the means by which it is overcome in objective immortality in the consequent nature of God may be more excusable since a dissertation is being submitted at Claremont this year emphasizing these features of Whitehead's system.[40]

As time passes and distance brings a better perspective, I may be able to see that my eschatological predispositions or some other factors have unconsciously operated to put emphasis on morally responsible freedom and voluntary love. The expression "voluntary love" is taken from Hick.[41] I thought I was using a term from Hick for an idea that was really present in Whitehead's system. The response of my readers has raised questions in my mind, but I am as yet unable to determine precisely where my interpretation deviates from Whitehead's position. I eagerly await that illumination that may come from scholarly criticism and temporal perspective.

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[40] Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, "The Correlation Between God and Evil" (Ph. D. dissertation, Claremont, 1974).

[41] John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 113, 159, 309. Hereafter cited as EGL.

CHAPTER II

WHITEHEAD'S CRITICISM OF THOUGHT BEARING ON THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Whitehead nowhere gives a systematic treatment of the failure of past solutions to the problem of evil, but he mentions the problem in connection with other matters often enough to show that he was aware of the difficulties and was consciously trying to develop a solution. My analysis of such statements will first deal with issues that are more philosophical and then with those that are more theological.

Philosophical Criticisms

One of the major problems with which Whitehead deals in his philosophy is the relation between permanence and change. In his early years at Cambridge the static Newtonian world with its fixed particles of matter controlled by fixed laws seemed adequate to his teachers. By the time he was doing his philosophical writing the pressure was on to explain the dynamics of change as expressed in the emergence of new species and in relativity. The problem was not really new but it carried new urgency. Parmenides had said nothing changes. Heraclitus had said everything changes. Plato had tried to put the things that do not change together with the things that do change into a meaningful whole. Whitehead notes that some thinkers focusing on permanence develop a "metaphysics of 'substance.'" Others concentrating on change produce a "metaphysics of 'flux.'" He then approves of those who try to include both. He notes that "Plato found his permanences in a static, spiritual heaven, and his flux in the entanglement of his forms amid the fluent imperfections of the physical world."[1] The attempt to combine permanence and flux is commendable but the specific method of combination is unsatisfactory. The changing things are imperfect because of their change. Process by nature is evil and consists in a loss of reality.

Changing world as unreal

Whitehead protests the Platonic tendency to describe a static realm of eminent reality and a fluent world that is not really real. In the realm of permanence "there is no passage, no loss, no gain. It is complete in itself. It is self-sustaining. It is therefore the realm of the 'completely real'."[2] The realm of change "is degraded to a status of partial reality, issuing into the notion of mere appearance."[3] Absolute idealism has carried through this contrast and has "sidetracked science by proclaiming that science dealt with finite truths respecting a world of appearance; and that these appearances were not very real, and that these truths were not very true."[4]

The derogation of the world to inferior reality carries with it a loss of reality for individuality. "The multiplicity of finite enduring individuals were relegated to a world of appearances, and the ultimate reality was centered in an "Absolute."[5] Individuals become and what becomes is evil and defectively real.

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[1] Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1960), p. 318. Hereafter cited as PR.

[2] Alfred North Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 93. Hereafter cited as MT.

[3] MT, p. 109. [4] RM, p. 142.

A further defect of this concept of an eminently real, static absolute appears when there is an attempt to show how the self-existent reality is related to the dependent reality. If the individuals of the world really change, their change would require changing relations with that upon which they are dependent. Such change would seem to require a change in the ultimate reality. To insist that the ultimate reality does not change at all casts in doubt not only the reality of the dependent things but also the reality of their change. "The final outcome has been that philosophy and theology have been saddled with the problem of deriving the historic world of change from a changeless world of ultimate reality."[6] When "modern idealisms" refer to the world of change as "one of the inferior avocations of the Absolute,"[7] it is difficult to avoid the implication that something must be wrong with an absolute that would devote itself to inferior actions.

Whitehead condemns a "vicious separation" which places all the flux in the world and makes the realm of eminent reality static. "But if the opposites, static and fluent, have once been so explained as separately to characterize diverse actualities, the interplay between the thing which is static and the things which are fluent involves contradiction at every step in its explanation." Plato's final problem is this separation, the fact that the realm of change must be referred to as "illusion" and as "mere appearance."[8] The things of the world are thought of in terms of "dramatic imitation," as "second-rate substitutes" and never as "originals."[9] Bradley has the same problem when he finds the "objective world in which we live, and move, and have our being, 'inconsistent if taken as real.'"[10]

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[5] RM, p. 141. [6] MT, p. 112. [7] PR, p. 178; cf.; MT, p. 111.

It is clear that Whitehead finds fault with a view which makes individual existence unreal. The most important reason is that this violates our most basic intuitions of our own reality. There is a further difficulty in the relation between the loss of reality and evil. If with Augustine we say that a thing is good to the extent that it exists or is real,[11] we must conclude that a loss of reality is evil. If processive actualization consists in loss of some of the good of the eminently real, then process by its very nature becomes evil. Whitehead holds that processive individualization is good not evil. There is further the problem of explaining the relation between the static eminent reality and the fluent dependent things.

Monism cannot explain the rise of evil

A number of Whitehead's criticisms of the philosophical tradition come to focus in the failure of monistic philosophies to account for the origin and reality of evil. Whitehead holds that one of the purposes of philosophy is to attempt to show "the concordance of ideas conceived as illustrated in the concrete facts of the real world."[12]

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[8] PR, p. 526.

[9] Alfred North Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933), p. 215. Hereafter cited as AI.

[10] PR, p. 237. [11] See note 10, Chapter III.

[12] AI, p. 187; cf. AI, pp. 125 f.; MT, pp. 2, 16, 208; PR, p. 240.

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Philosophy starts with what is presented in experience and attempts to describe a consistent interrelation of things observed. There is wide consensus that the individualities in the world are characterized by an ideal partly realized and partly missed.[13] There is good in the world in that the ideal is partly realized. There is evil in that the ideal is partly missed. Monism can account for the good but neglects the evil.

It is evident that a philosophy which regards the things in the world as not quite real would have a tendency to neglect taking them into account in determining its basic positions. Whitehead finds that monistic philosophies tend to neglect the reality of evil in the world and fail to explain how it got there. He holds that they yield to the temptation to work out a system with a selection of the data and then attempt to treat evil as an afterthought. The attempt to account for evil in this fashion fails. Whitehead suggests that "this is the criticism to be made on the monistic idealisms of the nineteenth century, and even of the great Spinoza. It is quite incredible that the Absolute, as conceived in monistic philosophy, should evolve confusion about its own details."[14] He thinks that the tendency of orthodox philosophy to "dismiss turmoil" springs from "tired decadence."[15] Regardless of why such thinking developed it is clear that a static eminently real unified absolute cannot account for the emergence of evil in a changing unreal world.

It is not wise for philosophy to begin with a system and then attempt to account for the details of experience in the world. It must first attempt to bring together all of the data to be explained. "Its primary stage can be termed 'assemblage'."[16] This assemblage must include both good and evil. "There is no reason to hold that confusion is less fundamental than is order. Our task is to evolve a general concept which allows room for both; and which also suggests the path for the enlargement of our penetration."[17] An adequate philosophy will be able to explain the "frustration of order"[18] and the "mixtures of good and bad involved in the universe as it stands self-evident in our experience."[19] Philosophy which dismisses the element of turmoil and frustration "shirks its task."[20]

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[13] RM, pp. 60, 66; AI, p. 292. [14] MT, p. 70. [15] MT, pp. 109 f.

A philosophy which is able to explain the rise of order as well as the origin of evil will undoubtedly be complex. In the previous section we noticed that it is difficult to show the relation between an eminently real static absolute and dependent processive actualities in the world. In this section we notice that an eminently real static absolute is not able to account for the rise of good and evil. "We have to explain the aim at forms of order, and the aim at novelty of order, and the measure of success, and the measure of failure. Apart from some understanding, however dim, of these characteristics of the historic process, we enjoy no rationality of experience."[21] The factor in the universe which provides the forms of order and the thrust toward novelty must be more complex than that described in monistic philosophy and the factor in the universe in which evil emerges must be more real.

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[16] MT, p. 2. [17] MT, p. 70. [18] MT, p. 120.

[19] MT, p. 110. [20] MT, p. 71. [21] MT, p. 119.

This need for complexity in the nature of God which monistic thought is unable to provide is also noticed in those theologians who have a tendency to oversimplify doctrine. Such simplification avoids those complex systems of dogma whose vast interlocking structure promoted intolerance and restricted freedom of inquiry, but it is not able to explain the rise of evil. "All simplifications of religious dogma are shipwrecked upon the rock of the problem of evil."[22] Monistic thought like oversimplified theology is neither able to account for the rise of evil nor the rise of good.

A static monistic philosophy is not able to account for the emergence of evil. An unreal world certainly cannot frustrate an all powerful absolute. It is difficult to understand why a unified absolute would generate opposition to itself. Whitehead assigns himself a task when he says that we must explain both the rise of good and evil.

Materialism cannot explain the rise of good

Whitehead accepted organic evolution and relativity as among the given elements of experience that must be accounted for by philosophy. New species and the progress of human civilization are instances of the emergence of novel good. He held that materialism can not account for the rise of this good.

The question may arise about the relation of the rise of good to the problem of evil. Part of the problem of evil is determining what evil is. The theory of the nature of evil will be dependent on the theory of the nature of the good. Whitehead holds that novel good emerges. Materialism is not able to explain this emergence of good.

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[22] RM, p. 77.

Materialism is understood in this context as the belief that the "ultimate substance" is matter and that all observed phenomena may be explained by changes in the external relations of these bits of static matter. This means that "a thoroughgoing evolutionary philosophy is inconsistent with materialism. The aboriginal stuff, or material, is incapable of evolution."[23] There are at least two reasons why materialism cannot account for the emergence of good.

First, if there is merely a chance movement of static bits of matter, the question of the good cannot be asked because "one set of external relations is as good as any other set of external relations."[24] Matter is valueless.[25] Until there is a subject whose internal relations are affected positively or negatively by various states of this matter, there can be no question of good and therefore of the emergence of good.

Second, in the accidental changes of location of matter there can be no purposeful progress. Evolutionary development requires progress with retention of achievement and the building of new progress on past achievement. Whitehead finds such progress impossible without final causation. Materialism rejects final causation. Whitehead asks, "Why has the trend of evolution been upwards?"[26] It is not possible to explain the production of organic species from inorganic configurations of matter by showing that the organic species are superior to the less complex matter in their survival power. No organic species is able to survive as long as the matter which is part of its composition. We cannot say that the trend is upward because the more complex survives better than the less complex. Even the explanation that complex organisms persist because they are better adapted to their environment is not adequate to explain the activities of some surviving species. Many species change the environment rather than change themselves. Such purposeful change of the environment requires the use of final causation in explanation. "There is clear evidence that certain operations of certain animal bodies depend upon the foresight of an end and the purpose to attain it."[27] Materialism is not able to explain such emergence of good because it rejects final causation. In materialism "there can merely be change, purposeless and unprogressive."[28]

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[23] Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926), p. 157. Hereafter cited as SMW.

[24] SMW, p. 157. [25] SMW, pp. 25, 281; MT, pp. 183, 217.

[26] Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929), p. 4. Hereafter cited as FR.

At certain points in the development of evolutionary theory materialism with its claim that only efficient causation is legitimate in explanation has been prominent. Such a theory attempts to explain progress and the emergence of good without any reference to final causation. It is easy to see that such a position would be strongly resisted by religion. Whitehead suggests that "the whole fight over evolution was about this very latter point."[29]

Materialism is unable to account for the emergence of good because it is not able to differentiate good from evil and because it denies final causation. An adequate philosophy must be able to show how the factors in the composition of emergent actuality are related to good and evil. It should also be able to account for the evidence indicating the effectiveness of final causation.

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[27] FR, p. 12; cf. pp. 20 f. [28] SMW, p. 157. [29] FR, p. 11.

Idealist philosophy tends toward renunciation

Whitehead criticizes some kinds of idealist philosophy because they tend to encourage men to despair of overcoming evil and to renounce active modification of the environment. There is an inclination to adopt a passive attitude toward the temporal world. This criticism is closely related to his condemnation of the relegation of the temporal world to unreality. It is obvious that belief that the things of the environment were unreal would stifle action designed to improve them.

Whitehead calls attention to the tendency among the Greek thinkers to neglect action in the temporal world. Plato's putting eminent reality in a static spiritual heaven and imperfect, reflected reality in the fluent world has already been noted. "The notion of a purely abstract self-enjoyment of values apart from any reference to effectiveness in action was the fundamental error prevalent in Greek philosophy, an error which was inherited by the hermits of the first Christian centuries, and which is not unknown in the modern world of learning."[30]

Christianity has not been consistent in renunciation. It has wavered between "renunciation, and its impracticable ideals culminating in a crude Millennium within the temporal flux."[31] During the Middle Ages and in the period following, the tendency to "abandon the immediate experience of this world as a lost cause"[32] was prominent. Mystical religion counsels passive surrender in the face of evil. "The shadows pass--says mystical Religion. But they also recur, and recur--whispers the Experience of Mankind. Be tranquil, they will end--enjoins Religion."[33] During this period philosophy and theology directed their attention toward passive participation in the static realm of the eminently real. "The final wisdom has been pictured as the changeless contemplation of changeless reality. Knowledge in abstraction from action has been exalted. Action is thereby conceived as being concerned with a world of shadows."[34]

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[30] Alfred North Whitehead, "Immortality," in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), p. 686. Hereafter cited as Imm.

[31] AI, p. 41.

Whitehead holds that "absolute idealism" is "undoubtedly a reaction" towards the metaphysics of renunciation in which the "multiplicity of finite enduring individuals were relegated to a world of appearances, and the ultimate reality was centered in an Absolute."[35] What is wrong with this position is that it "discourages the sense of active personality."[36]

Another way of describing the philosophy of renunciation is to point out its turning away from the finite toward the infinite. "The mystic, ineffective slumber expresses the vacuity of the merely infinite. Those theologians do religion a bad service, who emphasize infinitude at the expense of the finite transitions within history."[37]

Whitehead finds fault with the stress on the infinite in Buddhism which he says, "emphasizes the sheer infinity of the divine principle, and thereby its practical influence has been robbed of energetic activity."[38] Buddhism goes beyond the mystical side of Christianity in turning away from active involvement in the world. "In it despair of this world is conjoined with a program for the world's abolition by a mystic tranquility."[39] For such religion the best that we can say of the evil in the world is, "For so he giveth his beloved--sleep."[40] Lucien Price has Whitehead calling Buddhism "a religion of escapism" because in it "there is no determined resistance to evil."[41] He further reports that it leads "to an unfruitful passive meditation" which in turn leads to "social stagnation."[42] Whitehead finds that Christianity differs from Buddhism in that Christianity has a strong current of emphasis on the goodness of individual personality.[43] Buddhism on the other hand "finds evil essential in the very nature of the world of physical and emotional experience." It therefore preaches a gospel designed to encourage people "so to conduct life as to gain a release from the individual personality which is the vehicle for such experience."[44]

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[32] AI, pp. 40 f. [33] AI, p. 41. [34] MT, p. 112.

[35] RM, p. 141. [36] RM, p. 140. [37] MT, p. 108.

Whitehead does not seem to have had an extensive knowledge of Buddhism. His comments are of value with regard to the problem of evil even if they do not in every respect accurately describe the central tendency of Buddhism. In this discussion he clarifies the relation between good and evil in their relation to individual

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[38] Alfred North Whitehead, "Mathematics and the Good," in The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), p. 675. Hereafter cited as MG.

[39] AI, p. 41. [40] PR, p. 519.

[41] Lucien Price, Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1954), p. 189. Hereafter cited as D.

[42] D, p. 301. [43] RM, p. 140. [44] RM, p. 49.

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personality and the fluent world.

Those elements of Christianity are right which hold that "evil is not the necessary outcome of the very fact of individual personality." A sound philosophical position will show how the ideal is "conceivable in terms of what is actual." Actualization is not by its very nature falling. Becoming actual is good. Such a position forms a better base for dealing with evil. "It overcomes evil with good."[45] Whitehead predicts that the religion will triumph which "can render clear to popular understanding some eternal greatness incarnate in the passage of temporal fact."[46]

Philosophical positions and related religious teachings which tend toward renunciation of action in the world are to be condemned. They cut the nerve of action designed to overcome evil with good. Actual individuality is good not inherently evil. The process of becoming is good and a sound philosophy should contribute to the thrust toward the new good which can overcome evil.

Viewed from one angle Whitehead's criticism of certain philosophical positions related to the problem of evil center around the issue whether process and becoming should be an integral part of philosophy. He launches an attack on those lines of thinking which degrade the becoming, changing world to inferior status in reality. He shows that static monist philosophies have neglected to take the reality of evil into account and fail to show how this evil can happen. He shows that reductionist materialism is at fault because it cannot account for the process of the becoming of the good. He attacks those philosophic tendencies which discourage committed involvement in the becoming world because they discourage the responsibility to overcome evil with good.

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[45] RM, pp. 51 f. [46] AI, p. 41.

Each of these criticisms is an invitation to analyze the philosophy of Whitehead to see how he has been able to furnish a better basis for an understanding of the nature of evil, how it happens, and how it is overcome. Whitehead does describe a cosmology in which becoming a finite individual is good not evil. He shows that evil is real and goes into great detail about how it arises. His system explains how novel good emerges in such a way as to salvage as much of the past as possible. Knowing how the good emerges is a major step toward motivating men to plunge into the cosmic struggle with evil in committed action that overcomes evil.

Theological Criticisms

Whitehead holds that theology should develop an interpretation of the universe which can explain the rise and preservation of the good as well as the rise and the reality of evil. So far the theologians have not been very successful. He reports, "I am not disguising my belief that in this task, theology has largely failed. The notion of the absolute despot has stood in the way."[47] The absolute despot refers to the concept of God which has prevailed at various times in the development of theology.

God the despot

Whitehead levels a major attack on the concept of God which pictures him with the characteristics of a despotic ruler of a political kingdom. This concept, he says, has its origin in the historical circumstances of the rise of Old Testament religion. The concept of God held by many men of Old Testament times was "a sublimation from its barbaric origin. He stood in the same relation to the whole World as early Egyptian or Mesopotamian kings stood to their subject populations."[48] When they tried to express "the ultimate unity of direction in the Universe, upon which all order depends, . . . they could find no way better to express themselves than by borrowing the characteristics of the touchy, vain, imperious tyrants who ruled the empires of the World."[49] Consistent with this description but a little more graphic is Price's memory of Whitehead's account when he said, "But the Jews, looking around them, saw always an Oriental despot, and so, looking over the world at large, thought there must be a despot over all, and the consequence was they conceived one of the most immoral Gods ever imagined."[50]

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[47] AI, p. 218.

Whitehead suggests that the reason why Christian religious thinkers did not purify the despotic concept of God derived from Western Asia through the Old Testament rests in their making him an exception to their metaphysical principles. "The nature of God was exempted from all the metaphysical categories which applied to the individual things in this temporal world."[51] For this also there was historical precedent in the Oriental despots. They were not themselves bound by their laws. There was no enduring character of definiteness which was the basis of the ruler's action the principles of which could be learned and remembered by his subjects. Arbitrary actions were to be expected which had no rational connection with past actions. Such a view issued in a "Divine Despot and a slavish Universe, each with the morals of its kind."[52] There is a significant difference between the rational God reflected in medieval Christianity which is derived from Greek conceptions and this Asian concept of God who was "either too arbitrary or too impersonal" to warrant any attempt at formulating patterns of expectation. "Any definite occurrence might be due to the fiat of an irrational despot, or might issue from some impersonal, inscrutable origin of things."[53] One of the outstanding features which made the concept of God despotic was irrational arbitrariness. Whitehead describes a God who is not irrationally arbitrary. His actions in which he introduces "persuasive elements" into the world are not "accidents of will"[54] but are guided by his primordial nature which is the "ground of rationality."[55]

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[48] AI, pp. 216 f. [49] MT, p. 68. [50] D, p. 198. [51] AI, p. 216.

Whitehead regards Jesus as a living protest against the despotic concept of God,[56] but he thinks that New Testament Christianity did not completely rid itself of objectionable features. "The last book in the Bible illustrates the barbaric elements which have been retained to the undoing of Christian intuition." He finds it "shocking" that this book has been preserved for the "formation of religious sentiment."[57] He has some reservations about Paul,[58] but reports that the gospels contain "most emphatic repudiations" of the idea that "Gods are not like Dictators."[59]

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[52] AI, p. 32. [53] SMW, p. 19. [54] AI, p. 215.

[55] SMW, p. 257, cf. PR pp. 164, 529.

[56] AI, p. 214. [57] AI, pp. 218 f. [58] D, p. 307.

The Christianization of the Western world was an event which had a powerful influence on the prolongation of the despotic concept of God. In the adoption of Christianity as a state religion "Caesar conquered" and God was theologically described by the lawyers of Justinian's court in a way that would assure the conquest.[60] The hesitant Galilean vision of humility struggled against the idolatry of "the fashioning of God in the image of the Egyptian, Persian, and Roman imperial rulers." In the long run "The Church gave unto God the attributes which belonged exclusively to Caesar."[61] These included the characteristics of a "ferocious God" who would enforce obedience with such things as "infant damnation" and "eternal punishment."[62] The idea of God portrayed by the followers of Paul, he says, is "the idea of the devil."[63]

Whitehead shows sympathetic understanding for those who were active in developing the theology of the despotic God, but he is emphatic in indicating that it is time for reformation. The New Testament clearly portrays Jesus as a "revelation in act" of the Platonic conception of a God who is not a tyrant exerting "coercive agency" but is a God of love who is a "persuasive agency" in the world.[64] Philosophy and theology should develop this conception of God and eliminate the remaining despotic elements.

God responsible for all evil

Closely associated with the concept of a despotic God is the criticism that much theology makes God responsible for all evil. Only a despot could cause a man to be evil and then punish him for it.

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[59] MT, p. 68. [60] PR, p. 519. [61] PR, p. 520. [62] D, p. 176.
[63] D, p. 189. [64] AI, pp. 213 f.

Whitehead finds that the conclusion that God is responsible for all evil is derived from the philosophical tradition of an eminently real static absolute in combination with an omnipotent despot who creates everything that is and determines each in every particular. He explains that the "worst of unqualified omnipotence is that it is accompanied by responsibility for every detail of every happening."[65] It is the active creator who is responsible not what is created. "The potter, and not the pot, is responsible for the shape of the pot."[66] Lucien Price puts the following words into the mouth of Whitehead, "The conception is as of God, an omniscient, all-wise, all-powerful Being who has created this world exactly as he wanted it, with even the evil preordained, and although they throw in a few sentences to mitigate its severity, it does not really get them out of the rigid situation they have let themselves in for."[67]

Whitehead finds that the conception of the closed mechanistic system of God determinism is similar to the conception of nature as a machine. Man is as helpless before "Irresistible Grace" as he is before the "irresistible mechanism of nature." How could such conclusions develop? "The mechanism of God and the mechanism of matter were the monstrous issues of limited metaphysics and clear logical intellect."[68] The limited metaphysics no doubt included the belief in an eminently real, static absolute.

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[65] AI, p. 217.

[66] Alfred North Whitehead, Symbolism, Its Meaning and Effect (New York: Capricorn Books, 1959), pp. 8 f. Hereafter cited as S.

[67] D, p. 61. [68] SMW, p. 109.

As long as there is retention of this metaphysical view there can be no solution to the problem of evil. At least, there is no solution which shows God to be good and explains his relation to the fluent world in a way that gives efficiency to efforts to overcome evil. "So long as the temporal world is conceived as a self-sufficient completion of the creative act, explicable by its derivation from an ultimate principle which is at once eminently real and the unmoved mover, from this conclusion there is no escape: the best that we can say of the turmoil is 'For so he giveth his beloved--sleep.'"[69] The only possible response to this kind of evil is the renunciation and refusal of committed action in the world which has already been criticized.

Whitehead's criticism of conclusions which make God responsible for all evil includes a criticism of the idea that this evil is not really evil because the world is the best world that is possible. "The Leibnizian theory of the 'best of possible worlds' is an audacious fudge produced in order to save the face of a Creator constructed by contemporary, and antecedent, theologians."[70] Job is described as "tearing to pieces the sophism that all is for the best in the best of possible worlds, and that the justice of God is beautifully evident in everything that happens."[71] Making God responsible for all evil is not satisfactory because the world is not the best possible world.

There seems to be no escape from the conclusion that if God is responsible for all the evil in the world, he is an evil God. "If the theory of complete determinism, by reason of the necessity of conformation with the nature of God, holds true, then the evil in the world is in conformity with the nature of God."[72] If the world is evil in any way, that evil must then be there because of the character of the nature of God. An evil quality in the world would then have to be produced by an evil quality in the nature of God. Whitehead finds Hume's criticism unanswerable that "the God whom you will find will be the sort of God who makes that mechanism."[73]

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[69] PR, p. 519. [70] PR, p. 74. [71] RM, p. 48.

Whitehead is not able to accept an evil God. As long as metaphysics portrays an eminently real absolute which is determinative of all that is, the alternatives are either to affirm that everything apparently evil is really instrumentally good or to accept the conclusion that God is in some sense evil. Since neither of these alternatives is acceptable, there must be something wrong with the metaphysical position. One part of the solution is to deny total determination by the absolute. "The only way of mitigating mechanism is by the discovery that it is not mechanism."[74] Rejecting divine mechanism permits the denial that God is responsible for all evil and makes a solution to the problem possible.

Neither the Calvinists nor the Jansenists who affirmed irresistible grace would admit that God is evil. They would be likely to hide from this conclusion by affirming the concept of a God who is not subject to the kind of morality he imposes on his creatures. Such a concept of God has been criticized as despotic in the previous section. One of the purposes of Whitehead's criticism of views which make God responsible for all evil is to call attention to the fact that such a God is an evil God.

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[72] RM, p. 95; cf. p. 99. [73] SMW, p. 111. [74] SMW, p. 111.

Concept of a despotic God produces despotic people

Whitehead criticizes much of theology because it tends to produce despotic people. Certain theological ideas have created ruthless humans who destroy good with holy zeal. These theological ideas are the ones we have been criticizing so far in this discussion. When an Aristotelian unmoved mover and a Platonic-Christian eminently real absolute are combined the results are devastating. "The combination of the two into the doctrine of an aboriginal, eminently real, transcendent creator, at whose fiat the world came into being, and whose imposed will it obeys, is the fallacy which has infused tragedy into the histories of Christianity and of Mahometanism."[75]

Part of the tragedy issues from the destruction of life and civilization which has resulted from their conception of a despotic God. "Millions of men have marched to battle fiercely nerved by intense faith in Law imposed by the will of inflexible Allah, Law sharing out to each human his inevitable fate, Law sharing out to each faithful Mahametan either victory, or death and Paradise."[76] Whitehead contrasts the intrinsic evil of the carnage produced by Mohammedan theology with the evil avoided by the Buddhist doctrines of immanent law. It is of interest that Buddhist doctrines were held responsible for evil-producing renunciation in an earlier section. The question is whether it is possible to combine the Buddhist elements which here avoid evil with

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[75] PR, p. 519. [76] AI, p. 173.

Christian elements which empower an active thrust to overcome evil. At this point it is clear that the theology of a despotic God has produced horrendous destruction.

Christianity has not escaped from the destructive effects of a theology portraying a despotic God. Whitehead calls attention to the joy of reveling in the power of a tribal champion as expressed in Psalm 24. The King of glory is the one who is "mighty in battle." "This worship of glory arising from power is not only dangerous: it arises from a barbaric conception of God. I suppose that even the world itself could not contain the bones of those slaughtered because of men intoxicated by its attraction." He admits that this Psalm expresses "religious ascent," but he is concerned with the use to which it has been put in the glorification of conquest by force of physical power rather than by persuasion. "The glorification of power has broken more hearts than it has healed."[77]

Whitehead has leveled a persuasive attack on the evil produced by a theology which portrays a despotic God. The consequences in experienced evil has touched all our lives. As we look at our Christian past we can only look to the future and sigh in hope that a theology will be produced that will tend to produce different consequences.

Whitehead's criticisms of philosophical and theological ideas bearing on the problem of evil may be summarized as follows. The basic difficulty is the failure to give adequate expression to process and becoming. Plato's static, eminently real realm of ideas has been more influential than his suggestions of life and motion. When a fixed realm of forms is regarded as eminently real, the realm of process and becoming is degraded to mere appearance which is not quite real. This degradation of the fluent world to inferior reality carries with it the implication that the good resides in the static realm of the eminently real. Since any change would depart from this good reality, process and change are inherently evil. Whitehead then calls attention to the problem of explaining change and evil if the realm of eminent reality is static. A static, eminently real monism is not able to explain how evil can happen. Materialism, on the other hand, is not able to explain the emergence of novel good. Whenever there is an aura of goodness attached to a static eminently real realm, there are problems in finding a role for temporal human action. There is a tendency to renounce committed action in the changing world of poverty, bombs and smog.

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[77] RM, p. 55.

Classical theology has not been able to show the relation between the changing and the changeless any better than philosophy. When God is made eminently real and the unmoved mover, the consequences for theology are tragic. God takes on the ruthless irresponsible characteristics of an oriental despot. Having created the world as a divinely determined mechanism he is responsible for the origin of all evil. Too often those who worship such a God take on his ruthless, despotic characteristics.

From these criticisms we should be able to sketch some characteristics of a cosmology that would be judged satisfactory from this standpoint. Such a cosmology would provide for the full reality of the changing world. The good would be defined so as to include becoming. Process, becoming and individuality are not in themselves evil. The enduring source of order in the universe would be sufficiently complex to account for the becoming of the good, the rise of evil, and the reality of evil. God would not be responsible for all of evil and the possibility for evil for which he is responsible could be justified. There would be a prominent place for committed human involvement in the world in the production of the good. God would be an example of tender persuasiveness rather than ruthless force. He would furnish an example and a theoretical base for the most efficient overcoming of evil in the world.

CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF GOOD AND EVIL

A dissertation on evil should clearly portray the nature of evil as soon as possible. This is a notion of such high generality that its understanding is dependent on many other features of the cosmological scheme. In one sense the full meaning of the concept of evil can be achieved in a study of this kind only at the end. Even though the same words are used in the summary statement as in the introductory statement, it is possible at the conclusion to bring much more meaning to them. We begin with a discussion of the nature of evil that points to the conclusion where a more comprehensive meaning is possible.

There are some similarities between the theory of good and evil in Augustine and Whitehead. Perhaps a brief reference to Augustine would furnish a common basis for discussing likenesses and differences. For Augustine evil is a privation of the good and a discussion of the nature of evil would begin with a description of the good. The good is a composite of measure, form, and order[1] or of quantity of quality, form of definiteness or quality, and harmonious arrangement of these qualities. There is a scale of natures or substances[2] which range from the highest good or those with the highest degree of measure, form, and order to the lowest good or those with the lowest degree of measure, form, and order.[3] All natures are good even though one may have less good than another.[4] The completion of the universe requires both great and small goods.[5] The good is static realization of nature. Wherever there is change there is evil. Even a desire for suicide is an expression of a desire to be at rest. Existence that is good without evil is at rest.[6]

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[1] Augustine Nature of the Good 3. John H. S. Burleigh, ed., Augustine: Earlier Writings, Library of Christian Classics, vol. 6 (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), p. 327. Hereafter citations will be given as NG 3 (327).

Evil is the loss of some of the measure, form, and order appropriate to a nature.[7] This means that a thing that is low on the scale of natures could realize all of its measure, form, and order and still have less good than a thing high on the scale of natures which did not realize all its measure, form, and order. A corrupt soul is always better than any body.[8] If a thing loses all its measure, form, and order it does not exist at all and there is no good and therefore no evil since the evil is dependent on the good from which it is a deprivation.[9] To the degree that a thing exists it is good.[10]

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[2] Augustine On Free Will 3.13.36 (LCC 193). Hereafter cited as FW.

[3] NG 3 (LCC 327); FW 2.18.48 (165), 3.9.24 (185).

[4] NG 1 (326), 17 (330); FW 3.13.36 (193).

[5] FW 3.5.16 (180), 3.9.25 (186).

[6] FW 3.8.23 (185), 3.22.64 (209), 3.22.65 (210); Conf. 1.1.1 (43).

[7] NG 4 (327); 17 (330); Morals of the Manichaes 2.2 (NPNF IV, 70); City of God 11.22 (334). Hereafter City of God is cited as CG.

[8] FW 3.5.12 (177), 3.5.15 (179 f.), 3.5.16 (180), 3.9.27 (187).

Augustine finds it very difficult to explain how a good thing becomes evil. The problems that Whitehead mentions in pointing out that monistic idealism cannot account for the rise of evil are also involved here. Augustine wants to show that God is not the cause of the rise of evil.[11] He explains that there is no efficient cause but only a deficient cause.[12] When we try to imagine how this is an explanation we might picture a universe created perfect with each grade in its harmonious place and no defects. Then in the ongoing process a combination of factors came about in which something was missing that was needed in order to make a harmonious whole. All of the positive features were in their original created combination good, but in their new combination there was a missing feature which meant that there was deprivation and evil. The cause for the deprivation was defective, the absence of the needed factor. Even if this were a satisfying explanation it would be difficult to explain how there was process of combination of factors before there was any evil. The good was described as a static realization of the good so that the good is at rest. Restless movement indicates the presence of evil.

With the great emphasis on the good as rest, it is striking that Augustine has so many features in his theory of the good which make change possible. The composite nature of the good with the suggestion that elements of the composition may be gained and lost makes provision for change. The grades of units of good from simple to complex also make provision for a complex changing universe. Then he prevents himself from using these features with an immutable God and good that is at rest.

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[9] NG 3 (327), 6 (328), 17 (330 f.); CG 12.6 (345), 14.11 (386); Enchiridion 4.12.

[10] FW 3.7.21 (183); NG 15 (330); Conf. 7.12.18 (172).

[11] FW 1.1.1 (113).

[12] CG 12.7 (346); FW 2.20.54 (169).

It is at the point of explaining the process of change that Whitehead makes his most significant contribution. At many other points there is great similarity between Whitehead and Augustine as will become evident as the exposition proceeds.

The Good

For Whitehead the good consists in becoming. The good is process. With this concept Whitehead makes a great deal of progress in solving the problems brought up in the criticisms listed in the previous chapter. That becoming is good and real overcomes the difficulty of placing the reality of the fluent world in doubt. The explanation of how a unit of process becomes will begin the answer to the question how the good emerges. The explanation of how the good emerges becomes the basis for a discussion of how evil arises.

The good as process

There is no fundamental question about the experience of change. Almost all thinkers who have talked and written about their experience talk about change. The point which is at issue here is the status of this change. Is process real or is it mere appearance, delusion or dramatic imitation?

Whitehead holds that there is no way to avoid coming to terms with change. Process is "a fundamental fact in our experience. We are in the present; the present is always shifting; it is derived from the past; it is shaping the future; it is passing into the future." This process is an "inexorable fact"[13] which cannot be ignored. The flux of things appears in the best Hebrew poetry. Heraclitus called attention to the fact that all things flow. The story of the sparrow flying through a Northumbrian banquet hall speaks to the condition of human experience. That all things are in flux "is one ultimate generalization around which we must weave our philosophical system."[14]

Instead of relegating process to an afterthought Whitehead makes it central. Rather than making the static things real and the changing things departures from reality, he says that the "reality is the process."[15] This shift requires some adjustment in the conception of the nature of the subject of process. Earlier thought pictured a subject that existed as real and self-identical through time which then enjoyed experiences in time. It is very difficult to conceive of an experience as real if the subject of that experience remains identical, does not change, throughout the experience. Whitehead makes the subject processive. "The process is itself the actuality, and requires no antecedent static cabinet."[16] "The philosophies of substance presuppose a subject which then encounters a datum, and then reacts to the datum. The philosophy of organism presupposes a datum which is met with feelings, and progressively attains the unity of a subject."[17]

Earlier attempts to account for change had made the subjects or substances static and made the change consist in modification of external relations of these substances. Changes in external relations of a substance which does not itself change make it very difficult to account for the experience of change. How does a self-identical subject have an experience unless it itself changes? In order to account for the experience of change Whitehead describes internal relations in a subject.

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[13] MT, p. 73. [14] PR, p. 317. [15] SMW, p. 106.

[16] AI, p. 356. [17] PR, p. 234.

Three concepts have been mentioned leading toward Whitehead's concept of actuality. First, actuality is process. Second, a subject or substance is process. Third, the process in a subject consists in the becoming of internal relations. We are not able to speak meaningfully of the internal unless there is a boundary between the internal and the external. If there were no such boundaries separating what is fixed and an object from what is becoming and a subject, it would not be possible to have anything real to relate in internal relations. Whitehead therefore divides the process of the world into units. Processive reality is composed of units of becoming. "'Actual entities' --also termed 'actual occasions'--are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real."[18]

Whitehead repudiates the doctrine of "vacuous actuality."[19] By this rejection he means that there is no actuality which is "devoid of subjective immediacy."[20] The things that are related in a unit of becoming internal relations all refer to some becoming actual entity.

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[18] PR, pp. 27 f., cf. p. 33. [19] PR, pp. viii, 253, 471.

[20] PR, p. 43.

One expression of the "ontological principle" is that "every condition to which the process of becoming conforms in any particular instance, has its reason either in the character of some actual entity in the actual world of that concrescence, or in the character of the subject which is in process of concrescence."[21] Everything that is internally related in a unit of becoming reality comes from God, a unit of becoming in the past, or from its own becoming. There are no units of becoming which are not subjects.

While discussing Augustine I noted that he provided for the composite nature of the good but did not make explicit how this composition made it possible to account for process, for the rise of the good and the evil. Calling attention to the fact that every unit of becoming is a subject of experience emphasizes the feature of Whitehead's thought which makes it possible to use the composite nature of the good to account for the emergence of good and evil. More attention will be given in the next section to the elements in the composition and their relations.

The relation between process and reality is a major factor in the present discussion. The conclusion is that process is real and that units of process are subjects of experience. This means that the "very essence of real actuality--that is, of the completely real--is process."[22] Having established this position we turn to the relation between reality and the good.

Value is not a substance that can be added or taken away from a unit of experience with everything else remaining the same. "There is no such thing as bare value. There is always a specific value, which is the created unit of feeling arising out of the specific mode of concretion of the diverse elements."[23] Value emerges as a unit of reality becomes. I am using the words value and good as synonyms.

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[21] PR, p. 36. [22] AI, p. 354.

The good is not an object, because objects have value only in relation to subjects. Objective analysis of "the mere material world suggests to us no concepts of good or evil, because we can discern in it no system of grades of value."[24] Forms of definiteness may not be separated into those that are good and those that are evil. "In itself a pattern is neither good nor bad."[25] Neither actual occasions as past objects, nor eternal objects are good or evil in themselves.

The locus of the good is a unit of becoming, an actual entity. The becoming of an actual occasion is good because of the reality of its actuality. Whitehead says, "'Value' is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event." It is the "realisation" which is "in itself the attainment of value."[26] This realisation of value is the bringing together in the unity of feeling the factors of experience. A becoming occasion experiences past occasions by "prehending" them. The experiencing of actual entities is called "physical prehension" and the experiencing of eternal objects or forms of definiteness is called "conceptual prehension."[27] When the experienced physical prehensions or feelings and the conceptual feelings are integrated into a unity of experience there is the experience of value.

Every unit of actual process is a unit of good. Every actual occasion is a "grasping of diverse entities into a value by reason of their real togetherness in that pattern, to the exclusion of other entities."[28] Such good is "emergent value."[29] In a subsequent section there will be a discussion of grades of value, but at this point there is emphasis on the intrinsic value of actuality. "Value is inherent in actuality itself." This actuality consists in the self-creative experiencing of the diverse data of the past in a unity of becoming. "But the actuality is the enjoyment, and this enjoyment is the experiencing of value."[30] Augustine had said that a thing is good in that it exists and Whitehead's position on this point is quite similar. "Existence, in its own nature, is the upholding of value-intensity." He says that democracy is based on "the common fact of value-experience, as constituting the essential nature of each pulsation of actuality."[31]

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[23] RM, p. 103. [24] Imm., p. 692. [25] MG, p. 679.

[26] SMW, p. 136. [27] PR, p. 35.

We may summarize this section by calling attention to the conclusion of the first part that an actual entity as a unit of process is real. Process is real. The conclusion of the last part is that the process which is real is also good. Whatever is an actual process of becoming is good by the fact of its actuality.

The good as composite

It was not possible to discuss the processive character of the good in the previous section without beginning the discussion of the composite nature of the good. The good is an occasion of experience. The occasion is constituted by its experience of actual entities of the past and of eternal objects. The eternal objects are derived from the experience of some actual entity and therefore all the factors internally related in an occasion directly or indirectly are experiences of actual entities.

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[28] SMW, p. 152. [29] SMW, p. 238; cf. p. 287.

[30] RM, p. 100. [31] MT, p. 151.

Augustine had described a composite good including measure, form, and order, but he did not work out the details of the dynamics of variation in this composition in the emergence of the good or of the evil. His position described the good as static rest in the fixed nature of each kind of thing. He referred to the lack of some of the factors of the good which resulted in evil. He also talked about grace and gaining or regaining these factors. If he were asked how they were lost, he would no doubt have said that sin causes the loss. One of his later descriptions of the origin of sin seems to require some type of experience of past occasions in order to make sense. He differentiates between the angels who fell and those who did not by saying that they "either received less of the grace of the divine love than those who persevered; or if both were created equally good, then, while the one fell by their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted."[32] He holds that God created all of them perfect and good. There must have been some ongoing process after this perfect creation and before sin because as things changed new demands were made which revealed that a factor now needed was missing. Parenthetically we should note that process before sin is in tension with the conviction that the good is at rest and that process indicates the presence of evil. The bringing together of the past into a situation in which the unity of an organism is defective because of the absence of a factor requires experience of past actuality. Whitehead makes explicit the experience of past actualities in the ongoing process.

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[32] CG 12.9 (348).

A number of cosmological requirements seem to have been influencing the development of Whitehead's concept of the good as an experience of component factors. The doctrine that experience is composed of units is related to his awareness of the requirements imposed by the findings of quantum mechanics. That matter can come into being and be transmuted from one kind of matter into another is related to his thinking on relativity. The need to account for the rise of good and evil was mentioned in the previous chapter.

Whitehead regards it as the role of speculation to attempt to develop theories of explanation which can account for every aspect of our experience.[33] His cosmology is consciously designed to take into account all these findings of the physical sciences as well as the requirements of philosophy and religion. This speculation "obtains its urge from a deep ultimate faith, that through and through the nature of things is penetrable by reason."[34] In this section we are emphasizing his attempt rationally to explain the rise of the good. We have referred to Augustine who provided for a composite good but did not explain the dynamics of the composition. Whitehead notes that Bergson called attention to the emergence of actuality and its slow dissolution in the "doctrine of the _élan vital_ and its relapse into matter. The double tendency of advance and relapse is here plainly stated. But we are not given any explanatory insight. The older doctrine of individual substances with their inherent qualities does not give the slightest reason for the double aspect."[35] To call attention to the emergence of the good and its gradual dissolution while ignoring or precluding the possibility of explanation is to be subject to the charge of irrationalism. One of Whitehead's announced purposes was to "rescue" the type of thought represented by Bergson as well as William James and John Dewey from "the charge of anti-intellectualism."[36] The task of philosophy is not completed when there is mystical insight into unspoken depths. It is the purpose of philosophy "to rationalize mysticism: not by explaining it away, but by the introduction of novel verbal characterizations, rationally coordinated."[37]

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[33] PR, p. 4. [34] AI, p. 137.

It seems clear then that one of Whitehead's major purposes in his cosmological speculations was to rationalize the dynamics of the rise of good. "In the philosophy of organism it is assumed that an actual entity is composite."[38] Making each actual entity as a unit of good composite is a major step in rationalizing the process of the emergence of the good.

Analysis of any occasion of experience will show that the basic entities forming the complex of experience are actual entities and eternal objects. All other entities are combinations of these basic factors.[39] Since the effectiveness of an eternal object in experience is always dependent on experiencing an actual entity entertaining that eternal object,[40] it may be said that the experience of actual entities furnishes all of the components in a complex unit of experience. What is experienced is the totality of actual entities in the causal past and the experience is a complex novel combination of actual entities and eternal objects. It would seem that if every becoming occasion experienced every occasion in its causal past with equal weight all occasions would soon be just like each other. A number of principles regulating the emergence of the good prevent such an outcome.

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[35] FR, pp. 23 f. [36] PR, p. vii. [37] MT, p. 237.

[38] PR, p. 223. [39] PR, pp. 33, 37. [40] PR, pp. 36 f.

One of these is the "principle of intensive relevance" which provides that in a unit of experience an object experienced may have a large or a small influence ranging from the zero of negative prehension to high intensity.[41] A factor of the past may have almost no relevance with very low intensity or it may be very relevant with high intensity. All actual entities in the causal past are prehended. The majority of feelings from actual entities are felt only vaguely and a few are prehended with positive dominance. It is only by limitation to a select few that a unit of experience becomes something definite. "The mere fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity of indefiniteness."[42] To be a unit of good requires limitation[43] and exclusion of those factors which if included would be "neutralising cross-lights."[44] The becoming occasion is able to modify within certain limits the intensity of the determination exerted by a given factor.

A second principle is called the "principle of compatibility and contrariety." Certain combinations are compatible contrasts and can be experienced together.[45] Those factors that are not compatible are eliminated. This means that a method of selecting a factor for dominance in the initial phase of experience would also be a method of determining which factors are in turn eliminated. Some factors which are not directly compatible with each other may be combined in a contrast of contrasts. This means that a unit of experience must be very complex in order to hold a wide variety of factors in compatible contrast.[46] Where there are many factors combined in contrasts of contrasts there is "width."[47] A given factor can be more intense in a complex combination exhibiting width than it can as a sensum which has zero width.

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[41] PR, pp. 224, 315. [42] SMW, p. 137.

[43] RM, p. 150; SMW, pp. 137, 256. [44] SMW, p. 278.

[45] PR, pp. 224 f., cf. pp. 71, 128, 381.

A third principle is that where there is a society of actual occasions all containing a common element it is possible to reproduce that element with greater completeness in the future. Social order is present where there is a common element of form in each member of a group of occasions which is derived from positive prehensions of other members of the group in the causal past. The common element of form is called the "defining characteristic" of the society.[48] A society is self-sustaining in that the defining characteristic is maintained through the reinforcement provided by its experience from many actual occasions in the causal past.[49] When there is extensive reinforcement there is "narrowness."[50] In order for the defining characteristic to stand out the individual factors differentiating each occasion from the others in the society must be so various that they cancel each other out. This is referred to as "vagueness."[51]

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[46] PR, p. 390. [47] PR, pp. 170, 174, 252, 426.

[48] PR, pp. 50 f.; AI, p. 261. [49] PR, p. 137; AI, p. 261.

[50] PR, p. 171. [51] PR, p. 170.

The actual occasions in the proximate environment which do not belong to the society must be so various that no competing defining characteristic receives reinforcement. Such a diverse environment is referred to as "chaos." Where there is a background characterized by chaos and vagueness together with the extensive reinforcement of "narrowness" that defining characteristic achieves a high degree of intensity.[52] If the defining characteristic not only has narrowness but also width there is a greater possibility of intensity.[53] Here a reduction of width is not an increase in narrowness. These two terms do not refer to opposite ends of a continuum. There is an increase of narrowness when there is an increase in the number of actual occasions reinforcing the defining characteristic. There is an increase of width when there is an increase in complexity of the defining characteristic.

A fourth principle is that the "position" of an experienced actual entity makes a difference in its intensive relevance so that proximate actualities have more prominence in experience than remote actual entities.[54] This feature makes it possible for a contiguous occasion to be dominant in a successor and gives rise to a series of temporally contiguous occasions all containing a common element successively prehended from the antecedent occasion. The common element is called the defining characteristic. The route of occasions is called an enduring object.[55] By combining the first and second principles with this one it may be seen how parallel routes could maintain themselves with divergent dominant characteristics. The factor in the contiguous occasion is dominant and not exclusive. Each successive occasion in the route has the defining characteristic slightly attenuated by the experience of more remote factors.

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[52] PR, p. 171. [53] PR, pp. 170 f., 174 f. [54] PR, p. 38.

[55] PR, p. 50.

A fifth principle is that any unit of experience is controlled or guided by a conceptual aim which is initially derived in such a way as to guide the experience toward retaining those elements from the experienced world which are best adapted to yield the highest possible intensity.[56] This aim is able to initiate novel factors never before realized in a physical feeling in an actual occasion of the universe.[57] It is also able to promote activity overcoming the attenuating effect of the experience of more remote actual occasions. The aim initiates developmental and corrective novelty. This feature will be discussed more completely in the chapter on overcoming evil.

The good is composite. It is composed of a compatible synthesis of actual entities derived from the causal past and eternal objects. This composition is not just a simple cumulation of ingredients. There are combinations of combinations moving toward structured complexity. A number of principles regulate the combination of the components into the complex whole. In this discussion Whitehead shows how the good can emerge in a situation where each occasion is relative to its past. In the discussion of some of these principles the topic of grades of good was introduced.

Grades of good

In Adventures of Ideas Whitehead discussed grades of good under the term "strength of beauty."[58] The composite nature of this beauty is analyzed under three terms, massiveness, intensity, and harmony. Where there is a high degree of massiveness, intensity and harmony there is great strength of beauty. There is remarkable similarity between this position and Augustine's statement that those goods are great goods which have a high degree of form, measure, and order.

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[56] PR, p. 41. [57] PR, p. 73. [58] AI, p. 325.

Massiveness is "variety of detail with effective contrast."[59] The complex compatible contrast of contrasts referred to earlier as width is equivalent to massiveness. The aim toward increasd intensity is an aim toward "the realization of the maximum number of eternal objects subject to the restraint that they must be under conditions of contrast."[60] Massiveness refers to the degree of complexity and is dependent on both intensity and harmony. Massiveness contributes to the strength of beauty.

Intensity is "comparative magnitude without reference to qualitative variety."[61] Reference to this comparative magnitude was made in the previous section under the first principle regulative of the emergence of the good, the principle of intensive relevance. This comparative magnitude refers to the quantity of each component which goes together to constitute the good. As we have noted, the intensity of a component factor is greater where there is chaos and vagueness in the background along with narrowness and width of compatible contrast. This is the same as to say that intensity is enhanced where there is massiveness and harmony.

In the broad sense harmony is equivalent to beauty and "Beauty is the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience."[62] There is greater beauty where there are many factors combined or massiveness and where the factors so combined are present in high magnitude or intensity. But the mere presence in the causal past of many actual entities illustrating many eternal objects which are present in high magnitude does not in itself issue in strength of beauty in an experiencing occasion. The pattern of relationship of these factors must be harmonious. In the narrow sense harmony is the compatible arrangement of parts in a unified actual occasion. The narrower sense of harmony was discussed in the second principle regulating the emergence of the good as the principle of compatibility and contrariety. Sometimes a given eternal object in a certain magnitude in relation to other eternal objects is a compatible contrast and is able to be a component in a unified becoming actual entity. In a different magnitude or in relation to different eternal objects it would be incompatible and would be eliminated from a becoming actual entity.[63] The difference made by a pattern of arrangement is dramatically illustrated by comparing carbon and oxygen atoms arranged as CO_2 and free oxygen with the same number of carbon and oxygen atoms arranged as CO and free oxygen. One arrangement is life giving to humans and the other is lethal.[64] There is an analogy between the difference made by this different pattern of arrangement and the difference made by various patterns of arrangement within a becoming actual occasion. Certain patterns of arrangement are incompatible and destroy massiveness and intensity. Other patterns consist in harmony and hold many eternal objects in togetherness in high intensity. Where there is harmony the arrangement of parts is such that they "do not inhibit each other" but instead "the parts contribute to the massive feeling of the whole, and the whole contributes to the intensity of feeling of the parts."[65]

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[59] AI, p. 325. [60] PR, p. 424. [61] AI, p. 325.

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[62] AI, p. 324. [63] PR, p. 225; AI, p. 334. [64] AI, p. 196.

What is discussed as "harmony" in Adventures of Ideas is referred to as "order" in Process and Reality. "The heightening of intensity arises from order such that the multiplicity of components in the nexus can enter explicit feeling as contrasts, and are not dismissed into negative prehensions as incompatibilities."[66]

Actual occasions may be graded according to their strength of beauty or "intensiveness of value." These grades of good range from just above zero of intensity to God whose experience of intensity is unlimited. "The zero of intensiveness means the collapse of actuality." "Intensive value" is equivalent to "depth of actuality."[67] In one place Whitehead describes four grades of actual occasions which blend into one another. The lowest grade includes those occasions in "empty space" which do not have enough definiteness in a dominant characteristic to form a base in relation to which compatibility may be determined. The second grade includes actual occasions which "are moments in the life-histories of enduring non-living objects, such as electrons or other primitive organisms. The third grade is more complex and more variable and is composed of the actual occasions which are "moments in the life-histories of enduring living objects." The fourth grade has sufficient complexity for consciousness to appear.[68]

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[65] AI, p. 324, cf. p. 344. [66] PR, p. 128. [67] RM, p. 103.

[68] PR, p. 269.

As the grades go up there is an increase in the complexity and the variability of the occasions. "The higher the grade, the more vigorous and the more original is the enhancement from the supplementary phase."[69] Although each occasion is in reality indivisible, for the purposes of analysis, its becoming may be divided into phases. The first phase conformally experiences the actual occasions in the causal past. The conceptual aim, derived from God via a hybrid physical feeling, is the initial aim.[70] In the later phase supplementation begins because the contrast of what was experienced conformally with what emerges as a novelty in the mental pole brings about new definite actualization. Succeeding phases contrast these earlier contrasts building up more and more complexity. In very complex high grade occasions consciousness emerges.

Succeeding occasions in the route of occasions of an enduring object can build on the accomplishments of their antecedents. In the universe there is exhibited a thrust toward the realization of greater strength of beauty or intensity of value.[71] This means that there is a drive toward the realization of ever higher grades of good.

Any occasion by the fact of its actuality is good. Occasions range in strength of beauty from the barely definite occasions of empty space to the maximum strength of beauty in God. The good is graded from this lowest strength of beauty to the maximum.

Intrinsic and extrinsic good

In the three preceding sections the good has been discussed from the standpoint of the becoming occasion itself. Where there is massiveness, intensity, and harmony an occasion is good in itself. For purposes of analysis we may refer to this as intrinsic good. This good is a process of actualization. It is composed of experiences of abstracted elements from actual occasions of the causal past. Good actualizations may be graded from low to high according to the degree to which they exhibit massive harmonious intensity. Strength of beauty is intrinsic good.

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[69] PR, p. 183. [70] PR, p. 378.

[71] AI, p. 259; PR, pp. 104, 153, 373; MT, p. 230.

Extrinsic good refers to the value of an occasion for the occasions in its causal future. An occasion might experience great strength of beauty and therefore have a high degree of intrinsic good and subsequently have a destructive effect on the occasions in its causal future and therefore have a low degree of extrinsic good. When the degree of extrinsic good is less than could have been possible, it may be described as extrinsic evil. This distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic good is analogous to the distinction Whitehead makes between intrinsic and extrinsic reality.[72]

The point at which the differentiation between intrinsic and extrinsic good is helpful is the discussion of the relation of the good in one occasion to the good in occasions in its causal future. Every occasion achieves some degree of intrinsic good by the mere fact of its actuality. Occasions range in the degree of intrinsic good from those which are very simple to those which are very good because of their complex intensity. Sometimes an occasion in a route of occasions has to decide whether to actualize a more intense intrinsic good which will be extrinsically evil for occasions in the causal future of its route of occasions[73] or a less intense good in the present occasion which will be extrinsically good for occasions in the causal future.[74] There is compensation for the loss of present good in the contribution to present intensity resulting from consciousness of the future good to be achieved.[75]

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[72] SMW, p. 151; cf. AI, p. 53; Imm, p. 690; FR, p. 24; SMW, pp. 135, 154.

The degree of intrinsic goodness of a becoming occasion is dependent in part on the quality of the actual world from which it arises. If there is a society of occasions exhibiting narrowness so that there are numerous occasions reinforcing a certain defining characteristic along with an absence of competing characteristics, an occasion belonging to that society in the causal future will realize greater strength of beauty. A set of objects in the actual world which tends toward strength of beauty in a becoming occasion is described as "beautiful."[76] A beautiful world is conducive of occasions with strength of beauty. The adjective "beautiful" applies to objects in the actual world of a becoming occasion when they tend to produce strength of beauty in percipient occasions. The adjective "beautiful" refers to potential extrinsic goodness. The noun "beauty" refers to intrinsic goodness. When the objects in the actual world of an occasion are beautiful in high degree, they will be conducive to a high degree of beauty in the percipient occasion.

An occasion is intrinsically good when it achieves strength of beauty. It is extrinsically good when it contributes toward strength of beauty of the occasions in its causal future. Intrinsic goodness is judged in relation to the occasion itself. Any occasion because of its actuality has some degree of intrinsic good. No changes in the future can add to or take away from its intrinsic goodness.

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[73] RM, pp. 95 f.; PR, pp. 513, 525. [74] AI, p. 309; PR, p. 517.

[75] PR, p. 531; AI, p. 346. [76] AI, pp. 328 f., 339, 341.

Whether an occasion in the past is extrinsically good or not depends on its relation to the becoming occasion with reference to which the judgment is being made. A single occasion in the causal past might be good for one occasion and evil for another. If it reinforces the good aimed at in the subjective aim it is good. If it inhibits the good aimed at in the subjective aim it is evil.

There is a sense in which it is possible to make harmony synonymous with beauty so that harmony may be said to be intrinsically good. In the initial discussion beauty is defined as "the mutual adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience" and as "the perfection of Harmony."[77] If harmony is thought of as the absence of conflict, it would not be adequate as a characterization of intrinsic good. There is no conflict in nothingness, but there is no good either. The harmony of intrinsic good is the harmony of something. The more factors that are harmoniously integrated the higher the grade of intrinsic good. Wherever there is complex realization or massiveness, there is harmony because the possibility of realization is dependent on harmony. To become at all is harmoniously to combine some width of complex experience of past occasions into an intensity of satisfaction. Strength of beauty is composed of three factors, massiveness, intensity, and harmony, which are mutually dependent. There cannot be massiveness without intensity and harmony. Where there is maximum intensity there is also massiveness and harmony. Maximum harmony requires massiveness and intensity. This mutual dependence of the three factors would make it possible to refer to massiveness or to intensity as intrinsically good in the sense that harmony is intrinsically good. To the extent that use of any one of the mutually dependent factors as a characterization of intrinsic good emphasizes it at the expense of the others it is not satisfactory. Strength of beauty is the best characterization of intrinsic good because its description is more likely to give proper importance to each of the mutually dependent factors in its composition.

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[77] AI, p. 324.

Evil

An understanding of the nature of evil is dependent on an understanding of the nature of good. The process of actualization is good. This actualization is the coming together of the experience of past actual occasions in cohesive definiteness. Actuality is good in itself. If some strength of beauty is good, more is better. There are grades of good from trivial occasions to massively complex occasions. If many feelings are brought together in compatible unity, there is a great good. If few feelings are brought together, there is a small good. The good may be thought of as aesthetic construction.

Intrinsic evil

Intrinsic good is a process of becoming. Wherever there is frustration of the process of becoming there is intrinsic evil. Just as much discussion of intrinsic good as beauty emphasizes harmony, so much discussion of intrinsic evil emphasizes discord. "There is evil when things are at cross purposes."[78] The difference between evil and good is "the contrast between the turbulence of evil and the 'peace which passeth all understanding.'"[79] Discord is described as "in itself destructive and evil."[80] Then again "evil lies in the clash of vivid feelings."[81]

The experience of discord is intrinsically evil because wherever there is discord there is destruction of good. In discussing the emergence of the good we noted that a condition necessary for bringing certain feelinqs together into cohesive definiteness is their compatibility. Incompatible feelings by their incompatibility tend to be eliminated. It is discord as destruction of feelings available for synthesis in a becoming occasion that is intrinsically evil. We saw that regarding harmony as intrinsically good and thinking of such harmony as the absence of conflict might encourage passive renunciation and thus the loss of good. It is also true that if discord is regarded as the presence of conflict and if that conflict is removed by passive renunciation, there is a loss of good. There are situations in which an increase in the intrinsic good of strength of beauty is associated with an increase of conflict. Conflict should not be avoided when it is accompanied by an increase in intrinsic good. If the conflict which occurred in one occasion of a route of occasions is avoided in a subsequent occasion of the route by the further addition of positive good which is able to exclude the opposing factors, then there will be a further increase in intrinsic good. What makes the conflict evil is that its discordant presence destroys some of the potential features of the good in the process of the discord. The intrinsic evil of discord is often called "aesthetic destruction."[82] When intrinsic evil is described as "aesthetic destruction" any possible tendency to encourage passive renunciation is less probable.

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[78] RM, p. 97. [79] RM, pp. 97 f. [80] AI, p. 330. [81] AI, p. 355.

It will be easier to describe aesthetic destruction if we recognize the difference between two kinds of exclusion of the elements in the initial data in the process of becoming of an actual occasion. One kind of exclusion is necessary for the emergence of the good. The other kind consists in aesthetic destruction.

In the section on the good as composite we noticed that positive realization of the good requires the exclusion of most of the data from the actual world. If an occasion were to consist in the fusion of all the components of the actual occasions of the past, it would be "the nonentity of indefiniteness"[83] or "mere nothingness."[84] Apart from some kind of limitation the infinite "cannot be distinguished from nonentity." Since the infinite "has no properties" the emergence of the good "is the gift of finitude."[85] Restriction of experience to compatible elements is necessary for the emergence of actual definiteness. If everything were included, there would be a mutually inhibiting contrary present for each factor so that all would be prehended at an intensity hardly distinguishable from zero. In order to have some components emerge with sufficient intensity to support massive complexity their contrary feelings must be eliminated. The way the contrary feelings are excluded is by the amplification of the desired feelings. An important aspect of this amplification is the repetition of that factor in the social situation in the causal past. "Apart from the reiteration gained from its societies, an environment does not provide the massiveness of emphasis capable of dismissing its contrary elements into negative prehensions."[86] The good consists in the positive presence in a concrescence of factors which exclude the unwanted background.

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[82] AI, pp. 330, 233, 339. [83] SMW, p. 139. [84] RM, p. 153.

[85] MG, p. 674.

Where there is "complete inhibition" of the contrary elements there is no discord in the positive factors in the concrescence and there is an "absence from it of component feelings which mutually inhibit each other so that neither rises to the strength proper to it." Such an occasion does not experience evil. "There is then 'perfection' in its kind." There is no intrinsic evil even if the kind or grade of good is low in the scale of grades of good. This first type of exclusion is called "anaesthesia."[87]

The first kind of exclusion eliminates enough factors from the initial data so that the remaining factors can achieve positive realization. The first kind of exclusion does not involve evil when it eliminates all the unwanted background and permits the emergence of strong compatible feelings. The second kind of exclusion occurs in a becoming occasion in which the first type of exclusion was not entirely successful in eliminating all the contrary elements. There was sufficient elimination to have at least two feelings emerge with high intensity, but there is conflict between these feelings. "In this case there is a third feeling of mutual destructiveness, so that one or other--or both--of the component feelings fails to attain the strength properly belonging to the prehension of the datum from which it arises." This feeling of mutual destruction is "the feeling of evil in the most general sense." The second type of exclusion is called "aesthetic destruction."[88] This is intrinsic evil. The experience of aesthetic destruction as a dominant feature of concrescence is the "definition of evil."[89]

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[86] PR, p. 169. [87] AI, p. 329.

Aesthetic destruction does not refer to the destruction of something which has become and is then destroyed in analogy to the building of a house and then razing it with a bulldozer. Intrinsic good is a process of becoming not something that has become. Evil is the destruction of real possibilities in the process of becoming. It is the destruction of what might have been. A better analogy might be the destruction of a possible seven room house with a study conducive to the writing of dissertations by the construction of a six room house without a study on the same sight with the same lumber. The analogy breaks down at two points. With houses such decisions are made by a builder who has a certain self-identity before, during and after the building whereas in a becoming occasion the decision is made by the occasion itself. A house is only extrinsically good which means that it is good after it has come into being and not in the becoming.

In a sense we might describe the same occasion as intrinsically good and intrinsically evil. Intrinsic good consists in strength of beauty. A given occasion might have great strength of beauty, even more than its predecessor in an enduring object, and at the same time experience significant discord, even more discord than its predecessor. The good, which is actuality, consists in the compatible realization of complex positive feelings. The evil consists in the prevention of more of such realization by the incompatibility of the feelings which are discordant. The frequent use of the words "more" and "less" point to the need for a comparative analysis of evil.

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[88] AI, p. 330. [89] AI, p. 333; cf. AI, p. 339; RM, pp. 95 f.

Intrinsic evil consists in the aesthetic destruction produced by the mutual inhibition of contrary feelings in a concrescing occasion of experience. An occasion experiences intrinsic evil when it is dominated by the experience of aesthetic destruction.

Extrinsic evil

What is intrinsically good is good for itself. What is extrinsically good is good for a subject outside of itself. Whitehead sometimes uses the noun "beauty"[90] to refer to intrinsic good and the adjective "beautiful" to refer to extrinsic good.[91] Beauty is intrinsically good. Objects are beautiful which in that setting tend to produce beauty in the occasions experiencing them. An analogous distinction is made with regard to evil. What is intrinsically evil experiences aesthetic destruction in itself. What is extrinsically evil tends to produce aesthetic destruction for other subjects which experience it. Unfortunately there is not a difference in the form of the adjective "evil" and the form of the noun "evil." It will therefore be necessary to refer to aesthetic destruction in a subject as intrinsic evil and to objects that tend in that setting to produce aesthetic destruction as extrinsically evil.

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[90] AI, p. 324. [91] AI, pp. 328 f., 339, 341.

An occasion might be intrinsically good in that it achieves massive harmonious intensity or strength of beauty and does not experience significant aesthetic destruction while at the same time being extrinsically evil in that it inhibits strength of beauty in the occasions in its causal future. "Evil, triumphant in its enjoyment, is so far good in itself; but beyond itself it is evil in its character of a destructive agent among things greater than itself. In the summation of the more complete fact it has secured a descent towards nothingness, in contrast to the creativeness of what can without qualification be termed good."[92] A becoming actuality is intrinsically good to the degree that there are compatible feelings in synthesis even though it may have a detrimental effect on subsequent becoming. Any occasion has some degree of good or it would not be actual. Whitehead even seems willing to dramatize the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic good by referring to the immediate joy experienced by those who nailed Jesus to the cross as good.[93] Such "revolts of destructive evil" have an intrinsic goodness which consists in a certain immediacy of joy.[94] There is only one subject with reference to which an occasion is judged intrinsically good or evil, the occasion itself. There are many occasions with reference to which judgments may be made about the extrinsic goodness or evil of an occasion. With reference to some occasions a given occasion may be extrinsically good and with reference to others that same occasion may be extrinsically evil. Because of the generality of their concern theologians and philosophers are inevitably involved in judgments about the extrinsic qualities of occasions. When a person knows that some feature of his own possible intrinsic good in an immediate occasion will result in great extrinsic evil, he recognizes that he should avoid those features if possible. The extrinsic evil of destroying an innocent man is more fundamental than the intrinsic good of efficient occasions engaged in nailing.

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[92] RM, pp. 95 f. [93] PR, p. 513. [94] PR, p. 525.

Extrinsic evil is the quality of an object which tends to produce aesthetic destruction in an occasion which experiences it. An object may be intrinsically good and extrinsically evil. An object may be extrinsically good for one occasion in which it produced no aesthetic destruction and extrinsically evil for another occasion to which it contributes incompatible contraries which produce aesthetic destruction.

Comparative evil

The same evil which has been discussed under the classification of intrinsic and extrinsic evil may be analyzed profitably as comparative evil. The good is the experience of compatible togetherness of feelings which consists in actualization. The greater the number and intensity of such feelings the greater the good. Evil can only be experienced by something good. Evil is the experience of prevention of additional compatible realization in an experience of compatible realization. Compatible realization is diminished when incompatible feelings are present. A feeling which is incompatible with some feelings in a concrescence can only be present in that concrescence because of its compatibility with other feelings in the concrescence. A feeling that has no compatibility with any of the dominant feelings in a concrescence would be eliminated in transition. No feelings can be present if there are no compatible feelings. The good is the process of becoming. The evil is the inhibition of additional process of becoming in a process of becoming. In all process of becoming as process there is a movement from less to more in the number and strength of feelings integrating themselves in compatible contrast. Since all good consists in increase and all evil consists in inhibition of increase or in decrease, the need for comparison is evident. The degree of evil is determined by comparing the number and intensity of feelings actually compatibly realized with the number and intensity which might have been realized.

The basic type of comparison in comparative evil is the relation of the actual to the ideal. There is a pervasive human "intuition of immediate occasions as failing or succeeding in reference to the ideal relevant to them."[95] The degree to which there is conformity to the ideal is the degree of realization of the ideal good. "So far as the conformity is incomplete, there is evil in the world."[96]

We may discern three types of comparison in Whitehead's discussion. In the first type we compare the feelings which are actually being realized with the ideal feelings which might have been realized within one occasion. We have discussed this type of evil as intrinsic evil. The intrinsic evil of discord is evil because discord is a destruction of strength of beauty which might have been if there had not been the presence of that discordant feeling. The strength of beauty which might have been is the standard in comparison with which the strength achieved in the satisfaction is evil.

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[95] RM, p. 60. [96] RM, p. 62.

A second type of comparison analyzes the cumulative strength of beauty actually achieved in many occasions in relation to what might have been achieved. When more than one occasion is included in the scope of the comparison, extrinsic value as well as intrinsic value is involved. The preceding section referred to extrinsic evil in which the character of the intrinsic good of one occasion introduced evil into occasions in its causal future. The cumulative strength of beauty in all of the occasions being considered is less than it might have been if that one occasion had not had the character which it did have. The standard of comparison is the cumulative strength of beauty which might have been realized if that occasion with great strength of beauty had not had that character.

It is conceivable that an occasion and its cumulative effects might be judged comparatively good over a period of a week but evil because of its effect over a longer period, or good in a confined region and evil in a more extensive region. "Thus any system of things which in any wide sense is beautiful is to that extent justified in its existence. It may however fail in another sense, by inhibiting more Beauty than it creates. Thus the system, though in a sense beautiful, is on the whole evil in that environment."[97] The longer the time and the wider the scope of inclusion of occasions the more complex the judgment of comparative evil becomes.

A third type of comparison relates the strength of beauty realized in a member of an enduring object with the strength realized in a subsequent occasion in the route. Occasions in a route of occasions may add complexity and move upward on the scale of grades of good or they may lose complexity and move downward. An occasion that has more strength of beauty than its predecessor is comparatively good and one that has less strength of beauty is comparatively evil.

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[97] AI, p. 341.

An occasion whose immediate predecessor experienced no intrinsic evil because there was no discord might add just enough complexity to introduce some increased strength of beauty but the new features may introduce some discord. Such an occasion by this type of comparison would be comparatively good since it experienced a greater strength of beauty than its predecessors in the route. That same occasion would experience intrinsic evil because of the discord. This discord destroys additional good which might have been realized if there had been compatibility. It would have more strength of beauty than its predecessor and not as much strength of beauty as its successors will have when they remove the discord by including additional elements which make it possible to combine the discordant factors in compatible contrasts. This means that there are "imperfect occasions better than occasions which realize some given type of perfection. There are in fact higher and lower perfections, and an imperfection aiming at a higher type stands above lower perfections."[98] An increase in the strength of beauty may not produce a corresponding increase in harmony, but instead there may be "intense experience without Harmony."[99] If such discord is unavoidable in the transition to a higher grade of good it is better than avoiding the discord at the price of losing subsequent strength of beauty.

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[98] AI, p. 330. [99] AI, p. 339.

Occasions in a route of occasions which are experiencing discord may remove that discord by eliminating the discordant elements. Sometimes this elimination also involves dropping to a lower grade of good and therefore is comparatively evil. "Perfection at a low level ranks below Imperfection with higher aim."[100]

Whitehead is quite clear that a low grade harmonious occasion is not intrinsically evil. He affirms the intrinsic goodness of low grades of good in a passage that refers to several aspects of comparative evil.

> It must be noted that the state of degradation to which evil leads, when accomplished, is not in itself evil, except by comparison with what might have been. A hog is not an evil beast, but when a man is degraded to the level of a hog, with the accompanying atrophy of finer elements, he is no more evil than a hog. The evil of the final degradation lies in the comparison of what is with what might have been. During the process of degradation the comparison is an evil for the man himself and at its final stage it remains an evil for others.[101]

The first type of comparative evil is under consideration when it is said that a hog is not an evil beast. When an intrinsic comparison is made between what a hog might be and what it is and it is found that it has realized its potential, it is seen that the hog is intrinsically good and does not experience comparative evil in relation to a hog ideal. The third type of comparative evil is mentioned when it is said that a man degraded to the level of a hog is evil for others. Others notice that the hoggish state possesses less strength of beauty than what might have been. The third type of comparative evil is also mentioned when it is said that during the degradation the sequential loss of strength of beauty is an evil for the man himself. Each occasion in his route of occasions experiences a comparative decrease in strength of beauty and is aware that it falls short of its potential.

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[100] AI, p. 339. [101] RM, pp. 96 f.

Each of these types of comparative evil compares what is with what might have been. The use of the words "might have been" implies that what is could have been different if something else had been different. The first type of comparative evil refers to the different causal factors as residing within the becoming occasion. The second type of comparative evil refers to the different causal factors as being in the causal past. The third type of comparative evil also refers to the different causal factors as being in the causal past but concentrates on the increase or decrease of strength of beauty in comparison with other occasions in a route of occasions.

Evil from morally wrong decisions

Man is able to do more about evil which results from morally responsible decisions than he is that evil which results from the fortuitous combinations of events in nature. There may be some value in a discussion of that type of extrinsic evil which results from morally wrong decisions. A decision is moral where there is the conscious intent to act so as to promote the general good.

A moral decision is made by an actual occasion of sufficiently high grade to experience consciousness. Moral or ethical ideals are "the supreme example of consciously formulated ideas acting as a driving force effecting transitions from social state to social state."[102]

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[102] AI, p. 21.

Moral decisions are primarily exhibited in man although Whitehead reports that "morals can be discerned in the higher animals."[103] Price has Whitehead saying that dogs have "moral values" in the form of "simple-minded affection and loyalty,"[104] and that "moral ideas" first appear in animals so that "birds know when they have done wrong."[105] It would appear that animals are regarded as making moral decisions to the extent that they are conscious of having made right or wrong decisions.

A moral decision involves a certain kind of intention. This intention is a conscious aim. "Morals consists in the aim at the ideal. . ."[106] Morality "is the aim at greatness of experience in the various dimensions belonging to it."[107]

A moral decision involves freedom in which there is consciousness. Apart from some type of freedom or "self-production" there "can be no moral responsibility. The potter, and not the pot, is responsible for the shape of the pot."[108] It is the "final decision of the immediate subject-superject" which is the "foundation of our experience of responsibility, of approbation or of disapprobation, or self-approval or of self-reproach, of freedom, of emphasis."[109] That the occasion making a moral decision "determines its own ultimate definiteness" is the "whole point of moral responsibility."[110] At this point in our discussion we will merely note that a morally responsible decision requires freedom under special conditions. In the chapter on the cause of evil a more detailed discussion of the nature of freedom is found.

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[103] MT, p. 39. [104] D, p. 186. [105] D, p. 194.

[106] AI, p. 346. [107] MT, p. 19. [108] S, pp. 8 f.

[109] PR, p. 74. [110] PR, p. 390.

In a moral decision the general good is the focus of intention. Morality concerns "the general ideal which should be the justification for any particular objective." An action is moral to the degree that subsequent strength of beauty in occasions in general "depends on that concrete instance in the world's history."[111] The "conception of morals arises" from the fact that "everything has some value for itself, for others, and for the whole."[112] "Morality of outlook is inseparably conjoined with generality of outlook."[113] It is the intended effect on all occasions in general that makes a decision moral. For this reason two actions cannot both be moral if they have known opposite effects on the possibility of the realization of strength of beauty in occasions in the causal future. Whitehead rejects a "private world of morals"[114] for each occasion. He holds that there are objective criteria applicable to all occasions even though the specific application of these criteria may result in a unique decision for each occasion. "The greater part of morality hinges on the determination of relevance in the future."[115] "The effect of the present on the future is the business of morals."[116] The source of the general ideal is God whose act "issues into the mental creature as moral judgment according to a perfection of ideals."[117]

The ideal good is general in that it requires a certain type of action in a specific situation so as to have a beneficial effect on all occasions in general in the future. It is not general in the sense that one type of action applies to every occasion in every situation. "Thus the notion that there are certain regulative notions, sufficiently precise to prescribe details of conduct, for all reasonable beings on Earth, in every planet, and in every star-system, is at once to be put aside."[118] Such a conception of the moral ideal would only be possible if there were no process and if the goal of action were rest. The belief that the moral ideal in one situation is the ideal for all situations gives rise to the circumstance in which "the world is shocked, or amused, by the sight of saintly old people hindering in the name of morality the removal of obvious brutalities from a legal system."[119] Most people have the idea that specific moral standards apply to all situations. "Of course it is true that the defence of morals is the battle-cry which best rallies stupidity against change."[120] In "human society" it is generally true that the "champions of morality" are the "fierce opponents of new ideals."[121]

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[111] MT, p. 20. [112] MT, p. 151. [113] PR, p. 23.

[114] SMW, p. 281. [115] PR, p. 41. [116] AI, p. 346.

[117] RM, p. 119.

There are several characteristics of process which tend to confirm people in their belief that specific moral ideals never change. The lower grades of good tend to be more stable than the higher grades.[122] Growth, development, and progress often involve an aspect of discord in the transition to a higher grade of good.[123] It is therefore easy to see how people would develop the mistaken notion that

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[118] AI, p. 375. [119] AI, p. 374. [120] AI, p. 345. [121] AI, p. 346.

[122] RM, p. 98; FR, p. 2; PR, pp. 517 f. [123] AI, pp. 330 f., p. 342.

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morality is opposed to progressive ideals. It is clear that a so-called morality that tenaciously holds on to a low level stable goodness is a false morality. "Morality consists in the control of process so as to maximize importance."[124]

In the section on extrinsic evil we noticed that an occasion may be intrinsically and comparatively good in the sense that it achieves much more strength of beauty than its predecessors and successors and at the same time be extrinsically evil because it tends to inhibit strength of beauty in the occasions in its causal future. If such an occasion were a high grade occasion it might be faced with making a conscious decision between actualizing high intensity in the immediate occasion with the prospect of general loss of strength of beauty in the occasions of the causal future and actualizing a lower different intensity in the immediate occasion with the prospect of a general gain in strength of beauty in the occasions of the causal future. It might even be necessary to choose to destroy a certain aspect of beauty in order to gain a moral end. "Whether we destroy, or whether we preserve, our action is moral if we have thereby safeguarded the importance of experience so far as it depends on that concrete instance in the world's history."[125]

Sometimes a moral ideal requires the maximum strength of beauty possible in the immediate occasion so as to promote maximum strength of beauty in the future and sometimes it requires less than maximum strength in the immediate occasion so as to insure maximum strength in the occasions of the future. It is conceivable that a decision might tend to produce favorable strength of beauty over a period of a week but loss over a period of a month. The complexity of such decisions becomes frustrating. This complexity is another factor contributing to the tendency of men to retreat to a known stable good rather than move ahead with the moral ideal which involves a certain amount of instability and uncertainty. Such retreat not only sacrifices present strength of beauty but also sacrifices future strength of beauty since strength of beauty in the future is based on the structures created in the present. It is for this reason that the "good of the Universe cannot lie in indefinite postponement."[126] One compensating feature of the sacrifice of present strength of beauty for future benefit is that the consciousness of the future benefit "adds to the present a qualitative element which profoundly affects its whole qualitative harmony."[127]

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[124] MT, p. 19. [125] MT, p. 20.

The chief difference between evil which results from morally wrong decisions and other evil is that it is caused and its repetition can be avoided by the morally responsible free decisions of high grade conscious occasions. Theology and philosophy as well as science which clarifies the probable future consequences of various types of action is of more significance for this type of evil than for any other. More attention will be given to human effort in relation to evil in the chapter on overcoming evil.

Evil as temporal passage

Whitehead refers to the evil of temporal passage as ultimate.

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[126] AI, p. 346. [127] AI, p. 346.

This type of evil is significantly different from the evil discussed so far. In the section on intrinsic evil a contrast is made between destroying a house that has already been built and destroying possibilities in the process of construction. Intrinsic evil consists in the destruction of possibilities. It is the destruction of good which might have been.

The evil of temporal passage is the destruction of good which has become actual. "The ultimate evil in the temporal world is deeper than any specific evil. It lies in the fact that the past fades, that time is a 'perpetual perishing.'"[128]

The expression "perpetual perishing" is derived from Locke,[129] but the loss of value with the achievement of becoming is already expressed in Plato. "The conception of an actual entity in the fluent world is little more than an expansion of a sentence in the Timaeus: 'But that which is conceived by opinion with the help of sensation and without reason, is always in the process of becoming and perishing and never really is.'"[130] In Whitehead's organic philosophy "an actual entity has 'perished' when it is complete."[131]

As far as I am able to determine there is only one mention of perpetual perishing as evil in Whitehead's writing. This infrequent mention should not be taken as an indication of the insignificance of this type of evil. In Chapter V there is a discussion of the means by which the evil of perishing is overcome through the preservation without loss in the consequent nature of God of all the actuality achieved in the world.

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[128] PR, p. 517. [129] PR, pp. 43, 126, 222, 320.

[130] PR, p. 126. [131] PR, p. 126.

We may summarize our discussion of the nature of evil by attempting to use the word evil in such a way that it will apply to all of the classes of evil mentioned. All of these types of evil refer to the loss of value. For intrinsic evil this means destruction of possibilities which might have been realized as value. When an occasion perishes it loses value for itself. All the value achieved is preserved in the consequent nature of God. An occasion which is extrinsically evil causes a loss of value in the occasion which prehends it as evil. Comparative evil analyzes the same loss of value discussed as intrinsic and extrinsic evil by making several different types of comparisons. This comparison may relate the loss of good to what might have been within one single occasion or within the cumulative experience of various groups of occasions. That group of occasions called an enduring object has a particular significance for an analysis of comparative evil since man as a moral being is a special type of enduring object referred to as "enduring living objects." When man makes a morally wrong decision he freely deviates from a conscious ideal for the general good. Since both consciousness and freedom are involved, there is a greater possibility for the removal of this type of comparative evil through action guided by clarification of ideas than the evil which arises in occasions where there is no conscious decision. In the evil of temporal passage the last phase of concrescence is the destruction of the immediacy of that occasion of becoming actuality as it perishes in satisfaction.

Characteristics of Evil

Although a basic description of the nature of evil has been given there remain a number of characteristics which need attention. One of these factors is the question of the positive or negative nature of evil. In some ways Whitehead's position is similar to Augustine's theory that evil is the privation of the good. There are some basic differences that grow out of the process character of his thought in contrast to a philosophy of being.

Evil as positive

Augustine's description of evil as the privation of good was formulated in the context of a philosophy of substance. The good is static, complete being which is at rest. Wherever there is movement and process there is a lack of something which if present would put the movement to rest. Such a description seems to make process by its nature evil.

Whitehead criticizes a position that makes process inherently evil. The good is in its very nature process. The emphasis on process makes time and place important to the good. The emergence of a positive element at the wrong time and place is evil. The goal of process is not static completion but the processive realization of the maximum intensity of actualization in each occasion in the present which will in turn lead to maximum intensity of satisfaction in the relevant future. Evil cannot then be the lack of a feature of the static completion but an inhibition of the process. Nothing does not have the power to inhibit something. In order for evil to inhibit the good process it must be positive.

The positive character of evil is more apparent in extrinsic evil than in intrinsic evil. An occasion is said to be extrinsically evil if it contributes to aesthetic destruction in an occasion which prehends it in its causal future. It could only produce this inhibition if it contributed a positive feeling contrary to some other included feeling. "For in its objective efficacy an actual entity can only inhibit by reason of its alternative positive contribution."[132] An occasion could be intrinsically good in that it experienced no significant aesthetic destruction in its own concrescence but be extrinsically evil in that it contributes a positive inhibiting feeling to an occasion in its causal future. "Evil is positive and destructive; what is good is positive and creative."[133] An object is evil for a subject if that object produces inhibiting aesthetic destruction in the prehending subject. It is clear that such an evil object is positive. The evil of this object is extrinsic evil.

Time and space relations are important in determining whether an object is extrinsically evil. In one situation an object might contribute to strength of beauty and in another it might tend toward aesthetic destruction. "Insistence on birth at the wrong season is the trick of evil."[134] The time-space relations of sense objects also are factors in determining whether they are evil or good. There is art which is "good in its place, but out of place a positive evil."[135]

There is a sense in which the intrinsic evil of aesthetic destruction is positive. An evil object is only able to inhibit when it is positively prehended and then opposes a contrary factor in the concrescence. When there is the positive presence of contrary feelings there is the emergence of a "third feeling of mutual destructiveness." This feeling of "aesthetic destruction is a positive component in subjective form."[136] The positive inhibiting feeling and the positive feeling of aesthetic destruction which occur when there is evil of aesthetic destruction do not really conflict with the position that actuality as positive realization is in itself good. The positive feeling that inhibits is not in itself evil. It is the destruction arising out of the presence that is evil. In the section on overcoming evil there will be a discussion of the method by which destructive feelings are maintained and readjusted so as to eliminate their evil effect. Furthermore, actuality is a unitary concrescence not a discrete independent feeling within a concrescence. The inhibiting feeling is not an independent evil actuality within a concrescence. It is making a positive contribution to becoming actuality or it would not be present. The degree to which there is positive integrating actuality is the degree to which there is good. The degree to which there is destruction of integrating actuality is the degree to which there is evil.

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[132] PR, p. 341. [133] RM, p. 96. [134] PR, p. 341.

[135] AI, p. 345.

Some of the features of Augustine's concept of evil as negation are still present. The main achievement of providing for evil without needing a self-existing evil substance is retained. An adjustment has been made corresponding to the shift from a philosophy of being to one of process. The evil is not the timeless and spaceless absence of something needed for static perfection. The evil is the positive process of inhibition of the positive process of the emergence of strength of beauty.

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[136] AI, p. 330; cf. pp. 336, 339.

Pain and evil

The most dramatic forms of evil for human subjects are associated with pain and a discussion of evil would not be complete without some reference to pain. Whitehead gives pain a prominent place in the conscious human experience of evil. He refers to the evil of "aesthetic destruction" as "the feeling of evil in the most general sense, namely physical pain or mental evil, such as sorrow, horror, dislike."[137] Here pain seems to be a sensation indicating aesthetic destruction at some more or less localized region of the body. The three other terms seem to refer to suffering in the more generalized sense of the experience of aesthetic destruction to the whole self. "Sorrow" suggests that the aesthetic destruction has happened in the past and has destructive consequences in the present. "Horror" implies that aesthetic destruction is about to occur and has destructive consequences in the present. "Dislike" seems to refer to a present condition which is destructive and will be in the future.

Pain only refers to that portion of aesthetic destruction which has an effect on consciousness. Only a small portion of aesthetic experience emerges in consciousness.[138] This means that the majority of aesthetic destruction has no effect on consciousness. Only a small portion of evil is experienced consciously. A search for the basis of

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[137] AI, p. 330. [138] PR, pp. 211, 408, 470.

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selection of those items that do enter consciousness may give a clue to the relation of pain to good and evil.

Whitehead points out that it is an error to think that events enter consciousness which are "dominant in our neighbourhood." Activities and conditions which are pervasive and constant are seldom registered in consciousness. It is the "changeable, shifting aspects" of the environment which are selected for conscious observation. "This is only common sense; for something can be done about them."[139] Often we become conscious of our visceral events when something goes wrong and a possible change in eating habits or some other activity may overcome the aesthetically destructive situation. We do not usually smell the air we constantly breathe; but when an attractive odor invites or a repulsive odor warns, there is more likely to be consciousness of the atmosphere. It would appear that there is a tendency for those features of experience to enter consciousness which vary and for that reason may be useful to the organism for the conscious modification of the environment so as to minimize aesthetic destruction and maximize intensity of satisfaction. This would suggest that the consciousness of aesthetic destruction that appears in pain is useful to the organism because it may induce avoiding or overcoming behavior.

It is certainly true that not all pain is beneficial. The pain may be so intense that the organism is immobilized and cannot engage in modifying behavior. Whitehead suggests three main responses to persistent pain. "For example, a species whose members are always in pain will either cease to exist, or lose the delicacy of perception which results in that pain, or develop a finer and more subtle relationship among its bodily parts."[140] It would appear that pain is so closely associated with destructive evil in the first case that there would be difficulty in differentiating the pain from the evil. Where removal of pain and destruction of the species go together there is little basis for distinguishing pain from evil. In a situation where elimination of the registration of the pain in consciousness does not damage the organism, the pain is one form of evil. In such a situation the occasions experiencing aesthetic destruction are extrinsically evil for the dominant occasion which experiences them as inducing pain which is not instrumentally good. The dominant occasion is not able to respond to this consciousness of pain by acting in such a way as to remove its cause. If the pain is a stimulus for modifying behavior overcoming the destructive features in the environment, a distinction should be made between the evil of aesthetic destruction and the pain which is a conscious aid to overcoming the evil. Here the extrinsically evil occasions in a subsociety of the organism induce pain which is instrumentally good. The dominant occasion is able to act so as to remove the pain for future occasions in its route. The value of pain perception is dramatically illustrated in the vulnerability of lepers to injury because their nerves transmitting pain have degenerated.

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[139] MT, pp. 40 f.; cf. AI, p. 209.

More attention will be given in the chapter on overcoming evil to the method by which an organism responds to the consciousness of aesthetic destruction by behavior modifying the environment. At this point it seems clear that Whitehead regards the conscious experience of aesthetic destruction in pain and suffering in many cases as instrumentally good.

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[140] RM, p. 96.

Reality of evil

In the second chapter we noted Whitehead's criticism of those philosophies which confine reality to a static eminently real absolute and relegate the world of change and evil to the realm of mere appearance. One of the problems of a philosophy of being in contrast with a philosophy of process is that it makes evil unreal. Augustine had said referring to God, "To you, nothing whatsoever is evil."[141] Has Whitehead himself succeeded in granting to evil a reality which meets his own criticism?

The first part of the answer refers back to the section on evil as something positive. Evil is not merely the absence of something good. It is the positive prehension of a factor which is a contrary to some other positive prehension in the becoming occasion. This positive feeling of aesthetic destruction is a part of the process which is the becoming actual entity. "There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real."[142] It is "tired decadence" which allows philosophy to "dismiss turmoil" into a realm of mere appearance which is not quite real.[143] "No religion which faces facts can minimize the evil in the world, not merely the moral evil, but the pain and the suffering."[144] When assembling the data for a comprehensive vision of the world, it must be remembered that "Strife is at least as real a fact in the world as Harmony."[145] "The fact of evil, interwoven with the texture of the world, shows that in the nature of things there remains effectiveness for degradation."[146]

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[141] Augustine, Confessions of St. Augustine, trans. John K. Ryan (Garden City, New York: Image Books, 1960), 7.13.19, p. 172.

[142] PR, pp. 27 f.; cf. AI, p. 354. [143] MT, pp. 109-110.

[144] RM, p. 49.

Whitehead was critical of "even the great Spinoza" for his tendency to develop his thought around harmony and order and then to introduce evil "as a secondary aspect." In contrast Whitehead says that "'disorder', 'evil', 'error'" belong to the "general character" of reality. "There is no reason to hold that confusion is less fundamental than is order. Our task is to evolve a general concept which allows room for both; and which also suggests the path for the enlargement of our penetration."[147] When he formulated a systematic set of general ideas, he did give evil a place which suggests that it is as real as the good. "In our cosmological construction we are, therefore left with the final opposites, joy and sorrow, good and evil, disjunction and conjunction. . . ."[148] His description gives to disorder as integral a position in "givenness" as to order.[149] In his system there is no evasion of the factual givenness of evil. He takes account of its presence and accounts for its emergence. He gives to evil a place in his cosmological system corresponding with its factual reality.

A person might easily misunderstand Whitehead to be suggesting some kind of Manichaean dualism with his final opposites of good and evil and his reference to evil as belonging to the general character of the world. It will become clear in the next chapter on the cause of evil that there is no self-existent evil power in the world opposing a self-existent good God.

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[145] AI, p. 39. [146] RM, p. 17. [147] MT, pp. 69-70.

[148] PR, p. 518. [149] PR, p. 127.

At this point we may emphasize the reality of evil by pointing out that the process character of reality is connected with the emergence of evil. There is a constant drive toward more complex and higher grades of good. The process of change toward these higher grades involves evil so that "some admixture of Discord is a necessary factor in the transition from mode to mode."[150] "Decay, Transition, Loss, Displacement belong to the essence of the Creative Advance."[151]

Whitehead contrasts Buddhism and Christianity on their willingness to face the factual reality of evil. He commends Christianity for admitting that evil is "inherent throughout the world."[152] Although traditional Christianity is willing to acknowledge the facts of evil he thinks it is not as clear in its metaphysical ideas accounting for the evil. We have noted in the chapter on Whitehead's criticisms that God is made responsible for evil and is therefore a despotic example leading to despotic actions on the part of his followers. In the next chapter we turn to Whitehead's explanation of how evil does emerge. It will be seen that God is not responsible for evil that cannot be justified and that Christianity's acknowledgement of the factual reality of evil is included in his system.

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[150] AI, p. 342. [151] AI, pp. 368 f. [152] RM, p. 51.

CHAPTER IV

CAUSE OF EVIL

In the chapter on Whitehead's criticisms of thought bearing on the problem of evil, it was noted that monism cannot explain the rise of evil and materialism cannot explain the rise of good. In the preceding chapter in the section on the good as composite there was a beginning of a discussion of how Whitehead understands the good to emerge. It was noted that if every becoming occasion experienced all occasions in the causal past with equal relevance, all occasions would be like each other and each such occasion would be hardly distinguishable from nothing. "The mere fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity of indefiniteness."[1] Not everything in the past is experienced with equal relevance. Each occasion emphasizes unique features which in turn exclude those elements which are contrary to the dominant inclusions. Five principles regulating inclusion and exclusion were discussed briefly.

This chapter discusses how the evil arises. The evil was described as aesthetic destruction. Whitehead's use of the word concrescence suggests that we may think of the good as aesthetic construction. Concrescence of many feelings into a unit of becoming actuality is "the production of novel togetherness."[2] Whitehead explains his choice of the word "concrescence" by calling attention to the Latin meaning of the verb indicating "growing together."[3] The good is a unit of aesthetic construction and evil is destruction or inhibition of this becoming actuality. Evil is not the destruction of what has already been constructed but the destruction of what might have been constructed.

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[1] SMW, p. 137. [2] PR, p. 32.

A parenthetical comment should be made about ambiguity in the use of the term aesthetic destruction. Ordinary language is based on a view that whatever is constructed endures until it is destroyed. The philosophy of organism explains this appearance of endurance as the reconstruction in subsequent occasions of what had been constructed in antecedent occasions of enduring objects. The massive failure of the reconstruction of elements in many enduring objects would be perceived by the subjects of a route of conscious human occasions as destruction of something which had endured as actual. Often Whitehead does not carefully qualify ordinary language so as to remind the reader that evil is a destruction of what might have been reconstructed rather than a destruction of what is already actual. This discussion will not bother to reword his references to the destruction of species, cultural institutions, and other enduring phenomena so as to call attention to the strict definition of evil in relation to potentiality and actuality.

Whitehead finds that one of the basic characteristics of the cosmos is the opposition between the thrust toward evil and the tendency toward good. There is a "fundamental duality in the universe, namely the physical tendency towards degradation and the counter-tendency upwards."[4] The opposition between aesthetic destruction and aesthetic construction is a theme prominent in The Function of Reason. A one paragraph "introductory summary" of the book begins as follows:

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[3] AI, p. 303.

> History discloses two main tendencies in the course of events. One tendency is exemplified in the slow decay of physical nature. With stealthy inevitableness, there is degradation of energy. The sources of activity sink downward and downward. Their very matter wastes. The other tendency is exemplified by the yearly renewal of nature in the spring, and by the upward course of biological evolution.[5]

Empirical observation reveals that the "upward trend" is only represented by a "sprinkling of exceptional cases." Most of observed nature is characterized by "slow decay."[6]

Whitehead refers to the duality of the upward trend of the good and the downward trend of the evil in several thinkers. "We all remember Bergson's doctrine of the *élan vital* and its relapse into matter. The double tendency of advance and relapse is here plainly stated."[7] The upward and downward tendencies should not be "torn apart" as they were in Descartes.[8] In a different context Whitehead quotes Shelley's lines from "Hellas" which refer to the world as "rolling ever / From creation to decay."[9] It is clear that Whitehead is very much aware of the pervasiveness of the problem of explaining the rise of good and evil.

This chapter concentrates on the downward trend of aesthetic destruction. One way to subdivide the discussion of the emergence of evil is to treat separately aesthetic destruction as it appears in the two kinds of fluency in the process of the emergence of the good. Whitehead sometimes speaks of "macroscopic process"[10] or "transition"[11] as that aspect of creativity which focuses on the flow of the many actual entities into the objective datum which becomes the basis for the internal process of becoming. There is then the "microscopic process"[12] or "concrescence"[13] which focuses on the internal process of becoming. Efficient causation functions in the macroscopic process of transition and final causation is a dominant feature of the macroscopic process of concrescence.[14] We can conveniently separate for purposes of analysis the discussion of evil that results from efficient causation from that which results from final causation. There is danger in interpreting this analytical distinction as suggesting that transition and concrescence are successive in the sense of being ontologically distinct. There is some sense in which concrescence is successively dependent on transition but there is one ontological process of becoming.

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[4] FR, p. 25, cf. AI, p. 206. [5] FR, p. v. [6] FR, p. 23.

[7] FR, p. 23. [8] FR, p. 24. [9] MT, p. 60.

Efficient Causation and the Rise of Evil

There are some differences between the concept of efficient causation in the philosophy of organism and in the Aristotelian tradition. For Whitehead efficient causation is the determined transition of physical actuality of the past into the objective datum which is the basis for the internal process of concrescence of a becoming actual occasion.

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[10] PR, p. 326; cf. pp. 75-76. [11] PR, pp. 320, 322.

[12] PR, pp. 326-327. [13] PR, p. 320. [14] PR, pp. 228, 320, 327, 423.

Determinism reigns in efficient causation. "Deterministic efficient causation" is contrasted with the "self-determination" of final causation.[15] Beyond the "determined components" which each occasion receives and transmits in efficient causation there remains the self-creative element resulting from final causation.[16] The outcome of efficient causation is determined by the character of the actual world which produces the action. The outcome of final causation is self-determined within the becoming occasion.

Efficient causation applies to that aspect of process which is described as transition in contrast with concrescence. Transition is "macroscopic," involving the whole external world outside the standpoint of the becoming occasion and concrescence is internal.[17] This external aspect of process is an "inflow of the actual world" into the occasion so as to constitute the datum of the occasion.[18] "According to this account, efficient causation expresses the transition from actual entity to actual entity; and final causation expresses the internal process whereby the actual entity becomes itself."[19] With satisfaction an actual occasion "loses the final causation which is its internal principle of unrest, and it acquires efficient causation" by which it qualifies the creativity in occasions in its causal future.[20] Efficient causation refers to the external process of the flow of the data of the actual world into the becoming occasion to form the objective datum of the occasion and final causation refers to the internal process of the becoming of the occasion with that objective datum.

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[15] PR, p. 374. [16] PR, p. 75. [17] PR, pp. 326-327.

[18] PR, p. 374. [19] PR, p. 228. [20] PR, p. 44.

Efficient causation is concerned with the physical causes in the past in contrast with the mental or ideal. Whitehead speaks of the "efficient causation of purely physical interconnections."[21] "In our experience we find appetition, effecting a final causation towards ideal ends which lie outside the mere physical tendency."[22] That philosophy which "asserts that physical causation is supreme, and which disjoins the physical cause from the final end"[23] is derived from the thought of Francis Bacon.[24] He made an "appeal to efficient causes as against final causes."[25] The flow of physical feeling from the actual world into the becoming occasion to become the objective datum is the focus of attention in an analysis of efficient causation. Final causation is the action of the mental pole integrating the feelings of this objective datum with those of the aim.

The causal factor in efficient causation is actual and in final causation is ideal. That aspect of the creative process which is the transition from the many occasions of the actual world to their objectification in the objective datum is "dominated by the efficient cause which is actual" and the process of the unification of the many objectifications in the objective datum into the one becoming occasion is "dominated by the final cause, which is the ideal."[26] "In this way the decision derived from the actual world, which is the efficient cause, is completed by the decision embodied in the subjective aim which is the final cause."[27] A parallel statement amplifies the contrast between the actual and the ideal. "The 'objectifications' of the actual entities in the actual world, relative to a definite entity, constitute the efficient causes out of which that actual entity arises; the 'subjective aim' at 'satisfaction' constitutes the final cause, or lure, whereby there is determinate concrescence; . . ."[28] Efficient causation as an expression of the actual repeats what already has been actualized, but final causation moves toward the actualization of novel definiteness. Insofar as an occasion merely repeats the past with a "lack of origination" in the mental pole, it expresses the "efficient causation operative in the actual world."[29] To whatever extent there is the emergence of novel form there is "final causation regulative of the emergence of novelty."[30] Repetition of the actual expresses "efficient cause, maintaining its power of survival." Actualization of novelty expresses "final cause, maintaining in the creature its appetition for creation."[31] Occasions in the actual world are causally active in efficient causation and the subjective aim of the occasion itself is the final cause. "Concrescence moves towards its final cause, which is its subjective aim; transition is the vehicle of the efficient cause, which is the immortal past."[32] This subjective aim which is the final cause itself undergoes development in the process of the concrescence. The subjective aim is the "private ideal which is the final cause of the concrescence." This private ideal is "gradually shaped in the process itself."[33] Efficient causation is a function of actuality and final causation is a function of ideality.

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[21] FR, p. 20. [22] FR, p. 72. [23] SMW, p. 111. [24] FR, p. 21.

[25] SMW, p. 12. [26] PR, p. 229. [27] PR, p. 423.

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[28] PR, p. 134. [29] PR, p. 178. [30] PR, p. 73. [31] MT, p. 163.

[32] PR, p. 320. [33] PR, p. 323; cf. p. 228.

The description of efficient causation so far given has already shown that the causal factor is in the past. The "immortal past" is causally operative in efficient causation.[34] "This individual objective existence of the actual occasions of the past, each functioning in each present occasion, constitutes the causal relationship which is efficient causation."[35] The efficient causation out of the past is contrasted with the emergence of novelty in the present. "An actual entity is at once the product of the efficient past, and is also, in Spinoza's phrase, causa sui."[36] Explanation by "efficient cause" is "explanation by 'tradition.'" Explanation by "final cause" is explanation of a becoming occasion in which "the subjective aim which determines its process of concrescence has introduced a novelty of definiteness not to be found in the inherited data of its primary phase."[37] Efficient causation is determined by an immortal past which is fixed and final causation arises out of a becoming present which is creative of novelty. Novelty produced by final causation in a becoming actual occasion is added to the pool of past actuality when that occasion perishes in its satisfaction. "But with the attainment of the 'satisfaction,' the immediacy of final causation is lost, and the occasion passes into its objective immortality, in virtue of which efficient causation is constituted."[38] Efficient causation is "activity urged from behind" and final causation in a conscious human being is "activity directed to determinate ends in the known world."[39]

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[34] PR, p. 320. [35] AI, p. 251; cf. p. 280. [36] PR, p. 228.

[37] PR, p. 159. [38] PR, p. 448. [39] SMW, p. 131.

In efficient causation a settled past determines a becoming present. In final causation a becoming ideal determines a becoming present.

Now that efficient causation is seen to be an expression of physical actuality from the past and final causation an expression of developing ideality in the present, another comment on the deterministic aspect of efficient cause is possible. The interaction of efficient and final causation may be seen as the mutual relations of the compulsion of past physical actuality and the persuasion of developing ideality. "The force is the sheer fact of what the antecedent volume of the world in fact contains."[40] In efficient causation we have the "iron compulsion of nature,"[41] the "massive habits of physical nature," which in part produce the "impracticability of purpose."[42] "Compulsive determinism in the universe" depends on the principle that the mental pole to some degree conforms to efficiently caused objective content and does not merely introduce novelty.[43] In a paraphrase of a selection from the Timaeus Whitehead shows the relation between determined efficient causation and self-creative final causation by saying that what happens in the creative process "is conditioned by the compulsion of its own past, and by the persuasion of its immanent ideals."[44] In another passage referring to Plato Whitehead refers the immanent ideals to a divine origin. "More than two thousand years ago, the wisest of men proclaimed that the divine persuasion is the foundation of the order of the world, but that it could only produce such a measure of harmony as amid brute forces it was possible to accomplish."[45] In later discussion attention will be given to the difference between the divine ideal and the private ideal developed in the becoming occasion. Here the contrast between the compulsion of efficient causation and the persuasion of final causation is under consideration. In the next section it is shown that the long term tendency of efficient causation is toward aesthetic destruction or evil. In contrast "a widespread reliance on persuasion produces its reward in the shape of an upward evolution."[46] Here is portrayed the dual tendencies observable in the cosmos, aesthetic construction and aesthetic destruction, good and evil. "There stand in public view the persuasiveness of the eternal ideals, the same today as when realized in the Founder of Christianity, and the compulsoriness of physical nature, which passes and yet remains. . . ."[47] The eternal ideals persuade toward more complex higher grades of good. The compulsion of efficient causation over a long period of time eliminates complexity.

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[40] AI, p. 53. [41] AI, p. 108. [42] AI, p. 84.

[43] AI, p. 326. [44] AI, p. 241.

Although efficient and final causation have contrasting roles they are mutually dependent. Aristotelian influence led to the "overstressing of the notion of final causes during the Christian middle ages." Bacon was prominent in a "correlative overstressing of the notion of 'efficient causes' during the modern scientific period. One task of a sound metaphysics is to exhibit final and efficient causes in their proper relation to each other."[48] Without efficient cause final cause has no raw material with which to operate. "The universe, as construed solely in terms of the efficient causation of purely physical interconnections, presents a sheer, insoluble contradiction."[49] The attempt to remove final causation has made "the doctrine of efficient causation equally inexplicable" as Descarte's need to have God push extended substances shows. "The two tendencies upward and downward cannot be torn apart. They exist together."[50] A "satisfactory cosmology" is one in which efficient and final causation are shown to be "interwoven and required, each by the other."[51]

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[45] AI, p. 205. [46] AI, p. 88. [47] AI, p. 218.

[48] PR, pp. 128-129.

The mutual dependence of efficient and final causation on each other must be taken into account in this discussion which analyzes the cause of evil under the two headings of efficient and final causation. Although the downward trend of aesthetic destruction is associated with prolonged repetition of efficient causation, the upward trend of final causation could not function without efficiently caused data included in the objective datum.

Efficient causation is the determined transition of physical actuality of the past into the objective datum which is the basis for the internal process of concrescence of a becoming actual occasion. Final causation is the self-caused becoming of the subjective aim in the process of integration of the physical feelings of the datum with the conceptual feelings of that developing aim. A paragraph has been devoted to the explanation of each of the following characteristics of efficient causation. Efficient causation is deterministic. It is active in transition. Actuality is causally determinant of the outcome. That actuality is in the past of the becoming occasion.

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[49] FR, p. 20. [50] FR, p. 24. [51] FR, p. 23.

Correlative characteristics of final causation were mentioned in these same paragraphs. Final causation is a process of self-causation. It is active in concrescence. In final causation developing ideality is causally active. The becoming ideal within the epoch determines the becoming present. We turn now to a more detailed discussion of how efficient causation functions in the process of transition.

Transition eliminates contraries

Transition refers to that aspect of process which moves from the many data of the external actual world to the objective datum which is the objective basis for the concrescence within the becoming actual occasion. "There is a transition from the initial data to the objective datum effected by the elimination."[52]

The initial data include all the actual entities of the causal past. The "principle of relativity" provides that "it belongs to the nature of a 'being' that it is a potential for every 'becoming.'" This means that "every item in its universe is involved in each concrescence."[53] The ontological principle means "every entity is felt by some actual entity."[54] This means that there are no entities that exist independently of some actual entity. If all actual entities are prehended, all entities which are, in any sense, are part of the experience of those prehended actual entities and are therefore available for prehension and synthesis in the becoming occasion. "All actual entities in the actual world, relatively to a given actual entity as 'subject,' are necessarily 'felt' by that subject, though in general vaguely."[55] "The whole antecedent world conspires to produce a new occasion."[56] All actual occasions are felt. They are felt in grades of relevance ranging from dominance to traces of effect.[57] The means by which the welter of uncoordinated initial data is transformed into a unified objective datum with feelings in grades of relevance is the subject of this section.[58]

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[52] PR, p. 338. [53] PR, p. 33. [54] PR, p. 66.

Division makes it possible to feel one aspect of an actual occasion positively and other aspects negatively. There is an abstraction of the positively prehended element from the other elements. "This abstractive 'objectification' is rendered possible by reason of the 'divisible' character of the satisfactions of actual entities. By reason of this 'divisible' character causation is the transfer of a feeling, and not of a total satisfaction."[59]

In the section on the good as composite in Chapter III five principles regulating the emergence of the good were discussed as follows. The principle of intensive relevance provides that objects experienced range in relevance from just above zero to dominance. The principle of compatibility and contrariety indicates that diverse objects may be felt positively if they form compatible contrasts and are eliminated if they are contraries. When the same feeling is experienced from many occasions in a society of occasions, that feeling is felt with greater intensity. Proximate objects are felt with greater intensity than remote objects. A unit of experience is guided by a subjective aim which is initially derived in such a way as to guide the experience toward retaining those elements from the experienced world which are best adapted to yield the highest possible intensity.

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[55] PR, p. 66. [56] MT, p. 225. [57] PR, pp. 335, 366; SMW, p. 252.

[58] RM, pp. 150 f.; PR, p. 224. [59] PR, p. 364.

All of these principles operate in efficient causation which transforms the initial data into the objective datum. The second principle is singled out for amplification in this part of the discussion. Transition proceeds as contrary feelings are eliminated.

There is a differentiation between contrasts which are compatible complexities and contraries which are incompatible. One of the grounds of order is that "the heightening of intensity arises from order such that the multiplicity of components in the nexus can enter explicit feeling as contrasts, and are not dismissed into negative prehensions as incompatibilities."[60] Incompatibilities are feelings which are contrary to the dominant feelings in an occasion. "Here 'contrary' means the impossibility of joint entry in the same sense."[61]

Contrariness and compatibility are determined by the relationships between the eternal objects involved. "The how of the limitations, and the how of the additions, are alike the realization of eternal objects in the constitution of the actual entity in question."[62] The transition from the initial data to the objective datum is "provided by the eternal objects concerned."[63] "Every individual objectification in the datum has its perspective defined by its own eternal objects with their own relevance compatible with the relevance of other objectifications."[64]

The relationships between eternal objects which determine compatibility and contrariety are grounded in the nature of things. The suitability of an eternal object to be integrated with another eternal object in a compatible contrast "depends upon the fundamental graduation of appetitions which lies at the base of things, and which solves all indeterminations of transition."[65] "The compatibilities and incompatibilities which impose the perspective, transforming the actual world into the datum, are inherent in the nature of things."[66] A more detailed discussion of the origin of gradations of relevance of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God will be given in the chapter on the relation of God to the problem of evil.

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[60] PR, p. 128; cf. pp. 145, 167, 170. [61] PR, p. 71.

[62] PR, p. 226. [63] PR, p. 227. [64] PR, p. 234.

The integrating tendency of compatible contrasts and the eliminating tendency of contraries is produced by the mutual interaction of the feelings involved. "There is interconnection between the degrees of relevance of different items in the same actual entity."[67] The decision of transition producing the datum "is a transference of self-limited appetition."[68] The objective content of the datum is "analysable into actual entities under limited perspectives provided by their own natures; these limited perspectives involve eternal objects in grades of relevance."[69] The unity that is present in the datum is produced through "inherent presuppositions of each other" in the feelings which eliminate contraries and "elicit into relevance" those feelings that are compatible. "Thus objectification is an operation of mutually adjusted abstraction, or elimination, whereby the many occasions of the actual world become one complex datum."[70] This mutual causal relation of the feelings involved in a transition even applies to negative prehensions so that they "are not independent of the other feelings."[71]

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[65] PR, p. 315. [66] PR, p. 233. [67] PR, p. 224.

[68] PR, p. 227. [69] PR, p. 232. [70] PR, p. 321.

The first categoreal obligation describes the conditions necessary for positive inclusion in the first phase and in every phase of a becoming occasion. "The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of their subject."[72] The initial data include every actual entity in the actual world, and elimination of incompatible feelings leaves a set of compatible feelings.

The elimination of incompatible feelings is accomplished through negative prehensions. "The creative process is a process of exclusion to the same extent as it is a process of inclusion. In this connection 'to exclude' means to relegate to irrelevance in the aesthetic unity, and 'to include' means to elicit relevance to that unity."[73] Incompatible feelings must be excluded or their presence would cancel out other feelings. "The emergence of some actual value depends on limitation which excludes neutralising crosslights."[74] In order for a positive prehension to be effective in a concrescence there must be "elimination of elements in the data not to be reconciled with that detail playing that part in the process."[75] The excluding limitations are "imposed by incompatibilities of feelings. Such incompatibilities relegate various elements in the constitutions of felt objects to the intensive zero, which is termed 'irrelevance.'"[76] The negative prehensions "which effect the elimination are not merely negligible."[77] The incompatible feelings are "dismissed by negative prehensions, owing to their lack of compliance with categoreal demands."[78] A high-grade organism is able to eliminate "the irrelevant accidents in its environment, and to elicit massive attention to every variety of systematic order."[79]

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[71] PR, p. 362. [72] PR, p. 39. [73] RM, p. 113.

[74] SMW, p. 278. [75] MT, p. 122. [76] PR, p. 225; cf. p. 227.

The emphasis in this section is on the action of incompatibilities repelling and compatibilities attracting feelings for the aesthetic construction of a becoming actual occasion. The other principles regulating the emergence of a unit of good are concurrently functioning. A feeling massively reinforced by being present in many actual occasions in the actual world will achieve greater intensity. Such an intense objectification would then become the base from which other less well reinforced incompatible feelings would be excluded by negative prehensions. A spatio-temporally remote feeling will be prehended with less intensity than one that is contiguous. The difference made by spatio-temporal proximity is included when it is said that "'Determination' is analysable into 'definiteness' and 'position,' where 'definiteness' is the illustration of select eternal objects, and 'position' is relative status in a nexus of actual entities."[80] If the feelings of a contiguous occasion are reinforced by social repetition, they have increased power to dominate. Even the subjective aim functions in the transition from the initial data to the objective datum. "The negative prehensions are determined by the categoreal conditions governing feelings, by the subjective form, and by the initial data." The subjective form in turn is determined by "the negative prehensions, the objective datum, and the conceptual origination of the subject." The conceptual origination of the final cause in the subjective aim is a factor in the subjective form which in turn is a factor in the negative prehensions. More attention to the role of the subjective aim will be given in the section on the role of final causation in the rise of evil. At this point it is important to call attention to the "mutual determination"[81] of the elements in a becoming occasion and emphasize again the interdependence of efficient and final causation.

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[77] PR, p. 346; cf. p. 353. [78] PR, p. 364. [79] PR, p. 483.

[80] PR, p. 38.

Inclusion of a feeling in the positive factors in a becoming occasion is not a matter of all or nothing. There is a continuum ranging from dominance to the zero of irrelevance.[82] "This ordering of relevance starts from those forms which are, in the fullest sense, exemplified, and passes through grades of relevance down to those forms which in some faint sense are proximately relevant by reason of contrast with actual fact."[83] The mutual sensitivity mentioned in the discussion of the elimination produced by negative prehensions results in an "interconnection between the degrees of relevance of different items in the same actual entity."[84] The degree of prominence of one factor affects the degree of elimination of another factor so that each occasion turns out to be a unique integration of all the actual entities of the actual world. The relegation of particular feelings of a past actual entity to the zero of irrelevance does not mean that the occasion itself is not felt. Every actual entity in the causal past "must enter into the concrescence of that subject by some simple causal feeling, however vague, trivial, and submerged." In spite of negative prehensions "in some way, by some trace of causal feeling, the remote actual entity is prehended positively."[85]

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[81] PR, p. 338. [82] PR, p. 225.

[83] PR, p. 69; cf. p. 232; RM, pp. 112, 150 f.; SMW, p. 233.

[84] PR, p. 224.

The outcome of efficient causation is the objective datum which is the physical basis for the process of concrescence within the becoming occasion. The abstraction of these physical feelings from the data into a unified set of feelings compatible for integration into a becoming occasion is sometimes referred to as the "perspective" of the actual world.[86] "The 'settlement' which an actual entity 'finds' is its datum." We have seen how this settled outcome is produced by the mutual sensitivity of the feelings which eliminate incompatibilities and elicit contrasts, and the "new concrescence starts from this datum."[87]

The source of the causal action in efficient causation is the state of the actual world. "There is the becoming of the datum, which is to be found in the past of the world."[88] All of the occasions of that actual world are determinative. The feeling of a form of definiteness from one occasion which is reinforced by a feeling of that same form from many occasions in the past will have more intensity and be more determinative. An occasion that is spatio-temporally proximate will be more determinative than one that is remote. A feeling that is more compatible with the initial ideal aim will tend to be drawn into positive inclusion more than a feeling that is incompatible. A feeling that is incompatible with the dominant feelings excludes itself by the repulsion of incompatibility as much as it is excluded by the feelings of the included feelings.

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[85] PR, p. 366. [86] PR, pp. 321, 338, 353, 361.

[87] PR, p. 227. [88] PR, p. 228.

No stable endurance

Through the effect of efficient causation there is no stable endurance of forms of definiteness in enduring objects and therefore in enduring phenomena made up of enduring objects. Such enduring phenomena range all the way from rocks to social institutions. In the absence of the upward thrust produced by final causation "nature is doomed to slow descent towards nothingness. Mere repetitive experience gradually eliminates element after element and fades toward vacuity."[89] As with the societies of nature so the social structures of civilization wear down with repetition. "We have seen that there can be no real halt of civilization in the indefinite repetition of a perfected ideal. Staleness sets in. And this fatigue is nothing other than the creeping growth of anaesthesia, whereby that social group is gradually sinking towards nothingness."[90] Referring to the argument in The Function of Reason Whitehead says, "It has been urged in these pages, that there is no true stability. What looks like stability is a relatively slow process of atrophied decay. The stable universe is slipping away from under us."[91] He finds that there is "no direct evidence" of "undifferentiated endurance" even in scientific analysis of the elementary particles in the atoms making up such enduring aspects of nature as stones. In this case stability is maintained through "vibration" which is produced through the intervention of final cause.[92] The novelty that is produced under the Category of Conceptual Reversion operates in this vibration so that "even amid stability there is never undifferentiated endurance."[93] There is more discussion of vibration in the chapter on overcoming evil.

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[89] FR, p. 28. [90] AI, p. 368.

[91] FR, p. 66; cf. pp. 18 f.

From the societies of occasions making up human life "no static maintenance of perfection is possible. This axiom is rooted in the nature of things. Advance or decadence are the only choices offered to mankind. The pure conservative is fighting against the essence of the universe.[94] This instability of any form of perfection results from the fact that "the law of fatigue is inexorable." When a form of life has reached fulfillment and tried out the variations that are possible, the only remaining alternatives are advance or decline. "It can stabilize itself, and relapse so as to live; or it can shake itself free, and enter upon the adventure of living better."[95] The maintenance of life through relapse is surrender to the evil produced by the cross currents of efficient cause. Advance requires final causation to overcome this downward trend.

Whitehead says that the doctrine that no stable endurance is possible is founded on "three metaphysical principles. One principle is that the very essence of real actuality--that is, of the completely real--is process."[96] The denial of the process character of reality and the assertion of the static character of the realization of perfection comes through two Greek roots. Plato located ultimate reality in the "super-world of ideas."[97] Aristotle regarded the primary substances as the "static foundations which received the impress of qualification" and led to Locke's mind as an "empty cabinet" which receives the "impress of ideas."[98] The preceding chapter has presented an introductory description of the good as process and laid the foundation for the explanation why the nature of this process does not allow the stable endurance of an achieved type of perfection. This chapter has explained how the process of transition elicits compatible feelings from the actual world into the unity of an objective datum as it eliminates incompatible contraries. This objective datum is the basis for the integration of compatible feelings into a unit of becoming actuality. "Its good resides in the realization of a strength of many feelings fortifying each other as they meet in the novel unity. Its evil lies in the clash of vivid feelings, denying to each other their proper expansion."[99] A feeling that is supported by integration with a compatible feeling is a feeling intensified. A feeling that is opposed by an incompatible feeling is a feeling diminished. Since every becoming occasion prehends every actual entity in its causal past, it cannot avoid the tendency toward decay produced by the prehension of contrary feelings. The forms of definiteness in the defining characteristic of an enduring object are slightly diminished in intensity each time they repulse their contraries from the actual world. Each successive occasion in an enduring object suffers from the loss of some of the good experienced by its predecessor through the aesthetic destruction resulting from efficient causation. This evil is "the violence of strength against strength."[100]

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[92] PR, p. 285. [93] PR, p. 381. [94] AI, p. 354.

[95] FR, p. 14. [96] AI, p. 354.

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[97] AI, p. 354. [98] AI, p. 355. [99] AI, p. 355.

The second metaphysical principle is "the doctrine that every occasion of actuality is in its own nature finite." It is not possible to realize in one occasion all of the perfections made possible by the actual world. "There is no totality which is the harmony of all perfections."[101] Each becoming occasion must eliminate most of the initial data from the actual world in order to find a compatible set of feelings for the realization of its actuality. The finitude of an actual occasion requires that it eliminate most of these feelings in its initial data. The activity of elimination uses up some of the intensity of the feelings positively prehended in its satisfaction. Each successive occasion in an enduring object loses a little of the defining characteristic. "Repetition produces a gradual lowering of vivid appreciation."[102] Each successive loss may be very small. "There may be high survival power. For decadence, undisturbed by originality or by external forces, is a slow process."[103] The finitude of each occasion makes elimination necessary and elimination uses up strength of beauty so that no static maintenance of a form of realized perfection is possible.

The third metaphysical principle preventing stable endurance "may be termed the principle of Individuality."[104] Substance is not a static base which receives the impress of qualities. It is composed of the harmonious combination of individualities of the past. Each new occasion experiences all past occasions in an individual way. This individuality is an expression of freedom. "For freedom, in any one of its many senses, is the claim for vigorous self-assertion."[105] This individuality is not just a "surface show of sensa" as would appear in consciousness in the superficial experience of sense perception but is a "real conflation of fundamental feeling."[106] The bringing together of all of the feelings of the occasions of the actual world into a limited process of individualization results in the mutual cancelation of contraries and prevents the stable maintenance of an achieved form of perfection.

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[100] AI, p. 355. [101] AI, p. 356. [102] AI, pp. 356 f.

[103] AI, pp. 358 f. [104] AI, p. 360.

The process character of each realization of the good forbids stable endurance through identical repetition in a route of occasions. Process means either decay or change to some other type of realization. The process of limitation so as to exclude contraries uses up the strength of the feelings which might have been integrated into an occasion of greater actualization of good. The individuality of each occasion requires inclusion and exclusion of different elements from the causal past than those included and eliminated by its predecessor. The stable endurance of realized perfection is impossible. There may be gradual decline through the effect of efficient cause or growth to greater strength of beauty but static maintenance is impossible.

Efficient causation tends toward nothingness

The preceding section has concentrated on that aspect of process in which efficient causation prevents the static maintenance of a realized form of perfection. If the gradual decline resulting from the action of efficient causation is extended over a long period of time, it tends toward nothingness.

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[105] AI, p. 362. [106] AI, p. 363.

In such decay the complexity of a defining characteristic is slowly reduced. The attempt to maintain a characteristic in an enduring object results in a "slow, prolonged decay in which the complexity of the organism gradually declines towards simpler forms."[107] When a new individual occasion prehends all the occasions in its causal past it sums up or averages that past. "In so far as an average dominates, expression fades."[108]

The slow decay of enduring objects would mean the decay of the physical objects which are made of many such enduring objects. Scientific observation does show that "protons, electrons, molecules, cosmic dust, stars, and planets" are "wasting at a finite rate."[109] "Our scientific formulation of physics displays a limited universe in process of dissipation."[110] The upward thrust is not as apparent as the downward tendency. "If we survey the world as a physical system determined by its antecedent states, it presents to us the spectacle of a finite system steadily running down--losing its activities and its varieties."[111] Deterministic efficient causation expresses the compulsion of physical nature in contrast with the persuasion of final causation.[112]

The final result of persistent decay produced by efficient causation is nothingness. Apart from the upward trend produced by final causation, "nature is doomed to slow descent towards nothingness. Mere repetitive experience gradually eliminates element after element and fades towards vacuity."[113] Repetitive realization of a given form produces the "creeping growth of anaesthesia, whereby that social group is gradually sinking towards nothingness. The defining characteristics are losing their importance."[114] As the defining characteristics disintegrate "experience trivializes and verges towards nothingness."[115] It is somewhat misleading to say that the gradual decline produced by efficient causation tends toward nothingness since "you cannot approach nothing; for there is nothing to approach. It is an approach towards the futility of being a faint compromise between contrary reasons."[116] This experience of mutually canceling feelings sounds very much like the description of an occasion which does not limit itself to a few compatible features of the initial data. "The mere fusion of all that there is would be the nonentity of indefiniteness."[117]

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[107] FR, p. 19. [108] MT, p. 29. [109] FR, p. 19.

[110] FR, p. 22. [111] FR, pp. 71 f.

[112] AI, pp. 84, 205, 218, 241, 326. [113] FR, p. 28.

Several descriptions of the final outcome toward which efficient causation tends call attention to the counter-tendency which is expressed in final causation. We have noted that efficient and final causation are intertwined and mutually require each other. Descriptions of what efficient causation would produce in the absence of final causation would seem to be designed to clarify the role of efficient causation in the complex and not to suggest that efficient causation could occur without the contribution of final causation. In objectification there is an immanence of past occasions in a becoming occasion. The transition from such past occasions to the present is efficient and "apart from some notion of imposed Law, the doctrine of immanence provides absolutely no reason why the universe should not be steadily relapsing into lawless chaos."[118] God is the source of order which is expressed in law. "Apart from God, the remaining formative elements would fail in their functions. There would be no creatures, since, apart from harmonious order, the perceptive fusion would be a confusion neutralizing achieved feeling."[119] The downward trend of efficient causation is contrasted with the upward thrust traceable to God. "Apart from the intervention of God, there could be nothing new in the world, and no order in the world. The course of creation would be a dead level of ineffectiveness, with all balance and intensity progressively excluded by the cross currents of incompatibility."[120] Efficient causation produces a small amount of aesthetic destruction in each occasion through the mutual self-cancellation of contrary feelings. Efficient causation produces the downward trend of aesthetic destruction. Final causation through the "teleology of the universe, with its aim at intensity and variety"[121] produces an upward thrust.

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[114] AI, p. 368. [115] MT, p. 12. [116] PR, p. 142.

[117] SMW, p. 137.

The evil produced by efficient causation is primarily comparative evil since the strength of beauty in each occasion in a route of occasions in which there is slow decay has less intensity than it would have if there had not been that mutual self-cancellation of feelings. Often this comparative evil is not connected with intrinsic evil in which there is a feeling of aesthetic destruction within the concrescence of the occasion. In the creeping anaesthesia produced by efficient causation "there may be no pain or conscious loss."[122] Most of the evil produced in efficient causation occurs in the transition from initial data to the objective datum. This objective datum contains only feelings which are compatible for integration through the category of subjective unity.[123] The loss in transition occurs before production of the objective datum is complete and is therefore not intrinsic to the concrescence. There are instances when the aesthetic destruction in transition produces a defective objective datum which leads to intrinsic evil as well. The evil produced by efficient causation is felt most keenly by those high grade occasions which remember, anticipate and compare what is with what might have been.

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[118] AI, pp. 146 f. [119] RM, p. 104. [120] PR, p. 377.

[121] AI, p. 259. [122] AI, p. 368.

There should be no need to call attention to the positive role of efficient causation in the aesthetic construction of the good. Without efficient causation to produce the objectification of feelings of the past in the objective datum there would be no occasion at all. The immanence of past occasions in a present occasion "is the only way in which we can understand notions habitually employed in daily life" such as "causation."[124] Without this efficient causation science is "without any importance" and "effort is foolish, because it determines nothing."[125] Without the immanence of occasions of the causal past in a becoming occasion it would not be possible to carry out purpose. It is clear that efficient and final causation are mutually dependent.

The metaphysical situation in which efficient causation makes possible a science of causes which can effectively guide effort is at the same time a situation in which efficient causation tends over long periods of time to destroy all positive realization of forms of definiteness. Final causation is able to overcome the decaying effect of efficient causation. Although the most pervasive and persistent source of evil is efficient causation, there are also types of aesthetic destruction which are produced in the operations of final causation.

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[123] PR, p. 39; cf. pp. 341, 367 f., 378, 381.

[124] MT, p. 225. [125] MT, p. 226.

Final Causation and the Rise of Evil

In differentiating efficient from final causation we noted that final causation has to do with mentality and ideality. Whitehead defends his use of the concept of final causation by citing evidence for purposefulness. "There is clear evidence that certain operations of certain animal bodies depend upon the foresight of an end and the purpose to attain it."[126] In the preceding section the tendency of efficient causation to produce a gradual decline toward nothingness has been described. While there is evidence in animal bodies of an opposite upward tendency, in inanimate nature decay is dominantly observable. "In the general physical universe we cannot obtain any direct knowledge of the corresponding agency by which it attained its present stage of available energy."[127] From the human experience of the upward tendency overcoming decay, Whitehead infers that there must be a pervasive final causation introducing corrective and developmental novelty. "But there is in nature some tendency upwards, in a contrary direction to the aspect of physical decay. In our experience we find appetition, effecting a final causation towards ideal ends which lie outside the mere physical tendency."[128] The patterns of ideality which produce the upward thrust consist in "final causation regulative of the emergence of novelty."[129]

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[126] FR, p. 12. [127] FR, p. 19. [128] FR, p. 72.

The appearance of corrective and developmental novelty occurs in the subjective aim. It is in the subjective aim that final causation is expressed. "Concrescence moves towards its final cause, which is its subjective aim."[130] Efficient causation objectifies the past and "the 'subjective aim' at 'satisfaction' constitutes the final cause, or lure, whereby there is determinate concrescence."[131] It is the "final cause, which is the ideal."[132] "The 'lure for feeling' is the final cause guiding the concrescence of feelings."[133]

Efficient causation objectifies the actual occasions in the world and the initial phase of the subjective aim is derived from God. "The primary element in the 'lure for feeling' is the subject's prehension of the primordial nature of God."[134] The experience of God "in each derivate actual entity results in a gradation of the relevance of eternal objects to the concrescent phases of that derivate occasion."[135] This experience of God originates ideal conceptual elements which tend to overcome the decay produced by efficient causation and bring about greater strength of beauty. It may be said that "God and the actual world jointly constitute the character of the creativity for the initial phase of the novel concrescence."[136]

It is important to notice at this point that the repeated combination through efficient causation of what has been accomplished in the past does not result in progress but in decline. In order for final causation to overcome this decay there must be conceptual origination. If there is to be a counter tendency to the slow physical decay of nature, it must come from something. "From nothing, there can come nothing."[137] Conceptual origination ultimately comes from God.

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[129] PR, p. 73; cf. AI, p. 266, PR, p. 159.

[130] PR, p. 320; cf. p. 423. [131] PR, p. 134. [132] PR, p. 229.

[133] PR, p. 281.

[134] PR, p. 287; cf. AI, p. 256, PR, pp. 104, 164, 343, 373, 524, 527.

[135] PR, p. 46. [136] PR, p. 374.

The subjective aim which is the final cause is not a fixed factor which exerts a causal influence throughout the phases of process. The subjective aim itself undergoes a process of development. There are three main types of evil which are caused by the initiation and development of the subjective aim. The initial aim as derived from God sometimes diverges from the past enough to produce discord which results in aesthetic destruction. In the course of the autonomous development of the subjective aim there is unconscious deviation from the ideal envisaged in the initial aim. In higher more complex occasions which experience consciousness there is morally responsible deviation from the initial ideal aim.

Unavoidable discord as instrumental to good

In the section on the good as composite it was explained that self-causation combining the initial subjective aim and the initial data selects those feelings which are dominant in a becoming occasion. These dominant feelings then exclude contrary feelings and attract compatible feelings to build up a complete occasion. We have also shown that over a long period of time efficient causation gradually weakens the strength of the dominant feelings in the occasions of an enduring object. The clash of physical feeling with physical feeling in the exclusion of incompatible feelings uses up the intensity of the dominant feelings.

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[137] FR, p. 20.

As the dominant feelings in the defining characteristic are gradually dissipated, final causation may initiate a novel combination of the remaining feelings which will bring together a different set of feelings into a more compatible contrast. Because the new defining characteristic will need to exclude some feelings that were formerly included and include some that were formerly excluded there will be discord during the period of transition. This discord is evil which is unavoidably connected with the good of a more complex and more intense combination. "Thus the contribution to Beauty which can be supplied by Discord--in itself destructive--is the positive feeling of a quick shift of aim from the tameness of outworn perfection to some other ideal with its freshness still upon it."[138]

The presence of the intrinsic evil of discordant aesthetic destruction does not prevent the realization of a more complex and more intense combination of the remaining compatible feelings in the occasion. This is the situation which was mentioned in the section on comparative evil where an occasion may experience more discord than its predecessor in a route and at the same time experience a greater strength of beauty.[139]

Just as offense is often the best defense, progress to a more complex defining characteristic is the best way to avoid the slow

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[138] AI, pp. 330 f.; cf. p. 359; PR, p. 287; SMW, pp. 246, 254.

[139] AI, pp. 330, 336, 339, 364; PR, pp. 373, 525.

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relapse toward nothingness that results with repetition. "Adventure is essential, namely, the search for new perfections."[140] If such adventure is to produce progress it must "venture along the borders of chaos in its substitution of higher for lower types of order."[141] Such advance must turn away from the stable and secure patterns of present order. "A power of incorporating vague and disorderly elements of experience is essential for the advance into novelty."[142] As vague new patterns of order are emphasized there is inevitable conflict with old patterns of order since "Such transition is a frustration of the prevalent dominance."[143]

Progress is often associated with discord and therefore with the evil of aesthetic destruction. "Progress is founded upon the experience of discordant feelings."[144] Discord is not something valuable in itself so that it should be sought for its possible novel combinations. What is sought is a new more complex set of dominant feelings which in turn cannot be gained without conflict with some features of old patterns since "some admixture of Discord is a necessary factor in the transition from mode to mode."[145] The evil produced by final cause which is instrumental to good is "tragedy" where there is an "aim at fineness beyond the faded level of surrounding fact."[146]

The action of final causation in which a novel form of definiteness is introduced in order to reorganize feelings so that decadence may be overcome and progress produced is sometimes referred to as error.

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[140] AI, p. 332. [141] PR, p. 169. [142] MT, p. 109.

[143] MT, p. 119. [144] AI, p. 330. [145] AI, p. 342.

[146] AI, p. 369.

The "lure for feeling" which is the initial subjective aim is the "source of error, of truth, of art, of ethics, and of religion. By it, fact is confronted with alternatives."[147] This is error in the sense that there is deviation from a changeless repetition of the past and not in the sense of deviation from a desirable outcome. "The initial aim is the best for that impasse."[148] It is a good deviation. Conceptual origination which introduces forms of ideality which deviate from past actuality "pave the way along which the world advances into novelty. Error is the price which we pay for progress."[149] The more complex occasions have a greater capacity for creative innovation. "In fact, error is the mark of the higher organisms, and is the schoolmaster by whose agency there is upward evolution."[150] In the more complex occasions in which there is consciousness there is often difficulty determining whether a deviation from past order will yield greater strength of beauty along with some discord or will produce destructive discord without increase of strength of beauty.

The ideal aim which is the best for the impasse deviates from the past because the new pattern brings more feelings into an orderly arrangement. The greater strength of beauty is produced by more complex order and is only diminished by the discord which is unavoidably connected. The discord as discord makes no contribution. In the analysis of ideals there is "the contrast between order as the condition for excellence, and order as stifling the freshness of living."[151] All excellent strength of beauty requires order but sometimes the fear of disorder leads to the rejection of a more complex order because it also involves a small amount of disorder. "Panic of error is the death of progress; and love of truth is its safeguard."[152] That error which is a deviation from an old pattern of order toward a new more complex pattern of order produces progress and should be affirmed even though there is an unavoidable accompaniment of discord.

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[147] PR, p. 287; cf. SMW, p. 254. [148] PR, p. 373.

[149] PR, p. 284. [150] PR, p. 256. [151] PR, p. 514.

We may refer to the evil which is unavoidably produced when there is an aim at greater strength of beauty as evil which is instrumental to good. The aesthetic destruction involved in this discord is not directly instrumental to good in the sense of making a contribution to the comprehensive strength of beauty. After the period of transition when the incompatible feelings have been removed, there can be even greater strength of beauty with this new form of definiteness. Some evil is produced by conceptual innovation when it unavoidably introduces some discord in the course of transferring to a novel more complex pattern of order.

Evil from unconscious deviation from the initial ideal aim

We have seen how the conceptual innovation in the initial ideal aim as it is derived from God aims at the maximum strength of beauty possible in that situation. Conceptual innovation is an important aspect of final causation. The autonomous development of the subjective aim is also a part of final causation.

Self-causation starts with the initial ideal aim as derived from God. "Thus the initial stage of the aim is rooted in the nature of God, and its completion depends on the self-causation of the subject-superject."[153] God is that "actual entity from which each temporal concrescence receives that initial aim from which its self-causation starts."[154]

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[152] MT, p. 22.

The initial ideal aim presents ideality as possibility, and concrescence integrates some of that ideality into the reality of the actual occasion as it modifies the subjective aim in the course of its autonomous development. In this process "the admission into, or rejection from, reality of conceptual feeling is the originative decision of the actual occasion."[155] As conceptual feelings are admitted into reality of integration with the physical pole there is a modification of the subjective aim. "Process is the growth and attainment of a final end."[156] When there is only a small amount of conceptual innovation in the initial ideal aim as is the case with a simple occasion, the autonomous modification of the subjective aim is negligible. Where the occasion is complex and there is a large amount of conceptual innovation, "the autonomy of the subject in the modification of its initial subjective aim must be taken into account."[157] This autonomous modification of the subjective aim is an aspect of final causation. "The determinate unity of an actual entity is bound together by the final causation towards an ideal progressively defined by its progressive relation to the determinations and indeterminations of the datum."[158] The development of the subjective aim continues throughout the entire process of concrescence so that "the attainment of a peculiar definiteness is the final cause which animates a particular process; and its attainment halts its process . . ."[159] "Thus the satisfaction is the attainment of the private ideal which is the final cause of the concrescence."[160]

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[153] PR, p. 373. [154] PR, p. 374. [155] PR, p. 131.

[156] PR, p. 227. [157] PR, p. 375. [158] PR, p. 228.

In the modification of the subjective aim that aim is both actor and receiver so that the occasion is described as causing itself. Which conceptual feelings in the ideal aim will be admitted into reality of feeling is the "originative decision" of the occasion itself. It is in this sense that "an actual occasion is *causa sui*."[161] The subjective aim operates reflexively so that it both dominates the concrescence and is modified. "This subjective aim is this subject itself determining its own self-creation as one creature."[162] There seems to be some connection between the progressive development of the subjective aim and its ability to cause itself. "The progressive definition of the final end is the efficacious condition for its attainment."[163] The ideal both determines and is determined. "The ideal, itself felt, defines what 'self' shall arise from the datum; and the ideal is also an element in the self which thus arises."[164] There is some sense in which the finally developed subjective aim operates in the development of itself. "For the superject which is their outcome is also the subject which is operative in their production."[165]

We need to analyze the method by which the subject causes itself in order to describe how this process gives rise to evil. The basic explanatory principle in Whitehead's system is the process in which the many become synthesized into one actual entity. "The ultimate metaphysical principle is the advance from disjunction to conjunction, creating a novel entity other than the entities given in disjunction."[166] The word which is used for this bringing together of the many into one is creativity, which is defined as follows:

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[159] PR, p. 340. [160] PR, p. 323. [161] PR, p. 131.

[162] PR, p. 108. [163] PR, pp. 227 f. [164] PR, p. 228.

[165] PR, p. 390.

> 'Creativity' is the universal of universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity.[167]

The action in which the many become one is "inexplicable either in terms of higher universals or in terms of the components participating in the concrescence."[168] Whitehead specifically rejects the idea that God elicits "this final togetherness out of nothing" and adopts the idea that this activity is a "metaphysical principle belonging to the nature of things."[169] It is inherent in the metaphysical situation that the many become one.[170] Creativity is the activity in which the many occasions of the actual world become one actual occasion.[171] It is "creativity which drives the world."[172]

Although there is no explanation for the action of coming together, an analysis of the dynamics of unity is helpful for understanding how deviation from the ideal aim is produced. The first Categoreal Obligation states that "The many feelings which belong to an incomplete phase in the process of an actual entity, though unintegrated by reason of the incompleteness of the phase, are compatible for integration by reason of the unity of their subject."[173] We have discussed how in the formation of the datum from the initial data compatible factors are attracted to each other and incompatible factors are repellent to each other. This first category aids in the explanation how an occasion causes itself since it is "one expression of the general principle that the one subject is the final end which conditions each component feeling. Thus the superject is already present as a condition, determining how each feeling conducts its own process."[174] Whitehead uses the word "superject" to emphasize the fact that the individual selfhood of an occasion is the processive outcome of concrescence rather than the static cabinet or blank tablet receiving experience.[175] The subjective character of an occasion involves its role as "presiding over"[176] and "experiencing"[177] concrescence. The superjective character of an occasion is "the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity."[178] The pragmatic value of an occasion is "the emergent unity" of the occasion.[179] By the category of subjective unity all the feelings in the first phase and in all subsequent phases are compatible for synthesis. Some of the emergent unity is already present in the first phase. The initial phase of the subjective aim is both processive outcome and therefore the superject and the autonomous determiner and therefore the subject of the concrescence.

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[166] PR, p. 32. [167] PR, p. 31. [168] PR, p. 32.

[169] AI, p. 303. [170] PR, pp. 522, 529; SMW, p. 255.

[171] PR, pp. 46, 321 f.; RM, p. 101. [172] AI, pp. 230 f.

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[173] PR, p. 39. [174] PR, p. 341.

[175] PR, pp. 43, 135 f., 234; AI, p. 356. [176] PR, p. 71.

[177] PR, p. 43. [178] PR, p. 134. [179] PR, p. 71.

Synthesis of feelings into a unity is what makes possible reflexive self-causation. "This final cause is an inherent element in the feeling, constituting the unity of that feeling. An actual entity feels as it does feel in order to be the actual entity which it is."[180] There is no controlling principle in the discrete initial data to regulate the character of the synthesis. "The regulative principle is derived from the novel unity which is imposed on them by the novel creature in process of constitution."[181] The subject controlling concrescence is the processive outcome of the synthetic unity.

Greater autonomous modification is possible where there is sufficient complexity for an interplay between the physical and mental poles in the process of unification than in occasions which are not complex. In the physical pole there are objectifications of "actualized data" from the past and in the mental pole there are the "non-actualized potentialities" of the subjective aim. In autonomous self-causation there is "creative fusion of those data with those potentialities."[182] "The actual entity is the product of the interplay of physical pole with mental pole."[183] All of the feelings in the datum and the initial ideal aim are compatible for synthesis even though each provides for alternative supplementations. The initial conceptual aim "starts with conditioned alternatives, and by successive decisions is reduced to coherence."[184] These alternatives are referred to as "indeterminations awaiting its own decisions."[185] Decisions eliminating these indeterminations occur when conceptual prehensions "enter into integration with physical prehensions modifying both the data and the subjective forms."[186] We have noted that the subjective aim is "progressively defined by its progressive relation to the determinations and indeterminations of the datum."[187] This would suggest that an integration of elements in the initial ideal aim with compatible elements in the data would modify both the datum and the aim facilitating further integration and progressive modification. For purposes of analysis this progressive integration can be divided into phases. "In each phase the corresponding conceptual feeling is the 'subjective end' characteristic of that phase."[188] "This subjective aim, in its successive modifications, remains the unifying factor governing the successive phases of interplay between physical and conceptual feelings."[189] Sequential interdependence is suggested when Whitehead says, "These decisions are impossible for the nascent creature antecedently to the novelties in the phases of its concrescence."[190] One explanation for sequential dependence would refer to the need for complexity in order to hold diverse factors together in compatible contrast. "It requires a complex constitution to stage diversities as consistent contrasts."[191] In the early phases of integration a feeling might be so incompatible as to forbid inclusion as a contrast, but as complexity increases it may find itself in a "web of conditions which convert its exclusions into contrasts."[192] The conditioned alternatives provided for in the datum and aim are sequentially determined. "As elements in the datum, the components are individually given, with the potentiality for a contrast, which in the supplementary stage is either included or excluded."[193] As complexity increases there could be the "realization of contrasts, of contrasts of contrasts, and so on."[194]

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[180] PR, p. 339. [181] AI, p. 328. [182] MT, p. 207.

[183] PR, p. 470. [184] PR, p. 342. [185] PR, p. 343.

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[186] PR, p. 248. [187] PR, p. 228. [188] PR, p. 342. [189] PR, p. 343.

[190] PR, p. 343. [191] PR, p. 390. [192] PR, p. 341; cf. p. 167.

Autonomous self-causation is produced by the interaction of the feelings involved. Creativity which is the coming together of feeling into an integrated whole has no character of its own.[195] The character of a feeling is determined by the whole occasion of which it is a part. An aspect of that whole occasion is determined by the character of that feeling. "This mutual determination of the elements involved in a feeling is one expression of the truth that the subject of the feeling is causa sui."[196] This mutual determination of feelings is referred to as the "'mutual sensitivity' of feelings. It is also one aspect of the incurable 'particularity' of a feeling, in the sense that no feeling can be abstracted from its subject."[197]

Up to this point in our discussion of autonomy and self-causation we have not discussed any factor which goes beyond reflexive mutual determination which is in principle predictable. If the subjective aim is modified through mutual sensitivity of its feelings with those of the datum and is at the same time the subject which controls the integration of feelings in the datum into contrasts, there is as yet no provision for an unpredictable factor to emerge.

There are statements by Whitehead which may be interpreted to provide for an unpredictable factor in all self-causation. The formal statement of the category of "Freedom and Determination" is explained by the following paragraph.

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[193] PR, p. 250. [194] PR, p. 424. [195] PR, p. 47.

[196] PR, p. 338. [197] PR, p. 420.

> This category can be condensed into the formula, that in each concrescence whatever is determinable is determined, but that there is always a remainder for the decision of the subject-superject of that concrescence. This subject-superject is the universe in that synthesis, and beyond it there is nonentity. This final decision is the reaction of the unity of the whole to its own internal determination. This reaction is the final modification of emotion, appreciation, and purpose. But the decision of the whole arises out of the determination of the parts, so as to be strictly relevant to it.[198]

A similar expression of this idea refers to what is efficiently caused as determined.

> The doctrine of the philosophy of organism is that, however far the sphere of efficient causation be pushed in the determination of components of a concrescence--its data, its emotions, its appreciations, its purposes, its phases of subjective aim--beyond the determination of these components there always remains the final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe. This final reaction completes the self-creative act by putting the decisive stamp of creative emphasis upon the determinations of efficient cause.[199]

It is possible to understand the passages as saying that the final reaction includes an emergent determination in addition to that produced by synthesis or unification.

In order to be able to refer to the difference between these two aspects of self-causation I would like to make a difference between interactive synthesis and whole response. If only interactive synthesis operated in concrescence, there would be only one possible outcome with given initial data and aim. In interactive synthesis the subjective aim as superjective outcome chooses the alternative which its synthetic character causes it to choose. Whole response includes interactive synthesis but involves an additional emergent factor. In whole response some element may be accepted or rejected with everything else in the interactive synthesis remaining the same.

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[198] PR, pp. 41 f. [199] PR, p. 75.

In low grade occasions the evil produced by mutual sensitivity in transition and by interactive synthesis is of the greatest significance. Emergent freedom in such occasions is negligible. In high grade occasions the scope of emergent freedom increases and the amount of evil from this source becomes greater. Most of the evil produced from unconscious deviation from the initial ideal aim results from interactive synthesis. As occasions become more complex an increasing amount of this evil is caused by emergent freedom.

Evil from morally responsible deviation from the initial aim

In the section on man as morally responsible there will be a discussion of some conditions which I think should be presupposed in a morally responsible free choice. Among these conditions two are prominent in distinguishing self-caused evil for which the occasion is morally responsible from self-caused evil for which the occasion is not morally responsible. Evil for which an occasion is morally responsible only occurs in an occasion which is conscious of a better or a worse alternative and is able to choose either with the same initial data and initial ideal aim. The evil discussed in the preceding section where there is an unconscious deviation from the ideal aim is not evil for which the occasion is morally responsible.

That there are occasions which experience morally responsible freedom is not a conclusion derived from Whitehead's cosmological system. The system is an attempt, among other things, to make the immediate experience of morally responsible freedom intelligible. "It is the task of philosophy to work at the concordance of ideas conceived as illustrated in the concrete facts of the real world."[200] Both morally responsible freedom and enduring patterns of predictability are among the experienced facts of the real world. This means that philosophy must explain "the diverse senses in which freedom and necessity can coexist, or we have to explain away one or other of the most obvious presuppositions of our daily thoughts."[201] Human beings consciously experience an ideal "equally compelling recognition and permissive of disregard. This principle is not a dogmatic formulation, but the intuition of immediate occasions as failing or succeeding in reference to the ideal relevant to them."[202] We have already noticed that the freedom of autonomous self-causation which is attributed to every becoming occasion is an inference from direct human experience. Whitehead refers to this experience as follows:

> Further, in the case of those actualities whose immediate experience is most completely open to us, namely, human beings, the final decision of the immediate subject-superject, constituting the ultimate modification of subjective aim, is the foundation of our experience of responsibility, of approbation or of disapprobation, of self-approval or of self-reproach, of freedom, of emphasis. This element in experience is too large to be put aside merely as misconstruction.[203]

"Freedom and necessity" are among the pairs of opposites basic to the "cosmological construction," which are "in experience with a certain ultimate directness of intuition."[204] In explaining the kind of evidence on which philosophy bases its discussion Whitehead refers to the "common practice" of man. Man assumes the "compulsion of recent events" which furnish a dependable pattern of predictability and formulates a "policy" for the guidance of action "assuming that the imposed conditions leave room for the effectiveness of 'choice' and 'intelligence' [νοῦς]." There is an ideal with alternatives. "He conceives an ideal, to be attained or to be missed. He conceives such ideals as effective in proportion as they are entertained. He praises and he blames by reason of this belief."[205] Morally responsible freedom is assumed in the common practice of man.

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[200] AI, p. 187. [201] MT, p. 10. [202] RM, p. 60.

[203] PR, p. 74. [204] PR, p. 518.

We have discussed two different aspects of self-causation in the common experience of man. There is the emergence into consciousness of an ideal which is traced ultimately to conceptual innovation from God. Then this ideal is attained in the degree to which it is entertained and missed in the degree to which it is not entertained. This is morally responsible freedom.

In one passage Whitehead refers to conceptual innovation as "intellectual ferment" and the freedom of moral responsibility as "wisdom." Instinct refers to inherited initial data from the actual world. "Also, after instinct and intellectual ferment have done their work, there is a decision which determines the mode of coalescence of instinct with intelligence. I will term this factor Wisdom." If there is no "spontaneity of thought" then the "moral claim for freedom of thought is without meaning." The conceptual innovation which is "spontaneity of thought" is "subject to control as to its maintenance and efficiency. Such control is the judgment of the whole, attenuating or strengthening the partial flashes of self-determination. The whole

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[205] AI, p. 292.

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determines what it wills to be, and thereby adjusts the relative importance of its own inherent flashes of spontaneity." Here again two aspects of self-causation are distinctly discernible. There is first the emergence of new patterns of ideality and then the morally responsible acceptance or rejection of various aspects of this ideal. "This final determination is its Wisdom or, in other words, its subjective aim as to its own nature, with its limits set by inherited factors."[206]

The distinction between conceptual innovation and morally responsible freedom is not obvious but still vaguely present in another passage.

> It is the freedom of that virtue directly derived from the source of all harmony. For it is conditioned only by its adequacy of understanding. And understanding has this quality that, however it be led up to, it issues in the soul freely conforming its nature to the supremacy of insight. It is the reconciliation of freedom with the compulsion of the truth. In this sense the captive can be free, taking as his own the supreme insight, the indwelling persuasion towards the harmony which is the height of existence.[207]

We have noted that conceptual innovation emerges in the initial ideal aim primarily derived from God. Here it is described as derived from the source of all harmony. When he says that however conceptual innovation is approached it issues in conformity and when he speaks of compulsion, there appears to be an unavoidable quality about some of God's persuasion. In the preceding section we have noted that an occasion is conditioned but not totally determined by the initial ideal aim. There are suggestions of this free ability to accept or reject some of the conceptual innovation when it is said that the soul "freely" conforms and when it is implied that he can either reject or take as his own the persuasive insight.

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[206] AI, pp. 58 f. [207] AI, p. 86.

Even Pols, who writes a whole book with the primary purpose of showing that Whitehead was not successful in providing for real freedom in the becoming of an actual occasion, acknowledges that it was one of his "primary purposes" to formulate a cosmology which could account for responsible freedom.[208] Pols claims that Whitehead is not successful in accounting for responsible freedom because creativity is not able to be the source of "active power" by which a subject is able to accept or reject novelty from God.[209] It is possible that more work needs to be done clarifying the dynamics of responsible freedom, but I find Cobb's answer to Pols fundamentally convincing.[210]

We have already referred to another important passage in which this final freedom is mentioned as the "final reaction of the self-creative unity of the universe."[211] The issue in the interpretation of this reference involves the meaning of the words "final reaction." We may interpret this reaction as the expression of the character of the superjective outcome which is the sum of all the determining components in the synthesis. I have used the expression "interactive synthesis" to refer to part of concrescence in the preceding section. In a simple synthesis there is only one possible outcome which is ultimately determined by the developing interactive character of the whole. Such a synthesis does not provide for a self to be able either to accept or reject a given element which is required for a morally responsible agent. Whole response as described in the preceding section includes not only interactive synthesis but also emergent freedom. We may therefore interpret the reaction to be the responsible choice either to accept or to reject some aspect of the ideal with both alternatives really possible. This makes morally responsible freedom possible.

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[208] Edward Pols, Whitehead's Metaphysics: A Critical Examination of Process and Reality (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), pp. 9 and 118.

[209] Ibid., pp. 134, 138, 142.

[210] John B. Cobb, Jr., "Freedom in Whitehead's Philosophy: A Response to Edward Pols," Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (Winter 1969-70): 409-413.

[211] PR, p. 75.

Several expressions already used in this section favor the second interpretation. When it is said that the ideal which compels recognition is at the same time permissive of disregard, it suggests that either alternative of acceptance or rejection is possible."[212] A person would not deserve praise or blame if his acceptance of the ideal were merely caused by synthesis.[213] Whitehead clearly rejects the Calvinist and Jansenist view of man as "helpless to co-operate with Irresistible Grace."[214] An occasion whose response to divine initiative was determined by a synthesis of that initiative with his own accumulated past character would not be able either to cooperate or resist grace. Whitehead's use of the word responsibility also suggests that either alternative is possible. "In defence of this notion of self-production arising out of some primary given phase, I would remind you that, apart from it, there can be no moral responsibility. The potter, and not the pot, is responsible for the shape of the pot."[215] He seems to be saying that if an occasion cannot choose either to become a vessel of honor or dishonor with both its past and God's grace taken into account, then God is responsible for the evil. This conclusion leads up to a discussion of the responsibility for evil in the next section.

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[212] RM, p. 60. [213] PR, p. 74; AI, p. 292. [214] SMW, p. 109.

[215] S, pp. 8-9.

This section examines that evil which is caused by the morally responsible free deviation from the initial ideal aim which sometimes occurs in complex occasions where there is consciousness. Evidence that human beings are morally responsible for some of their failure to realize the possible ideal comes from the immediate experience of man. Whitehead's cosmological system attempts to account for man's immediately experienced responsible freedom as well as his experience of compulsive necessity. Morally responsible freedom occurs when an agent accepts or rejects some aspect of a conscious ideal without having been caused to do so by the character of the initial data from the actual world, the conceptual innovation from God in the initial ideal aim, or their determined synthesis.

The Responsibility for Evil

In the chapter discussing Whitehead's criticism of theological and philosophical themes related to the problem of evil it was noted that he criticizes traditional theology for making God responsible for all evil. A second criticism was that monistic and idealistic philosophy is not able to explain how evil could arise. This discussion of responsibility for evil is designed to show how Whitehead explains the rise of evil without making God responsible for excess evil. Here excess evil refers to that which is not logically necessary for a compensating or more than compensating good.

The word responsibility may be used in a variety of ways. Two are of primary importance for this discussion. Sometimes responsibility is a word used to identify a component in a causal sequence explaining an event. The tack in the highway was responsible for the flat tire. The mosquito was responsible for the patient getting malaria. An insane man was responsible for setting the forest fire. By this popular usage any item identified as responsible for an event is usually caused by another cause. A hole in the keg was responsible for the tack on the highway. A knot in the wood was responsible for the hole in the keg. A limb on the tree was responsible for the knot in the wood. Responsibility as a component in a causal sequence which is itself the result of other causes is not the meaning intended when we say that God is made responsible for all evil.

Another important use of the word responsible applies to a cause which was itself not caused by something else. When Whitehead says that orthodox theology made God responsible for evil, he meant that the ultimate cause for evil which was itself not caused by something else was God. At various points in the history of thought a cause for evil which was not itself caused by something else has been sought in some type of dualistic matter or darkness.

There are a number of reasons why a dualistic uncaused evil power is not a satisfactory answer for the search for the responsibility for the rise of evil. There is first the difficulty of providing for a common ground for the interaction between the two self-existent powers. If both the good and evil power are grounded in a third factor, the good power is not self-existent and the third factor is self-existent as a God should be. If the common ground is in some way provided by the good

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power so that the evil power is grounded by the good power, then the search for the cause of evil is traced to its ground and back to God. If there is no common ground how can there be any relationship between the two? There is second the problem of the value of processive matter. Some historical dualisms have made processive matter evil, but Whitehead finds that processive matter is good. Third, a simple dualism does not explain the immediate experience of responsible cooperation or opposition to good which Whitehead finds among the basic given data for philosophy. A simple dualism or pluralism does not provide for the free agent to have any autonomous role in throwing his weight on either the good or the evil side. A division of substance or power into two or more nonderivative sources does not explain morally responsible freedom.

We turn now to examine Whitehead's explanation of the rise of evil to see if he has been successful in showing that God is not responsible for excess evil. The cause of evil has been discussed under four main aspects of process. In efficiently caused transition the elimination of incompatibilities results in aesthetic destruction. In finally caused conceptual innovation factors are sometimes introduced which are incompatible with the feelings in the datum producing discord and aesthetic destruction. In finally caused concrescence whole response deviates from the initial ideal aim with resulting aesthetic destruction. In finally caused morally responsible freedom there is sometimes deviation from the initial ideal aim with resulting aesthetic destruction. We are searching for the cause which is responsible in the sense that it causes evil without its being caused to do so by something else. We can profitably analyze such responsibility under three headings. They are unconscious occasions, God, and morally responsible higher conscious animals primarily meaning man.

Unconscious occasions as responsible

The evil of interactive synthesis which is produced by mutual determination in the interaction between the physical and mental pole is common to all actual entities other than God. If the nature of the metaphysical situation means that every actual occasion is not able autonomously to avoid producing this kind of evil, there may be some hesitancy to make occasions responsible. It becomes necessary to discuss the nature of the metaphysical situation.

The ultimate characteristic of the metaphysical situation is that the many actual occasions in the actual world are brought together into units of experience. This unifying ongoingness is called "substantial activity" in Science and the Modern World.[216] Substantial activity is a "general metaphysical character which underlies all occasions, in a particular mode for each occasion."[217] With slight modifications this unification appears in Religion in the Making as Creativity.[218] In Process and Reality the "ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents" is called "creativity," and God is "its primordial, nontemporal accident."[219] Creativity is the "ultimate principle by which the many, which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively. It lies in the nature of things that the many enter into complex unity."[220]

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[216] SMW, pp. 102 f., 154, 157, 180, 238. [217] SMW, p. 255.

[218] RM, pp. 90-93, passim. [219] PR, pp. 10-11.

Whitehead says that there are two ways to explain the status of creativity which are in current usage.

> One is that of the external Creator, eliciting this final togetherness out of nothing. The other doctrine is that it is a metaphysical principle belonging to the nature of things, that there is nothing in the universe other than instances of this passage and components of these instances. Let this latter doctrine be adopted.[221]

Making creativity ultimate instead of God is a drastic shift from traditional thought. Whitehead notes that in "monistic philosophies, Spinoza's or absolute idealism, this ultimate is God, who is also equivalently termed 'The Absolute.'"[222] Making creativity ultimate means that God "presupposes the general metaphysical character of creative advance"[223] so that he is "in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty."[224] This language suggests that process in God is derived from the metaphysical situation.

I can think of three probable reasons why Whitehead has chosen to describe the metaphysical situation in such a way that creativity is ultimate and both God and actual occasions presuppose creativity. First, he wants to avoid making God responsible for excess evil.

> Among medieval and modern philosophers, anxious to establish the religious significance of God, an unfortunate habit has prevailed of paying to Him metaphysical compliments. He has been conceived as the foundation of the metaphysical situation with its ultimate activity. If this conception be adhered to, there can be no alternative except to discern in Him the origin of evil as well as of all good. He is then the supreme author of the play, and to Him must therefore be ascribed its shortcomings as well as its success. If He be conceived as the supreme ground for limitation, it stands in His very nature to divide the Good from

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[220] PR, p. 31. [221] AI, p. 303. [222] PR, p. 11.

[223] PR, p. 522. [224] PR, p. 529.

> the Evil, and to establish Reason 'within her dominions supreme.'[225]

We have noted in the chapter on Whitehead's criticisms that the static eminently real God of traditional orthodoxy is made responsible for all evil. "Also the worst of unqualified omnipotence is that it is accompanied by responsibility for every detail of every happening."[226]

A second reason why creativity is made ultimate could be that the explanation of the rise of evil is made possible. Something other than God can be shown to be responsible for evil. Whitehead criticized monistic and idealistic thought for not being able to explain the rise of evil. In the section describing the role of efficient cause in the rise of evil it was shown how bringing together feelings of the many occasions of the actual world in mutual sensitivity results in a gradual loss of feelings in the defining characteristic of an enduring object and the evil of aesthetic destruction. Creativity is the many becoming one. As the many are synthesized into one mutual sensitivity produces running down and the interactive synthesis of the physical and mental poles results in deviation from the initial ideal aim and therefore aesthetic destruction.

A third possible reason why creativity is made ultimate is that it gives full reality to processive actual occasions rather than demoting them to shadowy not quite real status. Each occasion as the unification of the many into one is just as real as God as the unification of the many into one. We have discussed Whitehead's criticism of much traditional thought which makes God static and eminently real and makes processive occasions evil and unreal. "The vicious separation of the flux from the permanence leads to the concept of an entirely static God, with eminent reality, in relation to an entirely fluent world, with deficient reality."[227] The problem is to account for the relations between the static and the processive elements. If the processive elements express the eternal act of the static element, God is made responsible for all evil. If the processive elements are not really real how can they originate evil opposition to the static good? In monistic thought "the ultimate is illegitimately allowed a final, 'eminent' reality, beyond that ascribed to any of its accidents."[228] In Whitehead's system "'Actual entities'--also termed 'actual occasions'--are the final real things of which the world is made up. There is no going behind actual entities to find anything more real."[229] He contrasts the two views by saying that monistic thought makes "fact ultimate" and his view makes "process ultimate."[230] Making process ultimate allows actual occasions to be as real as God.

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[225] SMW, p. 258. [226] AI, p. 217.

A good argument can be made for saying that the metaphysical situation is not responsible for any evil. The ontological principle provides that actual entities are the only reasons.[231] The creativity which characterizes the metaphysical situation is not an actual entity.[232] Therefore creativity which characterizes the metaphysical situation should not be given as the reason why the many become one producing the evil of running down and the evil deviation from the initial aim through interactive synthesis. We could say that this evil is caused

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[227] PR, p. 526. [228] PR, p. 11. [229] PR, pp. 27 f. [230] PR, p. 11.

[231] PR, pp. 28, 37. [232] RM, pp. 92, 102; SMW, p. 255; PR, p. 339.

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by the occasion itself. Each occasion is causa sui. Each occasion causes itself to become one since "there are not two actual entities, the creativity and the creature. There is only one entity which is the self-creating creature."[233] That evil which occurs in transition and interactive synthesis is not caused by the decision of any other actual entity. We may say that the occasion itself is responsible for this evil. The coming together of the many into one which occurs in the self-causation of that occasion is the cause of this evil. We may say that the occasion itself is responsible because it is the cause of this evil without having been caused to do so by any other actual entity.

God as responsible

In the section on unavoidable discord as instrumental to good there was a description of the initiation of developmental and corrective novelty aiming at greater strength of beauty which sometimes introduces discord and consequent destruction. The developmental and corrective novelty in the initial ideal aim comes from the graded envisagement of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God.[234] The primordial nature with its eternal objects in grades of relevance is non-derivative.[235] The cause of the appearance of developmental and corrective novelty in the initial ideal aims of occasions is God in his primordial nature. This primordial nature is responsible in that it is the cause which is not itself caused by something else.

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[233] RM, p. 102. [234] PR, pp. 73, 104, 164, 377.

[235] PR, pp. 48, 134, 522, 524.

The evil for which God is responsible is always unavoidably connected with a more valuable good. "The initial aim is the best for that _impasse_. But if the best be bad, then the ruthlessness of God can be personified as _Atè_, the goddess of mischief. The chaff is burnt."[236] The discord that results when there is a shift of ideal aim to a new pattern of contrasts may appear predominantly evil on the short view. It is when the new pattern of feelings succeeds in eliminating the incompatible feelings so that there is strength of beauty without discord that it may be seen that the discordant evil was instrumental to good. "Of course the present can be sacrificed to the future, so that Truth or Beauty in the future can be the reason for the immediate attenuation of either."[237] It is in the long view that "destruction of immediate realizations for the sake of purpose" can be seen to be a "sacrifice to Harmony."[238] Men vary in their ability to take the long view and it is to be expected that they will frequently regard the evil which is really the best for the situation as the expression of some malevolent power.

Excess evil was defined as that evil which is not logically necessary for a compensating or more than compensating good. God is only responsible for evil which is unavoidably connected with the realization of the highest possible good. God is not responsible for any excess evil.

Man as morally responsible

Whitehead reports that he as a man immediately experiences his own responsible freedom. He also experiences iron-bound necessity in the patterns of regularity in nature. His cosmological system attempts to account for both responsible freedom and compulsive determinism. This section is not an examination of the evidence to determine whether man is responsible but an examination of the system to see if it accounts for man's moral responsibility which is assumed as immediately experienced.

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[236] PR, p. 373. [237] AI, p. 309. [238] AI, p. 342.

In this discussion an occasion is responsible if its action is not itself caused by some other occasion. Many elements in all occasions are caused by something else. An occasion is not responsible for caused elements. Conscious morally responsible occasions, like unconscious occasions are responsible for evil which is autonomously unavoidable but which is caused as the many become one in that concrescence. This section examines that evil for which there is moral responsibility. What characteristics would be required in order to assign moral responsibility? I will first list some characteristics which I think would be required and then examine Whitehead's system to see if these characteristics are present.

First, the outcome of a free decision would have to be caused by the self. If the choice emerges in random fashion out of the total situation, "it would seem that we are speaking of a purely chance event rather than of any kind of responsible human freedom."[239] In order for man to be morally responsible, he himself must have made the choice.

Second, the man himself must not have been caused to make that choice by conditions external to himself. Augustine would agree that "nothing makes the mind a companion of cupidity, except its own will and free choice."[240] If a "free" choice were caused by efficient causes, whatever produced those efficient causes would be responsible. If God created them, he would be responsible. If some non-derivative cause other than God were responsible for producing the factors in the world which caused the choice, then that non-derivative cause would be responsible. If a "free" choice were caused by an external or transcendent source of ideality which is non-derivative, then that non-derivative ideal would be responsible.

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[239] CNT, pp. 93 f.

Third, a morally responsible choice would not be caused by antecedent causal conditions internal to the chooser. Here I am using the word chooser to apply to the larger self to which a name or pronoun applies. In Whitehead's language this would mean that the choice is not made by causal conditions in prior occasions in the route of occasions which is the person. Flew and Mackie would agree that free choice meets the second criterion but not the third. They claim that a choice is free if it arises out of the nature of the self without outside compulsion. They therefore hold that God should have created selves whose internal character would cause them always to choose rightly. Hick says that the Christian concept of the divine purpose requires "the stronger notion of free will as a capacity for choice whose outcome is in principle unpredictable."[241] Augustine's freedom which is in principle predictable would not meet this condition. A choice that is not caused by external factors or antecedent internal factors would satisfy this requirement. Hartshorne holds a similar view when he says, "It is not enough for freedom that other persons or circumstances refrain from predetermining my decision; my past selves also may not deny to my present self its power of self-creation, conditioned but not fully determined by all the past."[242]

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[240] FW 1.11.21 (125). [241] EGL, p. 304.

Fourth, a responsibly free choice would be made from at least two alternatives left open to freedom with all external and internal causal conditions and their determined synthesis taken into account as the choice is made. The freedom described by Hartshorne meets this requirement. "Freedom is choice among really possible acts, acts possible not only given the external situation but also given the pre-existing individual with his history and constitution. . . ."[243] James also supports this position by saying that freedom "says that of alternatives that really _tempt_ our will more than one is really possible."[244] Such real alternatives mean that the choice makes a real difference for the entire history of the universe and that a fixed immutable God as described in Augustine and in much traditional orthodoxy would not be satisfactory. There must be a break in the causal sequence in the sense that the attempt to trace the causal antecedents reveals some aspects of the outcome for which there is no prior cause. A good God would subsequently act differently depending on which way the responsible choice were made.

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[242] Charles Hartshorne, _The Logic of Perfection_ (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Company, 1962), pp. 20 f. Hereafter cited as LP.

[243] LP, pp. 188-189, cf. p. 231.

[244] William James, _Essays on Faith and Morals_ (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1965), p. 157.

Fifth, in order to be morally responsible a chooser must be conscious of objective distinctions between the better and worse alternatives of the choice.[245] If an adult prepared two equally attractive and equally tasty foods with poison in one of them and then placed the foods equally distant from a hungry child, the child might use his freedom to choose which one to eat first. If the child chose the poisoned food, he would not be morally responsible for the poisoning because he was not conscious of which alternative was better or worse. The adult would be morally responsible for poisoning the child. To apply the analogy we would say that if God creates a chooser which freely chooses an alternative without any awareness of better and worse and if God is responsible for providing the alternatives in the situation in which the choice is made, he is responsible for the outcome. There would be no difficulty in showing that God was nevertheless a good God if the resulting evil were instrumentally necessary for some higher good and if the good possibly achieved could be actualized in no other way and was of sufficient value to risk the chance of the evil.

Sixth, the self which causes the free choice must have the power to choose either the better or the worse alternative. It would be possible to conceive of a self which came into being in the process of the choice which when expressing its character in the choice could choose only one of the alternatives. The crucial process deciding between the better and the worse alternative would then be moved from the choice caused by the self to the process in which the self with that character emerged. If this self emerged from some synthesis of totality internal to the self and was not caused by antecedent external or internal factors, it would have the chance character which was rejected as a responsible free choice in the first factor. If the self which causes the choice emerges in the process of making the choice, there must be included some way in which conscious selection of either the better or the worse alternative is really possible given those causal conditions.[246]

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[245] CNT, p. 92; cf. pp. 97 and 59.

Seventh, where there is morally responsible freedom the state of affairs in the world is subject to alteration depending on whether the better or the worse alternative is chosen. In order to have morally responsible freedom there must be a state of affairs which can be manipulated freely by the agent. The degree to which there is comprehensive finite relativity is the degree to which a free choice can have an effect on the whole of reality. Voluntary love could not be expressed to another self unless the choice to love changed the state of affairs for the recipient of the love. If a free wrong choice had no effect on the rest of reality but merely resulted in the recording of one demerit point, the free wrong choice is not really expressible. A responsible free choice must make a difference in the state of affairs in the world.

A morally responsible free decision is a decision which is made consciously by a self from a better or a worse alternative without having been caused to make that choice either by external or prior internal causes. We turn now to see if Whitehead's system is able to account for morally responsible human freedom.

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[246] Compare LP, p. 20.

The first presupposition for morally responsible freedom is met when Whitehead clearly provides that the final decision is made by the self. Every actual occasion includes an element of self-determination made by the self. "An entity is actual, when it has significance for itself. By this it is meant that an actual entity functions in respect to its own determination."[247] We have made numerous references to the autonomous activity modifying the subjective aim which "is this subject itself determining its own self-creation as one creature."[248] In this modification in which there is "admission into, or rejection from, reality of conceptual feeling" the "originative decision of the actual occasion" is the basis for referring to the occasion as "causa sui."[249] The "final decision" which is "the foundation of our experience of responsibility" is made by "the immediate subject-superject."[250]

The second condition for morally responsible freedom is met when every occasion is described as "externally free."[251] In the "final autonomy" of every occasion the "synthesis of subjective forms derived conformally is not settled by the antecedent fact of the data."[252] Although the autonomous origination "is germane to the data" it is "not fully determined by the data."[253] The data referred to in these passages are objectifications of actual occasions of the immediately past actual world introduced into the occasion by efficient causation. Efficiently caused data from the actual world are not the only causal factors operating in the becoming of the occasion. There is also the conceptual origination in the initial ideal aim from a transcendent and therefore external God. We have noticed that Whitehead explicitly divides autonomous "self-definition" into two phases, one of "conceptual ingression" to form the "lure for feeling" and the other of "admission of the lure into the reality of feeling."[254] In order conveniently to distinguish these different actions we have called the first conceptual innovation and the second whole response. We have noted that autonomous self-causation is "conditioned, though not determined, by an initial subjective aim supplied by the ground of all order and of all originality."[255] Neither the efficiently caused data from the actual world nor the initial aim from God determine the final outcome.

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[247] PR, p. 38. [248] PR, p. 108. [249] PR, p. 131. [250] PR, p. 74.

[251] PR, pp. 41, 74. [252] AI, pp. 327 f. [253] PR, p. 131.

The third requirement that morally responsible freedom not be caused by antecedent causal conditions internal to the chooser introduces the problem of time and self-identity. The first condition of morally responsible freedom requires that a free choice be determined by the self. There is no problem with the choice being internally determined[256] by the self as long as the self is not determined, to make that choice, by its antecedent character. Whitehead distinguishes three meanings for the self of a man. They are "one occasion of his existence," the entire "historic route" of the occasions of his existence from birth to death, and the "common form, or pattern, repeated in each occasion" of his life.[257] At this point we are concerned with a morally responsible free decision made by a single occasion. Since data from actual occasions in the past do not determine the outcome of the free decision of an occasion, conditions in past occasions of a route of occasions which is a person's larger self do not determine his free choice.

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[254] PR, p. 131. [255] PR, p. 164. [256] PR, pp. 41, 74, 75.

[257] S, pp. 27 f.

Analysis of self-determination within an occasion is more difficult. The usual conceptions of sequence in clock time do not apply since the mental pole is not divisible into temporally earlier and later parts.[258] Cobb shows in his answer to Pols that there is a "temporal all-at-onceness" in the reflexive self-determination of responsible freedom which shows that the outcome is not determined by prior causes internal to the self.[259]

Whitehead meets the fourth requirement of at least two alternatives for morally responsible freedom when he provides for the acceptance or rejection of an element or elements with either alternative really possible with those initial data and that initial ideal aim. He refers to these alternatives variously as "attenuating or strengthening,"[260] as "the better and the worse,"[261] as entertaining or not entertaining the ideal which is "to be attained or to be missed,"[262] and as "admission into, or rejection from, reality of conceptual feeling."[263] An occasion only needs to be conscious of one new possibility in order to make a responsibly free decision since acceptance or rejection of that one possibility furnishes the two alternatives which are necessary. Where there is a variety of factors subject to this acceptance or rejection there is an indefinite number of alternatives that develop from possible combinations. Acceptance and rejection seems to be on a continuum rather than all or nothing. The gradual leveling down produced by efficient causation over a long period of time results from the rejection of very small amounts of the defining characteristic in each new occasion in the route of occasions which is an enduring object. Conceptual prehension in the subjective aim is also subject to these degrees of rejection on a continuum as is suggested by the use of the words "attenuating" and "strengthening."

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[258] PR, pp. 108, 380, 434.

[259] John Cobb, Jr., "Freedom in Whitehead's Philosophy: A Response to Edward Pols," Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (Winter 1969-70): 412.

[260] AI, p. 59. [261] AI, p. 105. [262] AI, p. 292. [263] PR, p. 131.

The fifth presupposition of morally responsible freedom which is conscious differentiation of a better and worse alternative is met in the acknowledgement that a cosmological description must start with the immediate conscious experience of responsible freedom. When Whitehead says that we must begin with experience which is "most completely open to us,"[264] he is referring to conscious experience. The common practice of man in which he "conceives an ideal, to be attained or to be missed"[265] is a consciousness of a better and a worse alternative. Ethical ideals are "consciously formulated ideas acting as a driving force effecting transitions from social state to social state."[266] There is a sense in which consciousness differentiates human occasions from all other occasions because it "makes us human."[267]

Although the difference between unconscious and conscious autonomy is a vital part of the difference between the freedom of whole response and the freedom of moral responsibility, it is important to notice that consciousness is not a sharp cut differentiation in human experience. "Consciousness flickers; and even at its brightest, there is a small focal region of clear illumination, and a large penumbral region of experience which tells of intense experience in dim apprehension."[268] The movement of physical and conceptual prehensions from an unconscious determining role to a realm of consciousness develops "gradually and fitfully."[269] Although elements "on the fringe of consciousness" are active in determining the outcome "massively qualifying our experience,"[270] those elements that do enter consciousness are singled out for special emphasis. "The growth of consciousness is the uprise of abstractions. It is the growth of emphasis."[271] The movement of determining elements into and out of consciousness gradually on a continuum is of importance in establishing legal responsibility in cases where sleep, drugs, or abnormal psychological states effect consciousness. The fact that there is a twilight zone where a person is almost but not quite conscious does not mean that a distinction should not be made in the attribution of responsibility in relation to the degree of consciousness. For a person to be morally responsible he must be conscious of better and worse alternatives.

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[264] PR, p. 74. [265] AI, p. 292. [266] AI, p. 21. [267] MT, p. 158.

All autonomous self-determination which occurs below the level of consciousness is excluded from morally responsible freedom. All occasions are responsible for the evil produced by the freedom of whole response in that this evil is not caused by the decision of any other actual entity. Only that evil which is autonomously avoidable through conscious decision is morally responsible.

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[268] PR, p. 408. [269] MT, p. 44. [270] AI, p. 209. [271] MT, p. 168.

The sixth requirement for morally responsible freedom places emphasis on the combination of the factors mentioned in the first five requirements. A becoming occasion must be able as a self to choose either the better or the worse alternative of which it is conscious without having been caused to make that choice by external causal factors or prior internal causal factors.

At this point I need to refer back to the distinction I made between interactive synthesis and whole response in order to clarify a point about the nature of freedom. All occasions have interactive synthesis, but if this were all that is involved there would be only one possible outcome with a given initial data and aim. In whole response the subject as interactive outcome is able at some point in the concrescence to choose either of at least two alternatives. In interactive synthesis the subjective aim as superjective outcome chooses the alternative which its synthetic character causes it to choose. Interactive synthesis could meet the third requirement of responsible freedom that a prior state of the self not cause the choice since the phases of the becoming of the subjective aim are not in time and therefore the character which causes the choice is all at once with the process of the choice which causes the character. It could not meet the fourth requirement that the self making the choice be able to choose either alternative.

The freedom of whole response does not qualify as morally responsible freedom to the extent that the outcome is determined by interactive synthesis and is therefore autonomously unavoidable and to the extent that the alternatives are below the level of consciousness. God is able to introduce aims into occasions which overcome the running down effect of interactive synthesis. If this were not true God would be unable to persuade the world toward progressively greater intensity of satisfaction.

We have cited some evidence that Whitehead provides for the choice of either the better or the worse alternative during the process of synthesizing the whole in such a way that there is more than one alternative possible when all the causal factors in the data and in the initial aim are taken into account in their combination. The final decision of the immediate subject-superject in certain higher occasions is consciously made in such a way that there is a feeling of being worthy of "approbation or of disapprobation, or self-approval or of self-reproach."[272] Man "praises and he blames" because he believes a becoming self can either actualize or not actualize the ideal of which he is conscious.[273] No self which has been reflexively caused by synthesis to choose the way it chooses can be considered worthy of praise or blame. A self which as reflexively caused could choose either alternative would be worthy of praise or blame. A self which chooses as it is reflexively caused to choose if it had extensive memory and foresight, could have its choices altered by the synthesis of its anticipation of praise or blame with the other conscious factors determining its choice. Educative praise or blame would be effective in determining behavior in interactive synthesis but a self would not be worthy of praise if the synthesis of causal factors together with the anticipation of praise could cause only the one outcome.

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[272] PR, p. 74. [273] AI, p. 292.

Murphy makes a difference between "utilitarian" and "retributive" responsibility. In utilitarian responsibility all events are determined in such a way that in any situation there is only one outcome possible which is in principle predictable but the responsible agent is able to respond to being held responsible so that punishment and reward result in changes in behavior.[274] Retributive responsibility holds that the universe is not determined in such a way that no one could do differently than he did. The universe is indeterministic in such a way that a person deserves retributive punishment and reward. An agent could be retributively responsible and not responsible in a utilitarian sense if it could choose to act differently but was unable to profit from the memory or the anticipation of punishment or reward.[275] In the freedom of "libertarianism" the agent both deserves retributive punishment and reward and is able to profit from utilitarian punishment and reward. Murphy concludes her thesis as follows:

> It was pointed out that Whitehead attributes freedom of libertarianism to some actual entities and he is therefore justified in maintaining that such actual entities are morally responsible for their actions both in the sense that educative punishment and reward are justifiable and in the sense that retributive punishment and reward are justifiable.[276]

My analysis holds that an agent can not be held morally responsible for a choice unless all seven of the requirements for morally responsible freedom are met. If this is the case, an occasion would not be worthy of praise or blame unless it could consciously profit from memory and anticipation as well as choose either alternative in that situation. There are implications in the word "retributive" which are inconsistent with Whitehead's concept of God. He has no provision for retributive punishment or reward for occasions in the state of objective immortality. Murphy's analysis is of interest since she concludes that Whitehead provides for a freedom in which more than one outcome is really possible with a given set of data and the initial aim.

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[274] Frances Harder Murphy, "The Place of Moral Responsibility in the Philosophies of Whitehead and Peirce" (Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University, 1940), pp. 9 f., 31, 45, 134.

[275] Ibid., pp. 10-11, 33, 45, 134.

[276] Ibid., p. 134.

The practice of men entering into contracts supports the reality of morally responsible freedom. The simultaneous signing of a contract would be a "futile gesture of consciousness" if it were not possible for both signers to accept or reject a possible ideal with all factors in the data and the ideal aim and their synthesized combination remaining the same.[277]

The fact that Pols has written a book questioning whether Whitehead has provided for responsible freedom at least indicates that he is not as clear on this issue as he is on some others. Since he uses the immediate experience of responsible freedom as a starting point for the inference that every occasion possesses autonomous subjectivity, we would not be consistent with his intentions if we removed this starting point for systematic reasons. If it is not easy to see in his cosmological system how morally responsible freedom occurs, adjustment of the system which preserved freedom would be more loyal to his work than defense of a possible obscurity. In spite of some lack of clarity it seems safe to conclude that Whitehead provides that the conscious self can sometimes choose either the better or the worse alternative in the process of causing itself to become what it becomes.

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[277] AI, p. 81.

The seventh requirement that morally responsible freedom must be expressible points to one of the most daring departures in Whitehead's cosmological system. The Newtonian universe in which change is explained as the movement of self-identical particles in time and space led to the vision of "the irresistible mechanism of nature."[278] There was no place for final causation and no way for morally responsible freedom to affect the irresistible mechanism. Men nevertheless did not give up their belief in freedom. The attempt to combine "mechanism" with "self-determining organisms" issued in a "radical inconsistency" which "enfeebles" modern thought.[279] The Newtonian mechanism was helpless to account for relativity. If the molecules of the body blindly run there can be no human "responsibility for the actions of the body"[280] because they do not respond to human purpose. By making each unit of reality a dipolar occasion of experience Whitehead is able to account for the compulsive determination of the past in efficient causation as well as account for the responsiveness of an occasion to final causation. Molecules run differently in a human body whose dominant occasion has chosen positively than they would if it had chosen negatively. Comprehensive finite relativity makes it possible for a human occasion to express his freedom by making a difference in the way things are in the world. The molecules of the body do not blindly run and a person can be held morally responsible for the actions of the body. With Whitehead's principle of relativity freedom can make a difference in the state of the world. Freedom can be expressed.

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[278] SMW, p. 109. [279] SMW, p. 110. [280] SMW, p. 114.

Man is morally responsible for that evil which is caused by the choice between consciously recognized better and worse alternatives when either alternative may be chosen without that choice having been determined by external causes or prior internal causal states of the self. Such evil is caused by the self under conditions in which that self was not caused to have produced the evil by something else.

Occasions below the level of consciousness are responsible for the evil of running down produced in transition and the evil produced in whole response. Each occasion is responsible for this evil because it is produced in self-causation without having been caused by the decision of any other actual entity. God is responsible for the evil which is caused when the initial ideal aim at the greatest strength of beauty desirable in a situation unavoidably includes some discord. Man as a conscious occasion is responsible for autonomously unavoidable evil he produces in transition and interactive synthesis because it is not caused by the decision of any other actual entity. He is morally responsible for that evil which he causes which results from a decision where there was consciousness of better and worse alternatives and the worse alternative was autonomously avoidable.

CHAPTER V

OVERCOMING EVIL

In the chapter on Whitehead's criticisms of thought relating to the problem of evil a section is devoted to the tendency of some idealistic and monistic thought to discourage active participation in overcoming evil. His system is well calculated to overcome this criticism. The chapter on the nature of the good portrayed processive matter as real and good. This means that active, purposeful involvement in the processes in the world is dealing with what has real value.

This chapter brings together into a single discussion comments made which describe how evil is overcome. There is a progression in the discussion from the dynamics of simple occasions to more complex societies of occasions. Many of the principles involved have been mentioned in the description of the good and in the cause of evil.

Elimination

In the section on the composite nature of the good[1] it was explained that a unit of good is composed of a set of compatible feelings of past actual occasions. Most of the feelings from past occasions are excluded in order to leave a set which are compatible for combination into actuality. In the section on intrinsic evil[2] two types of exclusion were described. The first type of exclusion eliminates incompatible feelings so that the remainder may be combined into a concrescence. The second type of exclusion eliminates some of the compatible feelings needed for the concrescence. Where the first type of elimination has been successful in eliminating all contrary factors there is no discord and no intrinsic evil in the occasion. Where the first type is not quite successful so that there are some incompatible feelings which produced discord in the becoming occasion, there is aesthetic destruction and intrinsic evil.

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[1] See pp. 48 ff. [2] See pp. 63 ff.

What makes discord evil is that it is a process of aesthetic destruction. Aesthetic destruction removes feelings which are needed for strength of beauty. One of the basic methods of removing discordant feelings is elimination. "Selection is at once the measure of evil, and the process of its evasion. It means the discarding the element of obstructiveness in fact."[3] An occasion is intrinsically evil to the degree that it includes discordant feelings which exclude each other from intense positive realization in the satisfaction.

There are several ways of dealing with the intrinsic evil of discordant aesthetic destruction. "One way is termed 'Anaesthesia', and is the way of mere negative prehension."[4] Where there is success in removing all discordant elements and retaining all the compatible elements, there "is then 'perfection' in its kind--that is to say, in its type of finiteness with such-and-such exclusions."[5]

The elimination which is called anaesthesia is sometimes called "blindness." In the section on unavoidable discord as instrumental to good[6] there was a discussion of the method by which conceptual innovation introduces developmental and corrective novelty moving toward greater strength of beauty. Sometimes such novelty involves discord. Blindness removes the discord by rejecting the novelty. "The Way of Blindness means relapse. This relapse eliminates those flashes of novel appetition which have constituted the means of ascent to the existing stage of complex life."[7]

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[3] PR, p. 517. [4] AI, p. 334. [5] AI, p. 329. [6] See pp. 122 f.

The price paid for harmony through elimination is gradual loss of strength of beauty. A type of order "can stabilize itself, and relapse so as to live; or it can shake itself free, and enter upon the adventure of living better."[8] When discord is removed by elimination there is "stabilization in some lower level, or progressive relapse."[9] Progressive relapse eventually results in the loss of a type of order. The aesthetic destruction of evil "leads to the world losing forms of attainment in which that evil manifests itself. Either the species ceases to exist, or it sinks back into a stage in which it ranks below the possibility of that form of evil."[10] We have seen in the section on efficient causation and the rise of evil[11] that even the attempt to maintain a type of order results in slow decay. "And this fatigue is nothing other than the creeping growth of anaesthesia, whereby that social group is gradually sinking towards nothingness. The defining characteristics are losing their importance."[12]

One constructive application of the method of elimination is the partial elimination of a feeling in order to achieve the proportion of that feeling which is compatible. When there is only a "clash of intensities" and not a "sheer logical incompatibility of qualities," the "readjustment of the relative intensities of incompatible feelings can in some cases reduce them to compatibilities."[13]

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[7] FR, p. 16. [8] FR, p. 14. [9] FR, p. 16.

[10] RM, p. 96. [11] See pp. 95-120. [12] AI, p. 368; cf. p. 355.

Elimination as a response to evil is sometimes unavoidable, but it is not preferred since it tends toward nothingness. Relapse toward nothingness is more evil than maintenance of all the feelings involved even with some positive feeling of discord. What makes discord evil is that it destroys possible intensity of satisfaction. Elimination of positive feelings and relapse to the next lower grade of good does not so much overcome evil as it surrenders good in order to avoid the feeling of discord. Elimination of some of the intensity of a feeling so that a compatible proportion of feelings can be achieved overcomes evil. When elimination is used as a method to pull back to a stable starting point for the development of a new complex structure of definiteness, it may be considered as a strategy for overcoming evil.

Reorganization of Forms of Good

Retreat from discord through elimination and slow demise is not the only response to the intrinsic evil of discordant aesthetic destruction. Adventure into new forms of good which reorganize feelings into compatible contrasts is possible. In the section on unavoidable discord as instrumental to good[14] there was a discussion of the discord that sometimes develops when there is a shift to a new form of order which includes more feelings in a more complex synthesis. The

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[13] AI, p. 334. [14] See pp. 122 ff.

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evil of discord and slow decay can be overcome by a positive development of more comprehensive forms of good.

When two sets of incompatible feelings produce discord and aesthetic destruction, sometimes a reorganized form of good can be introduced which includes elements of both. Evil is overcome by "spontaneity of the occasion so directing its mental functionings as to introduce a third system of prehensions, relevant to both the inharmonious systems." This method is sometimes called the "introduction of Appearance."[15] Appearance is "the effect of the activity of the mental pole, whereby the qualities and coordinations of the given physical world undergo transformation." The objective content of the initial phase of the physical pole constitutes reality for a given occasion and the "difference between the objective content of the initial phase of the physical pole and the objective content of the final phase, after the integration of physical and mental poles, constitutes 'appearance' for that occasion."[16]

The introduction of appearance involves the simplification of the experience of the past and the emergence of novelty. The objective content of the mental pole whose synthesis with the physical pole produces appearance is derived "alike by abstraction from the physical pole and by the immanence of the basic Eros which endows with agency all ideal possibilities."[17] Abstraction selects and emphasizes some features. "Appearance raises into a distinctness of feeling, factors which can be generalized for salvation from the welter of Fact."[18] This abstractive emphasis issues in an "incredibly simplified edition of reality" in appearance.[19] The novel forms of definiteness in appearance come from the immanence of God in the production of the initial ideal aim. The fusion of the mental pole with the physical pole in the production of appearance "is the essential mode in which novelty enters into the functions of the world."[20]

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[15] AI, p. 335. [16] AI, p. 270. [17] AI, p. 270. [18] AI, p. 336.

Overcoming evil may be a long and complex process no matter how it has been caused. There may be several steps so that "a weary task is set for creative function, by an epoch of new creations to remove the inhibition."[21] Such a reconstruction may begin with "trivial" structures used as a means for more complex elements. In this way "the struggle with evil is a process of building up a mode of utilization by the provision of intermediate elements introducing a complex structure of harmony."[22] Overcoming evil in an organism with a complex body may require the development of "a finer and more subtle relationship among its bodily parts."[23] Appearance is effective in societies of men where the process of its development may "lift into the poles the ideal of another type of perfection which becomes a program for reform."[24]

We have seen[25] that no stable endurance is possible because of the constant running down effect of efficient causation. When this slow decay has upset a compatible combination of feelings enough to introduce destructive discord, this evil is often overcome by a reorganization of the available feelings moving toward greater strength of beauty.

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[19] AI, p. 273. [20] AI, p. 273. [21] PR, p. 341. [22] PR, p. 517.

[23] RM, p. 96. [24] AI, p. 333. [25] See pp. 111 f.

Vibration and Rhythm

Static maintenance of a defining characteristic in a society is not possible because of the running down effect of efficient causation. Vibration is one of the methods by which "stabilization is secured."[26] "The Way of Rhythm pervades all life, and indeed all physical existence."[27] When conceptual origination is at a minimum, "the final trace of its operation is found in alternations backwards and forwards between alternative modes. This is the reason for the predominant importance of wave-transmission in physical nature."[28] The slow erosion that would occur if there were changeless repetition is avoided by change before there are built up enough contrary feelings to produce exclusions from the defining characteristic. In rocks and enduring aspects of nature there is in the basic elements "a regularity of alternation which procures stability in the life-history. Contrast is thus gained. In physical science, this is 'vibration.'"[29] Confusion between types of enduring things is avoided by an order in nature in which each type has a "definite pulse" and the transmission of each different sensum "is associated with its own wave-length."[30]

The connection between the parts of a cycle of vibration is described as follows:

> In the Way of Rhythm a round of experiences, forming a determinate sequence of contrasts attainable within a definite method, are codified so that the end of one such cycle is the proper antecedent stage for the beginning of another such cycle. The cycle is such that its own completion provides the conditions for its own mere repetition. It eliminates the fatigue attendant upon the repetition of any one of its parts.[31]

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[26] FR, p. 15. [27] FR, p. 16. [28] AI, p. 332.

[29] PR, p. 285. [30] PR, p. 247. [31] FR, p. 17.

In fatigue contrary feelings accumulate and gradually exclude the feelings of the defining characteristic. Change in vibration avoids the buildup of these contraries.

Vibration is produced by the "origination of reversions in the mental pole."[32] This reversion arises "by reason of the lure of contrast, as a condition for intensity of experience."[33] In vibration there is alternating origination of identical elements so that "the reverted conceptual feeling is transmitted into the next occasion as physical feeling, and the pattern of the original physical feeling now reappears as the datum in the reverted conceptual feeling."[34] Intensity is gained through contrast and the avoidance of the accumulation of fatigue which would have occurred if there had been simple repetition. There is massive multiple social reinforcement of the periodically repeated aspects in the cycle. "It has the weight of repetition, the intensity of contrast, and the balance between the two factors of the contrast."[35]

In human experience there is sufficient accumulation of contrary feelings in rhythmic cycles to produce the running down effect of fatigue. Fatigue is avoided in some cases through "the preservation of the fundamental abstract structure of the cycle, combined with the variation of the concrete details of succeeding cycles. This device is particularly illustrated in music and in vision."[36]

The principle of maintaining achieved character through rhythm and cycles of rhythm against the running down effect of fatigue is capable of many variations. One of the cyclic variations is called "the Way of Transience."[37] The higher types of existence such as animals, plants and men "preserve their zest by the quick succession of stages from birth, culmination, to death."[38] In the way of transience there is "the substitution of short-lived individuals by way of protecting the species from the fatigue of the individual."[39]

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[32] PR, p. 423.

[33] PR, p. 424.

[34] PR, p. 426.

[35] PR, p. 426.

[36] FR, p. 17.

The pervasiveness of rhythms and cycles in the universe is "one of the reasons for believing that the root principles of life are, in some lowly form, exemplified in all types of physical existence."[40] The period of cyclic repetition may vary from a fraction of a second to many years. There are combinations of cycles, "cycles of cycles,"[41] and variations within cycles.

We have noted that the variation in vibration aims at contrast for the purpose of intensity. The variation must be relevant so that it will be compatible for synthesis. Such feelings "involve realization of the relevance of eternal objects as decided in the primordial nature of God."[42] "Thus, a more fundamental account must ascribe the reverted conceptual feeling in a temporal subject to its conceptual feeling derived, according to Category IV, from the hybrid physical feeling of the relevancies conceptually ordered in God's experience."[43] Each change in a vibratory cycle requires divine initiative. Ordinarily when we think of vibration we think of a tuning fork or a piano wire which once started keeps going on its own. Such vibration gradually decreases in amplitude until it stops. Since the vibration produced by reversion involves the divine initiative, it is a method of overcoming the running down effect of inertia and fatigue. It does not keep going on its own as a tuning fork does and it does not run down as a tuning fork does. The age of rocks and the amount of time that light has been coming toward earth from the most distant light sources indicate that the divine initiative is able to maintain stable vibration cycles for vast amounts of time.

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[37] FR, p. 16. [38] AI, p. 369. [39] FR, p. 16. [40] FR, pp. 16 f.

[41] FR, p. 17. [42] PR, p. 425. [43] PR, p. 382.

Changing the Environment

The methods of overcoming evil mentioned so far have focused on changes within the becoming occasion. Elimination of contrary feelings so as to remove discord occurs within the occasion. Reorganizing the defining characteristic of an enduring object so as to include a wider variety of feelings without discord is primarily an internal change. Any cycle of vibration involves several occasions but the value of the change produced by reversion is effective in the contrast that occurs within the occasion. Certain types of evil are overcome through the purposeful modification of the environment by the more complex organisms.

A common expression in evolutionary theory is that in a competitive situation there is a survival of those organisms which best fit the environment. Whitehead finds that as organisms get more complex there is a contrary relationship in which animals have "progressively undertaken the task of adapting the environment to themselves. They have built nests, and social dwelling-places of great complexity; beavers have cut down trees and dammed rivers; insects have elaborated a high community life with a variety of reactions upon the environment."[44] Even those behaviors which are regarded as adaptation to the environment are in a certain sense a modification of the environment. The self of a complex organism having a body is a personally ordered route of dominant occasions.[45] The body is external to this personal self. In sense perception "the animal body is nothing more than the most intimately relevant part of the antecedent settled world."[46] The body is in a sense "part of the external world, continuous with it. In fact, it is just as much part of nature as anything else there--a river, or a mountain, or a cloud."[47] The body may be defined as "that region of the world which is the primary field of human expression."[48] By this definition actions taken by the personal self which result in changes in the body are a modification of the environment of the personal self. "The simplest living things let their food swim into them. The higher animals chase their food, catch it, and masticate it. In so acting, they are transforming the environment for their own purposes."[49]

For man as the most complex organism in the world "this active attack on the environment is the most prominent fact in his existence."[50] In man reason has reached high development and the "primary function of Reason is the direction of the attack on the environment."[51] Even though only a few changeable aspects of the environment enter man's consciousness, these variable factors are of the greatest significance "for something can be done about them."[52]

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[44] FR, pp. 4 f.

[45] AI, pp. 263, 267, 271; PR, pp. 166-67, 182, 516; MT, pp. 39, 215.

[46] PR, p. 100.

[47] MT, pp. 29-30, cf. AI, pp. 243, 290; MT, pp. 156, 221.

[48] MT, p. 30. [49] FR, p. 5. [50] FR, p. 5. [51] FR, p. 5.

Relativity and the consequent mutual interdependence of organisms in the world result in the need for extensive social cooperation before very far reaching changes can be produced in the environment. "The organisms can create their own environment. For this purpose, the single organism is almost helpless. The adequate forces require societies of cooperating organisms."[53] Ants and bees illustrate relatively simple social cooperation and the social and religious institutions of man constitute more complex cooperation for the modification of the environment in order to overcome evil. We have noted the tendency of mystical monistic and idealistic thought to "abandon the immediate experience of this world as a lost cause."[54] Christianity has wavered between active cooperative attack on evil conditions in the world and "renunciation." "The difference between the two consists in the difference between a program for reform and a program for abolition."[55] Buddhism tends to evade evil by total abolition of actualizing definiteness in the self and the consequent loss of good. Christianity in its active tendency cooperates to modify conditions so as to produce good that overcomes evil. Buddhism seeks "so to conduct life as to gain a release from the individual personality which is the vehicle for such experience."[56] Christianity acts toward evil so that "life is

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[52] MT, p. 41. [53] SMW, pp. 163 f.

[54] AI, pp. 40 f.; see p. 8 of this dissertation.

[55] AI, p. 41. [56] RM, p. 49.

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placed on a finer level. It overcomes evil with good."[57]

When we seek for the source of the upward thrust providing the novel ideal forms for overcoming evil we find God. Reason which directs the attack on the environment is from God. "Reason is the special embodiment in us of the disciplined counter-agency which saves the world."[58] In the next chapter there is a discussion of the process in which God responds to his experience of evil by presenting ideal aims to occasions in the world which will overcome the evil. God's response to evil in the world "enters into the actual world by reason of the inclusion of the nature of God, which includes the ideal vision of each actual evil so met with a novel consequent as to issue in the restoration of goodness."[59]

If the divine initiative to overcome evil is not obstructed by the freedom of whole response or by the morally responsible freedom of men there is a successful modification of the environment which overcomes evil. Concrescence combines the initial data reflecting evil conditions with the developmental and corrective novelty in the initial ideal aim to produce a decision which in turn results in progressive modification in the conditions in the world. God is the source of ideality which is able to overcome evil in the world.

Objective Immortality Overcomes Perpetual Perishing

The ultimate evil consists in the perishing of every actual occasion with its satisfaction. "But there is no reason, of any ultimate metaphysical generality, why this should be the whole story."[60]

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[57] RM, pp. 51 f. [58] FR, p. 28. [59] RM, p. 155. [60] PR, p. 517.

Actual entities have continuing significance after perishing since "actual entities 'perpetually perish' subjectively, but are immortal objectively."[61]

Because every actual entity in the past is prehended by each becoming actual entity, every actual entity is objectively immortal in the occasions of the world which prehend it. "Simple physical feelings embody the reproductive character of nature, and also the objective immortality of the past."[62] By anticipating its own efffect on the future there is a sense in which each occasion "experiences its own objective immortality."[63] This "objective immortality within the temporal world" is not the solution to the problem posed by the vision of "finer religious intuition. 'Everlastingness' has been lost; and 'everlastingness' is the content of that vision upon which the finer religions are built--the 'many' absorbed everlastingly in the final unity."[64]

Actual occasions which have perished in the world achieve everlasting objective immortality without loss of subjective immediacy in the consequent nature of God.

> Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's nature. The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living, ever-present fact. An enduring personality in the temporal world is a route of occasions in which the successors with some peculiar completeness sum up their predecessors. The correlate fact in God's nature is an even more complete unity of life in a chain of elements for which succession does not mean loss of immediate unison. This element in God's nature inherits from the temporal counterpart according to the same principle as in the temporal world the future inherits from the past. Thus in the sense in which the present occasion

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[61] PR, p. 44; cf. p. 94. [62] PR, p. 364; AI, p. 252.

[63] PR, p. 328. [64] PR, p. 527.

> is the person now, and yet with his own past, so the counterpart in God is that person in God."[65]

Whitehead calls attention to the fact that both in Christianity and Buddhism "the souls of the blessed return to God." He also points out that this similarity conceals "a wide divergence." There is first a significant difference in the "respective concepts of God."[66] While God "exhibits the immortal side of the many persons," this God is not the "diffused God of the Hindu Buddhistic tradition."[67] The Christian God is complex rather than simple, becoming actualization rather than eminent reality. There is further a difference in "the meaning of the return of the soul."[68] In the Buddhist return individuality is lost. In the Christian return each occasion retains its individuality so that there is a "multiplicity of elements with individual self-realization."[69]

The most striking difference between the significance of the return of occasions to God in Buddhism and Christianity has to do with the usefulness of this objective immortality for the future. God uses the experience of each actual occasion of the past in the determination of that best possible initial ideal aim which he gives in return to each becoming occasion in the present. God prehends these occasions without loss, both those which are extrinsically good and those which are evil. His consequent nature "contains within itself Evil as well as Good."[70] We have discussed how God transmutes what would be discordant in the world into harmony. "For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. For the kingdom of heaven is with us today."[71] The return of the soul in Buddhism "discourages the sense of active personality, whereas Christianity encourages it."[72] "In This way, the insistent craving is justified--the insistent craving that zest for existence be refreshed by the ever-present, unfading importance of our immediate actions, which perish and yet live for evermore."[73]

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[65] PR, pp. 531 f. [66] RM, p. 139. [67] Imm, p. 694.

[68] RM, pp. 139 f. [69] PR, p. 531. [70] Imm, p. 692.

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[71] PR, p. 532. [72] RM, p. 140. [73] PR, p. 533.

CHAPTER VI

GOD AS THE PRINCIPLE OF LIMITATION

It has not been possible to discuss the nature of good and evil and how they arise without mentioning God. A more systematic treatment of the nature of God and his relation to the world has been reserved for this chapter. This late discussion of God is intended to reflect Whitehead's approach. God is mentioned only incidentally in the chapter on "The Categoreal Scheme"[1] and concentrated discussion is reserved for the next chapter entitled "Some Derivative Notions."[2] The final chapter in the book is entitled "God and the World."[3]

This sequence results from Whitehead's philosophical approach. He notes that "philosophy has always proceeded on the sound principle that its generalization must be based upon the primary elements in actual experience as starting points."[4] It should not start with a system and select data that support the system. "Its primary stage can be termed 'assemblage'."[5] God is not prominent in the assemblage of factors which appear "in experience with a certain ultimate directness of intuition." An element of "interpretation" is required before the concept of God emerges into discussion.[6] Analysis of the metaphysical situation shows that God is required.

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[1] PR, pp. 27-45. [2] PR, pp. 46-54. [3] PR, pp. 519-533.

[4] PR, p. 240. [5] MT, p. 2. [6] PR, p. 518.

Whitehead speaks approvingly of Aristotle for finding it necessary "to complete his metaphysics by the introduction of a Prime Mover--God." This conclusion was particularly significant since "ethical and religious interests" did not dictate the outcome. He had no "motive, except to follow his metaphysical train of thought whithersoever it led him." It is clear that Whitehead believes that he as well as Aristotle has only introduced God because "the general character of things requires that there be such an entity."[7]

Assemblage of the elements in scientific experience for Whitehead included relativity, quantum mechanics, and evolution. We have seen how he accounted for these with a reality composed of processive units of experience internally relating past reality and eternal ideality.[8] The units of past reality which are experienced internally are actual entities. The eternal forms of ideality are eternal objects. Actual entities and eternal objects are brought together in a process called "substantial activity"[9] in the early period and "creativity" in later works.[10] If all actual entities of the past and all eternal objects were experienced with equal relevance by every becoming occasion, all occasions would tend to become like each other and each of these identical occasions would be hardly distinguishable from nothing.[11] In order for a unit of good actuality to arise there must be limitation so that only compatible feelings of past actualities are dominant. Such limitation is only possible if there is a principle of limitation in addition to creativity, actual entities and eternal objects. "In the place of Aristotle's God as Prime Mover, we require God as the Principle of Concretion."[12]

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[7] SMW, pp. 249 f. [8] See pp. 43-55.

[9] SMW, pp. 157, 180, 238, 254. [10] See pp. 115-118.

[11] SMW, p. 137; RM, p. 153.

In the section on the good as composite[13] five principles were described which make it possible for an occasion to limit its experience of past occasions and patterns of ideality to those elements which would produce differentiated definiteness. First, the principle of intensive relevance provides that all feelings from the past need not be experienced with equal intensity but that the various feelings of past occasions are experienced in differing magnitude on a continuum from low to high intensity. This allows elimination of different feelings by different occasions so as to provide for differences between occasions. Second, the principle of compatibility and contrariety says that some combinations of feelings are compatible contrasts and others are incompatible contraries. Contraries are eliminated through mutual sensitivity. The third principle is that a set of feelings experienced from many occasions in the causal past is socially reinforced and therefore achieves high intensity. The fourth principle provides that proximate occasions in the past are felt with greater intensity than remote occasions. The fifth principle is that an initial aim emerges which includes developmental and corrective novelty which tends to produce strength of beauty.

The need for a principle of limitation may be dramatized by attempting to imagine how these principles would operate if there were no principle of limitation. The first principle seems to be grounded in the metaphysical situation so that it applies to all entities including the principle of limitation and so it would not be effected. The second principle requires standards of compatibility so that all possibilities in ideality have established grades of compatibility with each other. Without the principle of limitation there would be no definition of contrariness or compatibility so this principle could not function. We have seen in the section on the cause of evil that the combination of the third and fourth principles tend toward a slow running down of all enduring forms of definiteness.[14] The intensity of a defining characteristic experienced from a contiguous past occasion is gradually eroded in each successive occasion in a route by the massively reinforced contrary feelings in the broader more remote environment. The third and fourth principles without a principle of limitation tend toward nothingness. The initiation of corrective and developmental novelty described by the fifth principle would be impossible without a principle of limitation which would itself be changeless and therefore not subject to running down. Without corrective novelty from the principle of limitation the defining characteristic would gradually run down.

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[12] SMW, p. 250. [13] See pp. 48-55.

The principle of limitation is required in order to establish grades of relevance of eternal objects to that there are standards of compatibility and contrariety. It is further needed in order to initiate developmental and corrective novelty in the initial aims of becoming occasions so as to overcome the running down effect of efficient cause. What characteristics would the principle of limitation need to have in order to perform these functions?

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[14] See pp. 95-120.

Non-derivative

A principle of limitation would have to be non-derivative in order to be able to provide initial aims which could overcome the running down effect of comprehensive finite relativity. Enduring forms of definiteness tend to run down because all actual occasions are mutually derivative. A principle of limitation which would derive its principles of limitation from the occasions in the routes of occasions for which it supplied ideal aims would itself run down.

God as the principle of limitation is non-derivative. He is a "non-derivative actuality, unbounded by its prehensions of an actual world."[15] He does prehend the occasions of the world but they have no binding effect on the primordial ordering which is the basis of limitation. An actual occasion in the world derives its character from its experience of actual occasions in its causal past and from the eternal objects in its initial aim which are also derived from the past. For the primordial aspect of God "there is no past" so that "Hume's principle, of the derivate character of conceptual feelings, does not hold for him."[16] Saying that there is no past for the primordial aspect of God means that there never was an event before which there was no primordial ordering of the eternal objects and after which the eternal objects were ordered.

In some places Whitehead uses temporal language which could be interpreted to say that this ordering could only "happen" once. "Unfettered conceptual valuation, 'infinite' in Spinoza's sense of that term, is only possible once in the universe; since that creative act is objectively immortal as an inescapable condition characterizing creative action."[17] "The primordial nature of God is the acquirement by creativity of a primordial character."[18]

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[15] PR, p. 48. [16] PR, p. 134.

If we try to imagine how an ordering event could occur, we could start with an unordered realm of eternal objects and then as the many become one in creativity these eternal objects could be brought together into a primordial order. This would seem to be impossible because unordered eternal objects could not be brought together into anything definite. Apart from an ordered relation in the non-derivative primordial aspect of God eternal objects would act as if they were non-existent.[19] Even if eternal objects could subsist independently of their primordial ordering, self-causation could not do anything with them in an unordered state. This is the whole point of the need for a principle of limitation. "Unlimited possibility and abstract creativity can procure nothing."[20]

Both of these temporal sounding statements can be interpreted more consistently as referring to the non-derivative character of the primordial ordering. "Once" does not refer to the first in a series of events. Only one non-derivative primordial ordering of eternal objects in a principle of limitation is metaphysically possible in the universe. It is not by the first action of self-causation in a series of creative events that the primordial ordering is acquired. Creativity receives a primordial character through the action of the non-derivative primordial ordering.

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[17] PR, p. 378. [18] PR, p. 522.

[19] PR, pp. 46, 64, 73, 392, 530. [20] RM, p. 152.

The ordering of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God is not derived from the nature of the eternal objects themselves. The relationships between eternal objects in the primordial ordering "do not involve the individual essence of the eternal objects."[21] When the individual essence of eternal objects is considered in abstraction from their relation in the primordial ordering there is only a "barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities."[22] The relationships established in the primordial ordering are independent from the individual essence of each eternal object so that "their relationships as possibilities are expressible without reference to their respective individual essences."[23] If the nature of eternal objects together with creative self-causation could produce and maintain such an order, there would be no need for a non-derivative principle of limitation. "The primordial created fact is the unconditioned conceptual valuation of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects."[24] The primordial ordering is not an ordering conditioned by the nature of the eternal objects.

The primordial ordering of eternal objects is not conditioned by events that occur in the world. God's "unconditioned actuality of conceptual feeling at the base of things" is "untrammelled by reference to any particular course of things."[25] It is not "derivative from the world."[26]

The primordial ordering is an "unfettered valuation."[27] It is not derived from the nature of eternal objects, from events in the world, or from processive events in God. It is non-derivative.

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[21] SMW, p. 237. [22] PR, p. 64. [23] SMW, p. 238.

[24] PR, p. 46. [25] PR, p. 522. [26] RM, p. 156; cf. PR, p. 75.

[27] PR, p. 47.

Changeless Base of Change

In order for a principle of limitation to be effective there must be a changeless base for change. The possibility of change and process is dependent on something permanent. One of the aims of the book Religion in the Making was to "direct attention to the foundation of religion on our apprehension of those permanent elements by reason of which there is a stable order in the world, permanent elements apart from which there could be no changing world."[28]

God must include both permanent and changing elements. We have noticed Whitehead's criticism of monistic systems of thought which are unable to explain how change could occur and evil arise if there is only a totally static eminently real absolute. If God is made totally static his relations to changing creatures cannot be explained and the creatures are deficient in reality. "Surely, the satisfactory answer must embody an understanding of the interweaving of change and permanence, each required by the other."[29] There are permanent elements in God and changing elements. The permanent elements need the changing elements in order to be effective in actuality. The changing elements need the permanent elements in order to have anything with which to be effective. There is an "interplay of the static vision and the dynamic history" which embodies the principle of "unbounded permanence acquiring novelty through flux."[30] Within God there is "actuality with permanence, requiring fluency as its completion." There is "completion of God's primordial nature by the derivation of his consequent nature from the temporal world."[31] God needs to experience the world in order to select developmental and corrective novelty from his permanent primordial nature which is appropriate for that changing world. "In God's nature, permanence is primordial and flux is derivative from the World: in the World's nature, flux is primordial and permanence is derivative from God."[32]

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[28] RM, preface. [29] MT, p. 73. [30] PR, p. 254.

The permanent element in God as the principle of limitation is required in order to provide sufficient determination for the concrescence of an occasion. If the ungraded totality of eternal objects and actual entities from the past converged on a standpoint, a definite concrescence could not emerge. "The boundless wealth of possibility in the realm of abstract form would leave each creative phase still indeterminate, unable to synthesize under determinate conditions the creatures from which it springs." There must be a selection of eternal objects and physical feelings from the actual occasions in the past. In order to accomplish this selection each occasion must receive an initial aim derived from permanent factors in the principle of limitation. "The definite determination which imposes ordered balance on the world requires an actual entity imposing its own unchanged consistency of character on every phase."[33]

The primordial grading of relevance in God must be non-processive in order to be able to overcome the running down effect inherent in the processive relativity of occasions in the world. The need for a non-processive primordial ordering may be shown by analyzing what would happen if the primordial ordering were processive. There are at least two ways to attempt to imagine a processive determination of the grading of relevance. One way is to imagine the emergence of the grading from nothing. Whitehead does not seem to believe that something more can come from something less with nothing added. "From nothing, there can come nothing."[34] "It is a contradiction in terms to assume that some explanatory fact can float into the actual world out of nonentity. Nonentity is nothingness."[35] We could not expect the grading to float into reality out of nothing. Another way to imagine the processive origin of the primordial grading is through the action of creative self-causation bringing eternal objects together in relation to their changing relations in realizations in the world. Such a process would tend to run down just as the defining characteristic of an enduring object is gradually eroded through repeated concrescence as the many eternal objects are brought together in relation to their changing realization in the world. Rather than thinking of the grading of the primordial nature as emerging processively out of nothing or through the action of self-causation, it is better to think of it as being permanent and non-derivative.

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[31] PR, p. 527. [32] PR, p. 529. [33] RM, p. 94.

A permanent, non-derivative grading in the primordial nature is able to counteract the running down effect of efficient causation. Without such a non-derivative grading things would run down for "apart from some notion of imposed law, the doctrine of immanence provides absolutely no reason why the universe should not be steadily relapsing into lawless chaos." Whitehead finds evidence that the Universe must include "a stable actuality whose mutual implication with the remainder of things secures an inevitable trend towards order. The Platonic 'persuasion' is required."[36] The principle of limitation persuasively overcomes the running down of efficient causation by initiating corrective novelty in the initial aims of becoming occasions. It can do this if its grading of relevance is non-derivative and stable so that it will not itself run down. This action "requires the primordial permanence of God, whereby the creative advance ever re-establishes itself endowed with initial subjective aim derived from the relevance of God to the evolving world."[37]

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[34] FR, p. 20. [35] PR, p. 73.

In discussing the changeless character of the principle of limitation we should notice Whitehead's distinction between that which endures and that which is eternal. Mountains endure. A color is eternal. "The mountain has to time and space a different relation from that which colour has."[38] "Enduring things are thus the outcome of a temporal process; whereas eternal things are the elements required for the very being of the process."[39] Certain features have no beginning. They are not the outcome of a temporal process. They are the permanent things which are required for process. They are non-derivative. They are eternal.

There are two features of the principle of limitation which are eternal. Eternal objects are eternally ordered. Each eternal object has an "individual essence" which is the character which constitutes its "individuality." The individual essence "is what it is."[40] Even though Whitehead rejects an eminently real static realm of ideality he says that we "must admit that in some sense or other, we inevitably presuppose this realm of forms, in abstraction from passage, loss, and gain."[41] "There stand in the public view the persuasiveness of the eternal ideals, the same today as when realized in the Founder of Christianity. . . ."[42] The fixed non-derivative character of eternal objects is emphasized when it is said that God "does not create eternal objects; for his nature requires them in the same degree that they require him."[43] The non-derivative, nontemporal character of individual essence is what makes the object an eternal object.

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[36] AI, pp. 146 f. [37] PR, p. 527. [38] SMW, p. 126.

[39] SMW, p. 158. [40] SMW, p. 229.

The second eternal feature of the principle of limitation is the ordering of the relationships between eternal objects. We have seen that these relationships between eternal objects are independent from the eternal individual essence of each object.[44] The limitless possible combination of individual essences is restricted so that eternal objects are graded in various degrees of compatibility. "Thus there is an antecedent limitation among values, introducing contraries, grades, and oppositions."[45] This "graded envisagement" in the primordial nature of God is an "eternal relatedness."[46] These "eternal principles of valuation"[47] constitute "the stable element of divine ordering"[48] which makes possible "stability of aim amid the multiple forms of potentiality."[49] "This ideal realization of potentialities in a primordial actual entity constitutes the metaphysical stability whereby the actual

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[41] MT, p. 93. [42] AI, p. 218. [43] PR, p. 392; cf. RM, p. 157.

[44] SMW, pp. 237 f. [45] SMW, p. 256. [46] PR, p. 287; cf. SMW, p. 254.

[47] PR, p. 380. [48] PR, p. 47. [49] MT, p. 117.

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process exemplifies general principles of metaphysics, and attains the ends proper to specific types of emergent order."[50] The "static majesty of God's vision"[51] is the "eternal order which is the final absolute 'wisdom.'"[52] God's conceptual nature is unchanged, by reason of its final completeness."[53]

It is important to emphasize that everything in God is not eternally unchanging. The consequent nature "evolves in its relationship to the evolving world without derogation to the eternal completion of its primordial conceptual nature."[54] It is the "primordial nature" which is "mental and permanent."[55] That which is "permanent in the nature of things"[56] is the basis for the changing things. God is an "unchanging actual entity"[57] which is "above change"[58] because of the static eternal objects in a static grading of relationships of compatibility. We have yet to discuss a processive aspect of God which is needed in order to select and make available from the static ideal possibilities those ideals which are appropriate for specific changes in the changing world.

At this point we should notice Christian's view that a single static ideal ordering of possibilities is impossible.[59] His interpretation rests primarily on the following statement. "There is not just one ideal 'order' which all actual entities should attain and fail to attain. In each case there is an ideal peculiar to each particular actual entity, and arising from the dominant components in its phase of 'givenness.'"[60] In this passage Whitehead is arguing against the conception of an ideal universe which is eminently real and static so that process is by the fact of its change a departure from reality. In such a universe there is a totally static God with a single ideal order for the world who could not respond to a processive becoming in the world with appropriate changes in ideality. Since the processive world is real, there is not just one ideal for every electron but a particular ideal for each adapted to its situation.

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[50] PR, p. 64. [51] PR, p. 530. [52] PR, p. 527.

[53] PR, p. 523. [54] PR, p. 19. [55] ESP, p. 118.

[56] William A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), pp. 271-277. Hereafter cited as IWM.

Cobb solves this problem by suggesting that there is "not one simple order but an indefinite variety of orders."[61] Such a solution is analogous to the initial ideal aim which presents a variety of ideals in "conditioned alternatives."[62] A single order of orders with conditioned alternatives appropriate for any possible given actual world is necessary in order to overcome the running down effect of efficient cause.

Christian proposes that the "primordial nature of God orders eternal objects in the sense, and only in the sense, that in God's envisagement eternal objects are together."[63] By this he seems to mean that God is that actual entity which rescues eternal objects from that relative non-existence which they would have if they did not belong to some actuality according to the ontological principle. He excludes a single fixed ordering of eternal objects in conditioned alternatives of relative compatibility. He seems to have forgotten that Whitehead's argument for the need for a principle of limitation requires that all eternal objects have a determinate relation of relative compatibility to each other which is not provided by a reservoir containing a multiplicity of all eternal objects in indeterminate relations. Christian's primordial nature would not be able to overcome the running down effect of efficient causation. Any eternal object would be as compatible for inclusion as any other and soon all actual occasions would be like each other because they all included all eternal objects in equal relevance.

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[60] PR, p. 128. [61] CNT, p. 155. [62] PR, p. 342.

[63] IWM, p. 274.

Process demands permanence. There must be a changeless basis for change. The principle of limitation includes two important changeless aspects which make process possible. The individual essence of each eternal object is changeless and eternal objects derive their effectiveness for process from their inclusion in the primordial nature of God. In the primordial nature all eternal objects are ordered in grades of relevance establishing conditioned alternatives or relative compatibility. This order is eternal. Its changeless character makes it possible to overcome the running down effect of efficient causation.

Complete

A principle of limitation that is non-derivative and changeless would have to be complete in order to account for what is accomplished in the world. We have already noticed that the primordial ordering is unchanging because of its "final completeness."[64] This "eternal completion" is unaffected by the progressive development of the consequent nature.[65]

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[64] PR, p. 523. [65] PR, p. 19.

The primordial nature of God is complete in that it includes every eternal object. The primordial ordering includes "the entire multiplicity of eternal objects."[66] This "all-inclusive"[67] conceptual valuation orders "all eternal objects."[68] Since "every eternal object"[69] is present there is "complete envisagement."[70] God does not create novel eternal objects.[71] There are no eternal objects which are novel to God[72] although there are eternal objects novel to the world in that they have never been realized in an actual occasion in the temporal world. In his primordial nature God is "the unlimited conceptual realization of the absolute wealth of potentiality."[73]

The primordial nature of God is complete in that it arranges the totality of eternal objects in an order of orders which is able to meet the needs of any eventuality. A principle of limitation which included the totality of eternal objects in an unsystematized aggregation would not be able to generate differentiated complexity which could overcome the running down effect of efficient causation. There must be a determination of differentiated relevance of each eternal object to every other eternal object in this system. "Accordingly the differentiated relevance of eternal objects to each instance of the creative process requires their conceptual realization in the primordial nature of God." This differentiated relevance consists in the establishment of "relationships of diversity and pattern."[74] God's conceptual realization of eternal objects is "devoid of all negative prehensions."[75]

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[66] PR, p. 46. [67] PR, pp. 47, 523. [68] PR, pp. 48, 134.

[69] PR, p. 382. [70] PR, p. 70, cf. p. 524. [71] PR, p. 392.

[72] PR, p. 33. [73] PR, p. 521. [74] PR, p. 392. [75] PR, p. 524.

Every eternal object has a positive role.

The complete ordering of eternal objects is a unity and not a loose aggregation or multiplicity. Whitehead refers to the primordial ordering as a "unity of conceptual operations"[76] and as an "unity of conceptual feelings."[77] This unity is systematic. "Thus God is the one systematic, complete fact, which is the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act."[78] In this system every eternal object has a definite determinate place in relation to every other eternal object. It is important not to apply the looseness and indeterminateness which is required for the free actualization of eternal objects to the definition of ideal relevance of eternal objects. Free occasions can refuse to actualize the ideal relevance proposed by the ideal aim, but this does not mean that the ideal in the primordial nature of God is not quite definite. If there were not a definite relative subordination of relevance of each eternal object to every other eternal object, specific eternal objects could not be selected for the ideal aim which would tend toward greater differentiated strength of beauty. Instead a flood of eternal objects would be presented with no differentiated relevance so that all occasions would soon be like each other. In God the complete realm of eternal objects with all of the various possible combinations of each eternal object are "graded in harmonious, relative subordination."[79]

In God's complete unified system there is not just one order of relevance but an order of orders. It would not be possible to have a complete system of relative relevance in a single order. The single complete unified system which includes all eternal objects is not itself a complex eternal object but the grading of relevance of eternal objects in an actual entity. If it would be possible effectively to grade all eternal objects in a single complex eternal object, a principle of limitation would not be necessary. There are ideals in the various orders of eternal objects which are not concurrently compatible. It is conceivable that some eternal objects are so incompatible that they are not included in every order. There is no total world situation which could realize in a unison of becoming all of the ideality envisaged in the order of orders. "There is no totality which is the harmony of all perfections. Whatever is realized in any one occasion of experience necessarily excludes the unbounded welter of contrary possibilities."[80] Politicians would be enlightened if they could gain the perspective to see that much conflict among men results from the advocacy by different groups of ideals which are appropriate in different situations but "incompatible for conjoint realization."[81] The primordial ordering then "includes in its appetitive vision all possibilities of order, possibilities at once incompatible and unlimited with a fecundity beyond imagination. Finite transcience stages this welter of incompatibles in their ordered relevance to the flux of epochs."[82]

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[76] PR, p. 522. [77] PR, p. 134. [78] RM, p. 154. [79] RM, p. 157.

There must be a determinate systematic relationship between the various orders in the divine ordering or God would not be able to select and present the required novel eternal objects which could initiate a new type of order when the conditions for that alternative occur in the world. There is not an order of orders in the sense that order number nine follows by necessity order number eight. There is an order of orders in the sense that which order is appropriate for a given actual world depends on changeless determinate conditioned alternatives in the primordial nature. This order of orders makes it possible to "constitute the eternal objects into relevant lures of feeling severally appropriate for all realizable basic conditions."[83]

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[80] AI, p. 356. [81] AI, pp. 356 f. [82] ESP, p. 118.

Another way to analyze the complete character of the primordial nature is to look at it as "completeness of 'appetition'."[84] "Appetition is immediate matter of fact including in itself a principle of unrest, involving realization of what is not and may be."[85] We experience the divine appetition as "effecting a final causation towards ideal ends which lie outside the mere physical tendency."[86] God holds the totality of the realm of eternal objects in such a way as to produce a thrust toward their selective realization in greater total strength of beauty in the world. The primordial nature "is the conceptual adjustment of all appetites in the form of aversions and adversions. It constitutes the meaning of relevance."[87] To say that eternal object B is relevant to A is to say that if A is realized in an actual occasion objectified in the datum of a becoming occasion God will present B in the initial aim with a persuasive urge toward its realization as the novelty which will effect the greatest strength of beauty. The primordial nature is "the fundamental graduation of appetitions which lies at the base of things, and which solves all indeterminations of transition."[88] Christian's denial of systematic order in the togetherness of eternal objects in the primordial nature would make it impossible for God to initiate eternal object B as the novelty which would effect the maximum strength of beauty for an occasion which experienced A in its datum.

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[83] PR, p. 134. [84] PR, p. 50; cf. p. 481. [85] PR, p. 47.

[86] PR, p. 72. [87] PR, p. 48. [88] PR, p. 315.

The primordial nature is complete in the sense that it provides for every type of definiteness which can possibly be actualized in the world. In the production of novelty the primordial nature provides the novel possibility and the novel actualization of that possibility occurs in the world. "There is no character belonging to the actual apart from its exclusive determination by selected eternal objects.[89] God "must include all possibilities of physical value conceptually. . . ."[90] Self-causation in the world produces new actualization of what was conceptually initiated by God but no new possibilities. God is "complete in the sense that his vision determines every possibility of value. Such a complete vision coordinates and adjusts every detail."[91] This detailed adjustment is presented persuasively and not as necessity. Its persuasive character does not consist in its being indeterminate in details but in that it is presented as final cause in such a way that its conceptual origination may be accepted or rejected by freedom in the occasion.

We may summarize our discussion of the completeness of the principle of limitation with five propositions. God envisages the complete totality of eternal objects. He establishes a complete system of relative relevance of each eternal object to every other eternal object. He holds these eternal objects not in just one order but in a complete set of conditioned alternative orders which is able to adjust to any possible condition that occurs in the world. The primordial nature constitutes complete appetition so that there is an effective thrust toward the realization of those eternal objects which will issue in the greatest possible strength of beauty. God is the exhaustive source of all conceptual novelty which can be actualized in the world. God is incomplete in the sense that the development of his consequent nature is dependent on the experience of occasions in the world. There will be more discussion of the incompleteness of God in the section on processive availability of ideal limitation.

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[89] PR, p. 367. [90] RM, p. 153. [91] RM, pp. 153 f.

Antecedent Presupposition

A principle of limitation in order to be effective must be the antecedent presupposition of every other actual occasion. God is the only actual entity which is presupposed by every other actual entity. When we say that God is presupposed by every other actual entity we seem to be saying that God is in the past of every actual entity. There is a certain ambiguity in all temporal language used in relation to God. In some ways God may be thought of as temporal and in other ways he must be thought of as non-temporal.[92] If temporal language is used in this section, the purpose of such language is to convey the non-derivative presupposed character of the principle of limitation.

The non-derivative character of the principle of limitation is antecedent to every actual occasion in the sense that every occasion presupposes that limitation in order to become a unit of concrescent value. "There cannot be value without antecedent standards of value, to discriminate the acceptance or rejection of what is before the envisaging mode of activity. Thus there is an antecedent limitation among values, introducing contraries, grades, and oppositions."[93] The character of the ongoing process in the world "requires a definite entity, already actual among the formative elements, as an antecedent ground for the entry of the ideal forms into the definite process of the temporal world."[94] The principle of limitation must be prior to all occasions in the sense that each occasion depends on the principle of limitation to hold and selectively make available appropriate developmental and corrective novelty. "God, who is the ground antecedent to transition, must include all possibilities of physical value conceptually. . . "[95] "Thus God is the one systematic, complete fact, which is the antecedent ground conditioning every creative act."[96]

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[92] AI, p. 267.

It is only the non-derivative ordering of eternal objects in God which is prior to every actual occasion. Concrescence within God is in unison of becoming with every actual occasion. God's objectification of each actual occasion in His consequent nature is in the future of each one of those occasions. Within God there is a sense in which the primordial ordering precedes processive actualization. "For God the conceptual is prior to the physical, for the World the physical poles are prior to the conceptual poles."[97] In the two preceding sections we have seen that the primordial ordering has no beginning in time and is unchanged by the ongoing process in God and in the world. It is the static changeless basis of change in God which has non-temporal characteristics. The processive actualization in God has temporal characteristics. God "combines the actuality of what is temporal with the timelessness of what is potential."[98]

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[93] SMW, p. 256. [94] RM, p. 152. [95] RM, p. 153.

[96] RM, p. 154. [97] PR, p. 528.

Timeless potentiality has priority in God. In actual occasions in the world physical feelings derived from the past actual world have the priority. For God "there is no past" from which the prior element is derivative. "Thus the ideal realization of conceptual feelings takes the precedence."[99] To say that there is no past for God does not mean that there is no processive ongoingness in God so that there is no sense in which God was ever different from what he now is. In the next section we show that God as the principle of limitation must respond to free process in the world in order to overcome evil. God is different after his response than he was before it.

There is a primordial ordering in God which is prior to every actual occasion and there is ongoing process in God which is contemporary with every actual occasion. The principle of limitation not only includes the primordial ordering but also the processive creative actualization by which selected aspects of that primordial ordering are made available for specific occasions in specific situations. "By reason of its character as creature, always in concrescence and never in the past, it receives a reaction from the world; this reaction is its consequent nature."[100] It is primarily the consequent nature which is not "in the past of all members" and which is "in unison of becoming with every other creative act."[101] We should not think of concrescence in God, however, as consisting in a static mental pole and a processive

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[98] PR, p. 64. [99] PR, p. 134. [100] PR, p. 47. [101] PR, p. 523.

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physical pole. It is the whole entity that is processive. In the next section there is a focus of attention on the processive character of God including the mental pole in making available specific ideality which overcomes evil and tends toward good. It is this processive character that is "not before all creation, but with all creation."[102] The creative process in occasions in the world which is contemporary with creative process in God is sequentially dependent on the prior non-derivative primordial ordering of eternal objects in order to start its process. God as the principle of limitation is the antecedent presupposition of every concrescent process in becoming occasions in the world.

Processive Availability of Ideal Limitation

In the preceding sections we have described God as the non-derivative, unchanging, complete presupposition of every becoming occasion. In the course of this description it was mentioned that a totally static God would not be able to respond appropriately to free changes in the developing world. In order for God to be able to select the most appropriate ideal order from his order of orders, he must include processive elements in his nature. There are elements in God which are derivative, changing, incomplete and which presuppose events in the world.

In order for God to be able to respond to free events in the world, He must first experience those events. Every occasion which is actualized in the world is objectified in the consequent nature of God. "His 'consequent nature' results from his physical prehensions of the derivative actual entities."[103] "Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's nature."[104] This prehension of "each creature" by God is directed by his subjective aim derived from the non-derivative primordial ordering of eternal objects in the primordial nature.[105] The versatility of the order of orders makes it possible to prehend "every actuality" into the consequent nature with a "tender care that nothing be lost."[106] In the consequent nature "there is no loss, no obstruction."[107] God as the kingdom of heaven is not "the isolation of good from evil."[108] God does not objectify only those occasions in the world in which there is no experience of the evil of aesthetic destruction. He experiences the triumphs of strength of beauty and the suffering of aesthetic destruction. He is "the great companion--the fellow-sufferer who understands."[109]

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[102] PR, p. 521.

The versatility of the variety of orders in the primordial nature and the unlimited complexity of the synthesis make it possible for God to incorporate into the consequent nature factors that would be mutually exclusive within an occasion in the world. The consequent nature "originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side."[110]

Although all actual occasions of the world are prehended without loss there is a modification of these feelings of occasions of the world. In the world an occasion is real as long as it is becoming and then perishes with its own satisfaction. That occasion acquires a new status in the consequent nature of God. "The corresponding element in God's nature is not temporal actuality, but is the transmutation of that temporal actuality into a living, ever-present fact."[111] A temporal actuality is transformed into an objectively immortal fact in its reception into the consequent nature.

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[103] PR, p. 46; cf. p. 134. [104] PR, p. 531. [105] PR, p. 523.

[106] PR, p. 525. [107] PR, p. 524; cf. p. 532.

[108] RM, p. 155, cf. Imm, p. 692. [109] PR, p. 532. [110] PR, p. 524.

What is evil in the world is transformed into good in the consequent nature through its harmonious relation with other factors in the divine synthesis. "God has in his nature the knowledge of evil, of pain, and of degradation, but it is there as overcome with what is good."[112] God is able to incorporate "what in the temporal world is mere wreckage."[113] This transformed immortal status of occasions from the world in the consequent nature of God "is beyond our imagination to conceive."[114] The divine synthesis "receives into its unity the scattered effectiveness of realized activities, transformed by the supremacy of its own ideals."[115] The good that was actually achieved in positive realization even in "revolts of destructive evil" is "yet saved by its relation to the completed whole."[116] The consequent nature "is the temporal world perfected by its reception and its reformation, as a fulfilment of the primordial appetition which is the basis of all order."[117]

The transformation of evil into good that occurs when a temporal occasion is incorporated into the consequent nature does not seem to involve the elimination of some of the feelings which were discordant in that occasion in the world since nothing is lost. It would seem rather that discord is removed by an adjustment of God's conceptual feelings. When the consequent nature changes by objectifying occasions from the world, there are also changes in the mental pole of God. The original non-derivative grading of eternal objects establishes conditioned alternatives for compatible combinations of eternal objects. This "unconditioned conceptual valuation"[118] of eternal objects establishes "eternal principles of valuation."[119] When certain physical feelings are experienced from the world, the corresponding relevant eternal objects established in the primordial ordering are elicited into integration. This derivative grading depends on the primordial grading for its principles of valuation. "The grading of the ideal forms arises from the grading of the actual facts."[120] God responds to the actual facts in the world with a particular grading of eternal objects which is based on the primordial grading and which will overcome that particular evil with good. In this application of the divine ideal to a particular situation "evil becomes a stepping stone in the all-embracing ideals of God."[121] The mental pole includes the changeless, non-derivative, primordial ordering and the derived application of this ideal to particular situations. "There is, therefore, in God's nature the aspect of the realm of forms as qualified by the world, and the aspect of the world as qualified by the forms."[122] In the supreme being the particular ideal form of process is derived from the fusion of the "infinitude of the conceptual appetition" with the "data received from the world process."[123]

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[111] PR, p. 531; cf. RM, p. 155. [112] RM, p. 155.

[113] PR, p. 525. [114] Imm, p. 698. [115] Imm, pp. 697 f.

[116] PR, p. 525. [117] PR, p. 527.

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[118] PR, p. 46. [119] PR, p. 380. [120] RM, p. 151.

[121] RM, p. 155. [122] RM, p. 98.

Again attention should be called to the fact that each occasion requires a particular initial ideal aim. "In each case there is an ideal peculiar to each particular actual entity, and arising from the dominant components in its phase of 'givenness.'"[124] "The initial aim is the best for that impasse."[125] There will never be two situations which have an identical causal past.

God responds to each actual occasion in the world in a particular way. The ideal relative relevance of eternal objects will differ for each occasion in the world. We have noticed that specific grading of relevant eternal objects is derived from the primordial ordering and the experience of the occasions of the world. "Accordingly the differentiated relevance of eternal objects to each instance of the creative process requires their conceptual realization in the primordial nature of God."[126] If there were no primordial ordering, any eternal object would be as relevant to a situation as any other. It is not the "total multiplicity of Platonic forms" which is "given" for a particular occasion. There must be a "selection from these forms."[127] This selection requires a standard for selection. "By reason of the actuality of this primordial valuation of pure potentials, each eternal object has a definite, effective relevance to each concrescent process."[128] Since there is a non-derivative, changeless primordial ordering of ideality, there can be application of this standard in the achievement of individuality. "Apart from him there could be no world, because there could be no adjustment of individuality."[129] The primordial ordering establishes the "relative relevance of eternal objects for each occasion of actuality." There must be a processive response in God to apply the primordial ordering to each specific situation. "His particular relevance to each creative act as it arises from its own conditioned standpoint in the world, constitutes him the initial 'object of desire' establishing the initial phase of each subjective aim."[130] "His purpose is always embodied in the particular ideals relevant to the actual state of the world."[131]

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[123] MT, p. 128. [124] PR, p. 128. [125] PR, p. 373.

[126] PR, p. 392. [127] PR, p. 69. [128] PR, p. 64.

The unique divine response in his mental pole which overcomes evil with good is the basis for each initial ideal aim which will in turn overcome evil in the world. "This transmutation of evil into good enters into the actual world by reason of the inclusion of the nature of God, which includes the ideal vision of each actual evil so met with a novel consequent as to issue in the restoration of goodness."[132] God's unique response for each occasion is the basis for a unique initial aim which is best adapted to promote strength of beauty. "Thus the primary phase is a hybrid physical feeling of God, in respect to God's conceptual feeling which is immediately relevant to the universe 'given' for that concrescence."[133]

The principle of limitation must be able to determine a unique initial ideal aim for each occasion through a processive response to conditions in the world in relation to the non-derivative, changeless, complete, primordial ordering of ideality. This means that the principle of limitation cannot be a static, lifeless realm of eternal objects in grades of ideal relevance. The principle of limitation must be an actual entity in order to respond processively to conditions in the world.

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[129] RM, p. 158. [130] PR, p. 522. [131] RM, p. 159.

[132] RM, p. 155. [133] PR, p. 343.

Actual Entity

The ontological principle "means that actual entities are the only reasons; so that to search for a reason is to search for one or more actual entities."[134] The principle of limitation is the reason why there is limitation. The principle of limitation must be an actual entity. "The definite determination which imposes ordered balance on the world requires an actual entity imposing its own unchanged consistency of character on every phase."[135] "Thus the whole process itself, viewed at any stage as a definite limited fact which has issued from the creativity, requires a definite entity, already actual among the formative elements, as an antecedent ground for the entry of the ideal forms into the definite process of the temporal world."[136]

The principle of limitation needs to be an actual entity in order to give effective existence to eternal objects. Eternal objects not realized in the world would be "relatively non-existent" for occasions in the world if they were not included in the primordial ordering in the principle of limitation.[137] The ontological principle provides that everything "must be somewhere; and here 'somewhere' means 'some actual entity.'"[138] Eternal objects are reduced to "undifferentiated nonentities" if there is an attempt to understand them in abstraction from their realization in actual entities. Apart from the realization of eternal objects in relationships of diversity and pattern in the primordial nature of God there is "mere isolation indistinguishable from nonentity."[139] Eternal objects "lack any existent character" if they are "conceived in their bare isolated multiplicity."[140]

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[134] PR, p. 37; cf. p. 28. [135] RM, p. 94. [136] RM, p. 152.

[137] PR, p. 46; cf. p. 64. [138] PR, p. 73.

Eternal objects are given effective existence in the primordial ordering which establishes the relative relevance of every eternal object to every other eternal object in an indefinite number of different orders appropriate for different situations. An order establishing the relevance of eternal objects is only possible in an actual entity. "'Relevance' must express some real fact of togetherness among forms. The ontological principle can be expressed as: All real togetherness is togetherness in the formal constitution of an actuality."[141] The question of whether an eternal object is "more, or less, proximate to an eternal object in realized ingression" can only be answered by referring to "some actual entity. Every eternal object has entered into the conceptual feelings of God."[142] In order for an eternal object to be relevant to another eternal object in such a way that the actual realization of one eternal object elicits the other so that it can be actualized, all eternal objects must be related to each other in an actual entity. "For effective relevance requires agency of comparison, and agency belongs exclusively to actual occasions."[143] "Accordingly the general potentiality of the universe must be somewhere; since it retains its proximate relevance to actual entities for which it is unrealized."[144]

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[139] PR, p. 392. [140] PR, p. 530. [141] PR, p. 48.

[142] PR, p. 382. [143] PR, p. 46.

In summary it may be said that a principle of limitation is required in order to establish grades of relevance of eternal objects as a standard of compatibility and in order to furnish initial aims with developmental and corrective novelty which will tend toward strength of beauty. A principle of limitation which could perform these functions must be an actual entity which experiences every event in the world and then selects from its complete, non-derivative, changeless order of orders that specific ideality for the initial aim of each occasion which will most persuasively overcome evil in each specific situation and tend toward overall strength of beauty. In Whitehead's system God is such an actual entity.

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[144] PR, p. 73.

CHAPTER VII

DOES WHITEHEAD'S GOD MEET HIS OWN CRITICISM?

Whitehead's system stands up remarkably well under the criticisms which he levels against other systems. Process is the feature which is most characteristic of his thought. He works out a way to account for change so that flux is not inherently evil.

Processive Actuality Is Real

In the chapter on Whitehead's criticisms, the first section[1] portrays his protest against making a static realm of ideality eminently real and a realm of process and change less than real. He points out that "Greek philosophy--at least in its most influential school--conceived ultimate reality in the guise of static existences with time-less interrelations."[2]

This Greek philosophical position has been very influential in Christian theology. It is dramatically expressed in a passage from Augustine.

> When a man who believes that he will not exist after death is driven by intolerable evils to desire death with all his heart, and snatches at death, his opinion that he will be rid of all being is false, but so far as feeling is concerned he has merely a natural desire for rest. But what is at rest is not nothing. Indeed it has fuller being than what is restless. Restlessness sets the emotions one against the other, so that they destroy one another. But rest has a certain constancy, highly suggestive of what we mean when we say of a thing simply that it exists. The

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[1] See pp. 17-19. [2] MT, p. 111.

> whole object of wanting to die is not non-existence but rest. So while such a man erroneously believes that he will no longer exist, his nature longs to be at rest, that is, to have fuller being.[3]

For Augustine what is completely real is static and what is in process by the fact of its movement opposes itself and is defectively real. For him salvation rescues a person from process. "Our heart is restless until it rests in you."[4]

For Whitehead processive actuality is real because of its process. It is a basic principle for him "that the very essence of real actuality --that is, of the completely real--is process."[5] In the section on "The good as process"[6] the good is described as good and real because it is processive.

Whitehead is also anxious to show that being a derivative occasion does not detract from reality. "But to be real is not to be self-sustaining."[7] There are non-derivative features about God, but it is not necessary to be non-derivative in order to be real. The reality of derivative process is dramatized by emphasizing the derivative character of God. In the section on "Processive availability of ideal limitation"[8] there is a description of the need for God to experience the outcome of free process in the world in order to be able to respond with appropriate initial aims for each unique situation.

God and the world mutually depend on each other and this derivative character does not detract from their reality. "There is no entity, not even God, 'which requires nothing but itself in order to exist."[9] There is no such thing as "independent existence." Forms of definiteness, actual entities, and God all depend on each other so that "every entity is only to be understood in terms of the way in which it is interwoven with the rest of the Universe. Unfortunately this fundamental philosophic doctrine has not been applied either to the concept of 'God,' nor (in the Greek tradition) to the concept of 'ideas.'"[10] The deficient actuality of the primordial nature is processively removed in the integration of the objectification of every occasion in the world without loss. "The completion of God's nature into a fulness of physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the world in God."[11] God "creates the World" in the sense that he furnishes developmental and corrective novelty to becoming occasions in the world. The "World creates God" in the sense that the definite actual physical feelings he uses in his processive selection of appropriate developmental and corrective novelty are created in the occasions of the world and objectified without loss in God.[12] "God and the World stand over against each other, expressing the final metaphysical truth that appetitive vision and physical enjoyment have equal claim to priority in creation."[13]

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[3] FW 3.8.23--LCC, p. 185. [4] Confessions, 1.1.1 (43).

[5] AI, p. 354. [6] See pp. 43-48. [7] MT, p. 95. [8] See pp. 205-211.

There is a sense in which the opposite character of God and the world makes it possible for each to contribute what is needed by the other. "Opposed elements stand to each other in mutual requirement. . . . God and the World stand to each other in this opposed requirement."[14] God originates from the mental pole and actual occasions in the world

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[9] RM, p. 108. [10] Imm, p. 687. [11] PR, p. 523.

[12] PR, p. 528. [13] PR, p. 529. [14] PR, p. 529.

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originate from the physical pole.[15] God and the world are opposite in their relation to permanence and flux. "In God's nature, permanence is primordial and flux is derivative from the World: in the World's nature, flux is primordial and permanence is derivative from God."[16] "God is primordially one" and "acquires a consequent multiplicity" and the "World is primordially many" and in the process acquires the "consequent unity" of an actual occasion.[17]

It would be a mistake to understand Whitehead as putting forward a Manichaean or any other type of dualism represented in the history of thought. He criticizes the dualisms of Plato, Descartes, and Locke because they mistake "an abstraction for a final concrete fact."[18] In Descartes's dualism there are two types of substances, mental substances and material substances. "Neither type requires the other type for the completion of its essence."[19] Attributing reality to ideality alone or physicality alone is a "disastrous separation"[20] which has "poisoned all subsequent philosophy."[21] Where static abstractions are considered real the processive combination of these abstractions is defectively real and therefore evil. The rejection of process may go so far as to make a processive physical body seem to be a prison house and a weight dragging the static good down to evil. The application of this faulty evaluation of process in real life results in tragic contradictions. Necessary processes such as eating and marrying are required for the good of preserving the race but are regarded as in some way evil. The ambiguity evident in the history of

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[15] PR, pp. 54, 524, 528. [16] PR, p. 529. [17] PR, p. 529.

[18] AI, p. 245. [19] MT, p. 204. [20] MT, p. 211. [21] MT, p. 204.

Christianity about marriage and involvement in the world results from remnants of this faulty dualism. What is described as evil is positively required for good.

Whitehead's dualism avoids these difficulties. Both aspects of the duality that he affirms apply to God as well as each actual occasion of the world.

> The universe is dual because, in the fullest sense, it is both transient and eternal. The universe is dual because each final actuality is both physical and mental. The universe is dual because each actuality requires abstract character. The universe is dual because each occasion unites its formal immediacy with objective otherness. The universe is *many* because it is wholly and completely to be analysed into many final actualities--or in Cartesian language, into many *res verae*. The universe is *one*, because of the universal immanence. There is thus a dualism in this contrast between the unity and multiplicity. Throughout the universe there reigns the union of opposites which is the ground of dualism.[22]

God is both transient and eternal, physical and mental, characterized by abstract eternal objects and objectifications of otherness, many and one. In an opposite way the world is transient and eternal, physical and mental, characterized by abstract eternal objects and objectifications of otherness, many and one.

The most important reason why Whitehead's dualism is better than prior dualisms is that processive actualization is intrinsically good not evil. Derivate actuality is good and real. Physicality is good because it is essential for all actualization in God as well as in occasions in the world. One side of the duality is not inherently evil. Both sides of the duality are required for process but no evil is in itself required for the process. The good that is required for process is sometimes unavoidably connected to evil but that evil makes no positive contribution. In a universe in which freedom occurs and which includes comprehensive finite relativity, a wrong free decision will immediately spread its discord throughout the universe. Discordant evil is inevitable but in itself makes no contribution to good.[23]

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[22] AI, p. 245.

Both God and the actual occasions of the world are derivative, processive, and real. While God and the actual occasions of the world are oppositely related in some ways, they are not equally and oppositely derivative. God derives no conceptual feelings and no primordial grading of relevance of conceptual feelings from other occasions. Actual occasions in the world derive all conceptual feelings and the ideal grading of relevance of conceptual feelings ultimately from God. What is non-derivative in God is the totality of eternal objects and the primordial grading. What is non-derivative in an actual occasion is the responsibly free decision whether to accept or reject derivative physical and conceptual feelings. What is non-derivative for God is something positive for contribution to becoming actuality. What is non-derivative for actual occasions is the act of freely deciding whether to accept or reject that contribution. Both God and actual occasions are equivalently non-derivative in relation to creativity. If creativity is an action in the self-causation of an entity, the creativity by which God is actualized is as non-derivative as that by which an actual occasion in the world is actualized. The metaphysical situation is no more a part of the world than it is of God. Occasions of the world are more derivative than God, but they are no less real.

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[23] See pp. 124 f.

Whitehead Accounts for the Rise of Real Evil

Whitehead finds that one of the more damaging errors of philosophy is attributing "misplaced concreteness" to abstractions.[24] In the preceding section we have noted that the tendency of dualism to regard forms of ideality and physicality as independently concrete and real makes it impossible to account for the reality of their combination. Monistic idealism retains the misplaced concreteness by attributing reality to self-existent ideality. Putting "matter inside of mind"[25] destroys the significance of matter and fails to account for its dynamic character. When "mind is the sole reality," physical nature is relegated to "mere appearance."[26] It becomes impossible to account for process and the rise of evil.

Whitehead appreciates the value of abstraction for understanding, but he is careful to give attention to the integration of abstractions into concrete wholes. The good is the processive experience of static forms of definiteness and static past physicality in coherent aesthetic construction. Evil is the destruction of aesthetic construction which might have been.

The chapter on the cause of evil[27] discusses four aspects of process which give rise to the evil of aesthetic destruction. In the efficiently caused transition from the many actual occasions of the past to the concrescence of the one occasion in the present the elimination of incompatible feelings results in aesthetic destruction. The origination of developmental and corrective novelty through final causation frequently introduces feelings that are incompatible with the datum resulting in discord and aesthetic destruction. In the self-caused modification of the initial aim through the freedom of whole response there is deviation from the best aesthetic construction for that situation and therefore the destruction of good which might have been. In morally responsible freedom there is conscious deviation from the initial aim and the emergence of evil.

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[24] AI, p. 245; PR, pp. 11, 27, 142 f.; SMW, pp. 75 ff., 82.

[25] SMW, p. 82. [26] MT, p. 205. [27] See pp. 92-141.

The section on the reality of evil[28] refers to several aspects of the reality of evil. Evil is factually present in experience and must not be ignored by philosophy but explained. Evil occurs in the realm of reality and not in a realm of mere appearance. Excess evil as that which is not logically necessary for a compensating good damages the universe permanently and is judged by God to be evil. No larger perspective from the standpoint of eternity could show that more good resulted from this evil than if it had not occurred. God is a fellow-sufferer when occasions through responsible freedom introduce evil which could have been avoided.

In the section on unconscious occasions as responsible, two of the causes of evil were described as unavoidable and seem to be connected with the metaphysical situation.[29] The gradual leveling down produced by the resultant of forces of efficient causation in transition is the outcome of mutual sensitivity where there is comprehensive finite relativity. Interactive synthesis deviates from the initial aim so as to produce aesthetic destruction.

It would be a mistake to regard the metaphysical situation as faulty because transition and interactive synthesis produce these two types of evil. It might be asked why all occasions of the past need to participate in the transition. Would not the metaphysical situation be better if the initial datum were formed from just a select few sources in the past which would not produce this running down effect? In order for a human being to be able to express morally responsible freedom the entire matrix of efficient causation must be responsive to his free decision. The whole universe must respond differently if he refuses to actualize the ideal in his initial aim than it would respond if he did actualize that ideal. Comprehensive finite relativity is required for the expression of morally responsible freedom. Voluntary love could not be expressed if the metaphysical situation did not provide for comprehensive finite relativity.

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[28] See pp. 89-91. [29] See pp. 144-148.

The metaphysical situation includes factors which prevent the decay and loss of differentiated definiteness from prolonged action of efficient causation. The advantage of comprehensive relativity is retained while compensating for the running down effect. In the chapter on overcoming evil[30] it was shown that God introduces corrective novelty in initial aims which is able to overcome the running down effect through vibration, rhythm and alternative development. God's initiative is persuasive and not coercive. The outcome of a concrescence is not totally determined by the divine initiative in the initial aim. The initial aim is one of the factors in a mutually determining interplay. The specific character of the actual world resulting from the cumulative effect of all past responsible freedom continues to be determinative through the datum. If the determining effect of the initial data from the actual world were eliminated by the determination from the factors in the initial aim, the expression of morally responsible freedom in the past would be cut off. God's action needs to have an effect in order to prevent running down. The long range continuation of the effect of efficient causation needs to be preserved in order not to cut off the expression of morally responsible freedom.

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[30] See pp. 166-181.

Another important reason for maintaining the uninterrupted effect of efficient causation is to preserve a dependable world in which morally responsible free decisions will have the effect intended by the chooser. God does intervene to prevent running down, but this intervention is dependable and in principle predictable. God's action prevents elementary particles and their structured relations in atoms from running down. This action is not coercive since there are circumstances in which the resultant of forces in efficient causation do result in decay. It is possible for man as a responsibly free being to learn what efficient causes are required for this decay and apply that knowledge in the generation of atomic energy. There are two elements in the universe from which estimates of probability may be derived for the guidance of responsible freedom. One of these is the "statistical" expression of efficient causation.[31] The other is the "preferential adaptation of selected eternal objects" for specific situations as derived from the "graduated order of appetitions constituting the primordial nature of God." It is possible to anticipate to some degree the future which will result from God's action. "There can thus be an intuition of an intrinsic suitability of some definite outcome from a presupposed situation."[32] It is possible to learn when God's intervention does and when it does not prevent atomic decay. Responsibly free human beings can use this knowledge to produce atomic energy to be used in overcoming evil in the environment or they can drop an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. We should not expect an arbitrary intervention from God preventing massive evil from occurring by a "miraculous" interruption of efficiently caused evil. We should not expect God to prevent an atomic bomb from going off. If we should not expect God to intervene arbitrarily to prevent a bomb from going off, we should also not expect him to prevent arbitrarily the long range effects of atomic pollution. God's intervention is an expression of the preferred order of eternal objects in the primordial nature. It is important that God not arbitrarily intervene to prevent evil consequences. Such intervention would abort the expression of responsible freedom and destroy dependability for the calculation and guidance of morally responsible freedom.

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[31] PR, p. 306.

If morally responsible freedom is good, the metaphysical situation which permits the expression of that freedom in comprehensive finite relativity is good. It is difficult to imagine a metaphysical situation which could permit the expression of responsible freedom without also including factors that produce the evil of efficiently caused decay and the evil of interactive synthesis. If a person could imagine a better way, he would probably be using eternal objects as graded in the primordial nature of God and would contribute to a more

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[32] PR, p. 315.

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accurate description of the metaphysical situation as it really is.

Whitehead Accounts for the Rise of Processive Good

Whitehead criticizes materialism for assuming evolution but not being able to account for the processive emergence of good.[33] Materialism assumes that matter is the ultimate substance. This matter is static and does not become. All phenomena are explained by changes in the external relations of this static matter. There is no production of subjects through the unification of the many into a one of internal relations. Since there are no subjects composed of internally related factors, the question of good or evil cannot arise. The good is a state of affairs for a subject. In materialism there is no final cause, no ideal forms of definiteness tending toward the production and preservation of certain unified combinations of internal relations. In the absence of final cause Whitehead holds that it is impossible to explain evolutionary development.

It seems that the reason Whitehead criticizes materialism for not being able to explain the rise of the good is because the more cannot come from the less. He points to the evidence that things are running down in the universe and then argues that there must be an "upward trend"[34] or "counter-agency"[35] since "From nothing, there can come nothing."[36] If something more could come from something less, the chance juxtaposition of static matter in external relations could produce structures which would have the power to hold and preserve that combination so as to form a new species, a new one out of a many.

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[33] See pp. 22-25. [34] FR, p. 19. [35] FR, p. 20.

[36] FR, p. 20.

There might be an attempt to explain the unified combination by the emergence of a new holding structure. The emergence of the new holding structure might be explained by the unified combination. When we express such reflexive explanation in the form the chicken causes the egg and the egg causes the chicken, it loses any persuasive power it might have had. Careful examination of this reflexive explanation shows that the new holding structure comes out of nothing.

Whitehead maintains that such holding structures cannot emerge out of nothing. "It is a contradiction in terms to assume that some explanatory fact can float into the actual world out of nonentity. Nonentity is nothingness. Every explanatory fact refers to the decision and to the efficacity of an actual thing."[37] That explanation must refer to actual entities is the ontological principle. "According to the ontological principle there is nothing which floats into the world from nowhere. Everything in the actual world is referable to some actual entity."[38]

In Whitehead's explanation of the rise of the good actual entities are prominent. In the section on the nature of the good[39] the good is described as the becoming of an actual entity. The good is the processive actualization of the experience of past actual occasions guided by ideal forms of definiteness in the ideal aim. God is an actual entity which is the principle of limitation. He initiates each becoming occasion by furnishing ideal forms of definiteness for the initial aim. The initial aim defines the ideal strength of beauty possible for that occasion in its situation. Creativity is the coming together of past actual occasions to form the datum in transition and the coming together of the datum with the ideal aim to form a unit of actualized good. God initiates corrective and developmental novelty which overcomes decay and results in the emergence of units of developmental good. God is the ultimate source of final cause defining the good. Creativity realizes the good.

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[37] PR, p. 73. [38] PR, p. 373. [39] See pp. 43-55.

It seems that one of Whitehead's major goals in writing was to rationalize the emergence of good. He acknowledges his indebtedness to Bergson, James and Dewey and then says, "One of my preoccupations has been to rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti-intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been associated with it."[40] In another setting he approves of Bergson's doctrine which provides for the double tendency of emergence of good and relapse and then complains that "we are not given any explanatory insight."[41]

There is one area of Whitehead's explanation of the rise of good which has been discussed rather frequently, the claim that creativity is the reason for the coming together of the many into the one in the realization of the good. Christian questions whether creativity is a "systematic" term.[42] Garland believes he took this position partly because he felt that the ontological principle excluded creativity as a reason for the realization of the good, since only actual occasions can be reasons.[43] In A Christian Natural Theology Cobb says that Whitehead seemed at times to give creativity a greater role than the ontological principle permitted. In a summary statement he says, "My own conclusion is that although Whitehead was compelled by the development of his thought to recognize that creativity is not an agent or explanation of the ongoingness of things, nevertheless, his feeling for its role continued to be greater than his definitions allowed."[44]

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[40] PR, p. vii. [41] FR, p. 23.

[42] William A. Christian, "Some Uses of Reason," in The Relevance of Whitehead, ed. Ivor Leclerc (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 30, n. 19.

[43] William J. Garland, "The Ultimacy of Creativity," Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (Winter 1969): 362, 365.

Garland responded to Christian by saying that the ontological principle applies to "causal explanation" but not to "ultimate explanation." Only actual entities are valid in making explanations involving causal explanation, but creativity which is a principle and not an actual entity may be used in making ultimate explanations. The attempt to drop creativity as an explanation and substitute actual entities in its place leaves out important factors.[45] Reeves responded to Cobb by attacking the assertion that God is "decisive" in the creation of actual occasions. He admitted that God's action is very, even most, important and pointed out that this action in the absence of creativity would not be a sufficient reason for the coming into being of actual occasions.[46]

It seems that Garland is right in the sense that removing the principle of creativity from the system cripples its explanatory power. Reeves is right in saying that God's action in providing initial aims would not result in producing a new actual occasion if there were no creativity. Neither Garland nor Reeves has sufficiently dealt with the more difficult problem of why creativity may be used as a reason. Whitehead argues that in themselves forms of definiteness are vacuously actual. They are ineffectual unless made effectual by their realization and processive introduction by God. Vacuous actuality cannot do anything and therefore it cannot explain anything. Eternal objects are only able to enter into the process of a particular actual entity because they are primordially in the divine process and are processively made available by the specific act of God. Eternal objects abstractly present in a metaphysical situation could not be effective. Whitehead approves of Plato for giving "life and motion" to "static, frozen, and lifeless" forms of definiteness through their entertainment in a "living intelligence."[47] The metaphysical situation, not being an actual entity, could not act to select those eternal objects which are most effective for each situation in the world. How could such a vacuous metaphysical situation which cannot act to select eternal objects, act to select and bring actual occasions together into the datum for a becoming actual occasion?

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[44] CNT, p. 214. [45] Garland, ibid., pp. 366-369.

[46] Gene Reeves, "God and Creativity," Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (Winter 1969): 377-385.

In this dissertation I have tried to meet this problem by using the word "creativity" to apply to the coming together of the many in becoming one in such a way that there is no suggestion that either creativity or the metaphysical situation is an actor. It is the nature of the metaphysical situation that each actual entity causes itself to become one. Looked at from one side an actual occasion is "a mode of creativity bringing together the universe. This side is the occasion as the cause of itself, its own creative act."[48] Whitehead explicitly seeks to avoid any suggestion that the metaphysical situation is a "transcendent Creator" and therefore guards against this possibility with the phrases "immanent Creativity" and "Self-Creativity."[49] He therefore frequently uses such expressions as "self-creation,"[50] "process creates itself,"[51] an actual entity is "self-creative,"[52] "self-formation,"[53] "self-realizing,"[54] and "_causa_ _sui_."[55] When creativity is seen as the action of the becoming occasion, creativity is recognized as not being an external agency. "The creativity is not an external agency with its own ulterior purposes."[56]

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[47] AI, p. 188. [48] RM, p. 101.

One way to provide that creativity not be an expression of an external power and still explain the origin of its power to unite the many is to think of it reflexively. Creativity as an action unifies disjunctive actual occasions and an initial aim containing eternal objects bringing them together to form a new occasion. "The initial situation includes a factor of activity which is the reason for the origin of that occasion of experience. This factor of activity is what I have called 'Creativity'." A reflexive understanding would say that this factor of activity originates from the unity which it produces. Actual occasions and eternal objects in disjunctive "abstraction" are "passive" but "in conjunction they carry the creativity which drives the world. The process of creation is the form of unity of the Universe."[57] The many becoming one is no more the activity of the one than of the many.

Garland's arguments that creativity cannot be dismissed as a systematic term seem convincing to me. Creativity as the many becoming one is vital for the explanation of the rise of the good. Creativity in Whitehead's thought is analogous to matter in the thought of Aristotle.

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[49] AI, p. 303. [50] AI, p. 305; PR, p. 130. [51] AI, p. 230.

[52] PR, p. 38. [53] PR, p. 165. [54] PR, p. 340.

[55] PR, p. 339. [56] PR, p. 339. [57] AI, pp. 230 f.

"'Creativity' is another rendering of the Aristotelian 'matter,' and of the modern 'neutral stuff.'"[58] Creativity is the basis for actuality in Whitehead just as matter is the basis for actuality in Aristotle. Creativity is different from matter in that it is not a passive, eternal, formable something. In creativity past actuality procures new actuality. In creativity the many past actual occasions and the eternal objects in the initial aim come together into a unified occasion which is actual. For Aristotle matter has a resistance to form producing individuality and evil which creativity does not have in Whitehead. Creativity is totally transparent to the character of past actuality in combination with ideality in the ideal aim. The new factor which is contributed in creativity is only actuality. The combination of past actuality does produce the evil of running down and the evil of interactive synthesis as we have seen in the chapter on the cause of evil. The exclusions result from mutually exclusive factors in past actuality not from creativity.

Whitehead's creativity is superior to Aristotelian matter in that it does not contribute evil of its own and it has a superior method of reflecting the state of past actuality. Continuity with the past permits the expression of morally responsible freedom so that its far reaching consequences will not be arbitrarily cut off. The emergent good is relevant to the past and cannot arbitrarily cut off the expression of past morally responsible freedom even if it is productive of evil. Whitehead's description of the rise of the good is superior to traditional theology in that there is not a God determinism which is responsible for all the good and evil. It is superior to materialism in that the emergence of novel good is possible.

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[58] PR, p. 46.

Whitehead Encourages Activity to Overcome Evil

In the chapter on Whitehead's criticisms idealistic and monistic patterns of thought are criticized for encouraging renunciation of active individuality and discouraging committed human activity planned to overcome evil.[59] This criticism is closely related to those which attack the same types of thought for denying the reality of processive actuality.

One of the greatest strengths of Whitehead's thought is that he describes processive actuality in terms that account for its reality. In the section on changing the environment in the chapter on overcoming evil there is an application of his thought to this problem.[60] There it is pointed out that planned modification of the environment is the most prominent aspect of human activity. This activity requires close cooperation. Such cooperation would be much more effective if the human race would become aware of a more adequate philosophy emphasizing processive reality.

Man's ability to act to overcome evil is dependent on his receiving corrective and developmental novelty in his initial aims from God. Whitehead's thought provides a satisfying account of why evil is present and furnishes an excellent basis for motivating human cooperation with God to overcome it.

God Is a Persuasive Companion not a Coercive Despot

An often repeated charge against traditional thought is that God is described as a despot.[61] The traditional God of Judaism and Christianity is despotic in the sense that He is exempted from metaphysical categories. Arbitrary will is emphasized in such a way as to destroy the possibility of rational cooperation on the part of subjects. His omnipotence and creativity are described so as to result in a God determinism. His despotic nature is compounded when he metes out unending punishment to those whom he has caused to sin.

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[59] See pp. 25-29. [60] See pp. 175-178.

Whitehead's God is not a despot because he does not determine everything that happens. He is persuasive in the first sense in that he acts through the presentation of final causation which contrasts with the compulsion of efficient causation exercized by the world.[62] Efficient causation is the determined transition of physical actuality of the past into the objective datum which is the basis for the internal process of concrescence of a becoming actual occasion. Final causation makes possible the self-caused becoming of the subjective aim in the process of integration of the physical feelings of the datum with the conceptual feelings of that developing aim. God initiates a persuasive subjective aim which defines the ideal strength of beauty for that situation and the self-caused concrescence accepts or rejects elements of that initial aim. Occasions below the level of consciousness deviate from this ideal aim through the freedom of whole-response. Each occasion is responsible in the sense that this evil is produced by self-causation in which the many become one without having been caused to do so by the decision of any other occasion.

God is persuasive in the second sense in that complex human occasions are able to choose to accept or reject elements of their initial ideal aims with morally responsible freedom. The most destructive and tragic forms of evil are introduced through morally responsible freedom. Morally responsible freedom makes voluntary love possible.

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[61] See pp. 29-32. [62] See pp. 95-103, 120-122.

God is a companion in that he needs to experience how responsibly free occasions use their freedom in order to select from his primordial ordering of eternal objects just that pattern of ideality which will be most effective in overcoming evil and developing the good.[63] God is "the great companion--the fellow-sufferer who understands."[64]

A situation in which there is a persuasive God and men with morally responsible freedom makes it possible for men to love God voluntarily. God prehends every occasion in the world transforming its discord into harmony and then introduces developmental and corrective novelty back into the world. His action is "the love of God for the world. . . . By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world."[65] God's loving action is not coercive. "Love neither rules, nor is it unmoved."[66] God's love relation with man is mutual and voluntary. God's entry into the world is a religious vision for man. "This vision claims nothing but worship; and worship is a surrender to the claim for assimilation, urged with the motive force of mutual love. The vision never overrules. It is always there, and it has the power of love presenting the one purpose whose fulfilment is eternal harmony."[67] Voluntary love in men who experience responsible freedom is the counter part of a persuasive God who works by love.

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[63] See pp. 205-206. [64] PR, p. 532. [65] PR, p. 532.

[66] PR, p. 520.

The expression "voluntary love" comes from Hick.[68] I do not intend to imply that Hick's concept of freedom or his concept of God is applicable to this action of men. The action is voluntary in the sense that the agent is able to accept or reject elements of the highest aim of which it is conscious. The action is love because it is an action of one agent which benefits another agent or agents. Whitehead refers to differing grades of love ranging from "selfishness to devotion."[69] In the higher forms of love "'self' has been lost, and interest has been transferred to coordinations wider than personality."[70] The conscious calculation controlling purpose ignores the personal self. In the experience of the highest forms of love there is a difference between what is consciously purposed and the resultant totality which goes "beyond the control of purpose" and comes as a "gift."[71] In what is consciously purposed there is no reference to self. The action of Regulus in which his conscious purpose was to promote the highest interests of the Roman Republic is an example. His own self-destruction was not a factor taken into account in making the decision. The gift of "peace" in which his "personal existence rose to its full height" included factors which were not under the control of conscious purpose and discursive reason.[72] He voluntarily loved the Roman Republic and received the gift of peace.

I think that it would not be wise to equate the gift character of this event with the highest type of freedom. It seems to me that this would place determination in the power of the giver who is obviously God. This would seem to place the most important aspect of freedom in the conceptual origination coming from God and all but ignore the conscious acceptance or rejection for which the agent is himself morally responsible.

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[67] SMW, pp. 275 f. [68] EGL, pp. 133, 159, 309. [69] AI, p. 371.

[70] AI, p. 368. [71] AI, p. 368. [72] AI, p. 374.

God Is Not Responsible for Unjustifiable Evil

Whitehead criticizes traditional thought for making God responsible for all evil.[73] God is made responsible for all evil when he is described as creating everything exactly as he wanted it and then omnipotently operating it so as to determine every detail of every event.

Whitehead subordinates God to creativity and it seems quite clear that one of his reasons for doing so is to show how evil arises without God being responsible. The evil of efficiently caused decay and the evil of the freedom of whole response are produced by self-causation bringing the many together into unified occasions which are relative to the totality of the past. Whitehead protects God from being responsible for the metaphysical situation which gives rise to this type of evil by making God as well as the actual occasions of the world presuppose this metaphysical situation.

God is responsible for that evil which occurs when there is a shift of ideal aim to one which will produce greater strength of beauty and the shift results in discord and aesthetic destruction. Such evil is justifiable since the metaphysical situation provides that the greater good of strength of beauty can only be obtained if this evil is experienced.

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[73] See pp. 32-36.

God is not responsible for the evil which occurs in transition and whole response since it is produced by self-causation without having been caused by the decision of any other actual entity. Each occasion is responsible for the evil which is produced in its own self-causation.

God is not responsible for the evil produced in morally responsible freedom. The responsible agent, which chooses to reject a conscious ideal which had been offered in the initial aim without having been caused to do so by something else, is responsible. The value of responsible freedom is that it makes voluntary love possible. The experienced value of voluntary love is greater than instinctive love.

Not only can God be justified for the evil which he introduces when he presents ideal initial aims which are sometimes unavoidably discordant with the datum, but also the metaphysical situation can be justified for the characteristics of self-causation which unavoidably introduce the evil of slow decay and the evil of interactive synthesis. The metaphysical situation controlling the relationships of occasions in the world is good.

A plastic medium responsive to the expression of responsible freedom is needed if there is to be voluntary love. Comprehensive finite relativity is required if there is to be a realm that can be manipulated by morally responsible free beings. I cannot imagine a better way to gain comprehensive finite relativity than to bring every

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element of the many into a new one as part of the ongoingness of process. The good of voluntary love requires a metaphysical situation of the type in which self-causation brings the many into one.

We have shown that God intervenes with developmental and corrective novelty to prevent differentiated definiteness from running down through the action of self-causation. There are several good reasons why God should not arbitrarily intervene to prevent realization of the effects of a wrong choice made by an organism with morally responsible freedom. God does intervene but his intervention is dependable, regular, and persuasive and not unpredictable, erratic, and coercive. To keep the universe from running down and to overcome evil each occasion needs a mental pole in which God can initiate corrective and developmental novelty. To carry out the expression of morally responsible freedom every occasion needs a physical pole which incorporates a response to every actual entity in the whole universe. Interactive synthesis combines these two necessary factors. If God would arbitrarily cut off the far reaching implementation of a wrong choice of morally responsible freedom, he would in effect be eliminating the freedom. A person does not have morally responsible freedom unless he can express that freedom. A second reason why God should not arbitrarily cut off the far reaching effects of wrong choice has to do with the human evaluation of right and wrong. Whitehead recommends with qualifications the use of pragmatic criteria for the evaluation of philosophy.[74] Arbitrary and erratic prevention of the far reaching effects of wrong responsible free choices would distort pragmatic evaluation. A third reason why God should not arbitrarily intervene to prevent implementation of a wrong responsible free choice is that responsible freedom requires a stable environment in which an action now will have a predictable effect on that environment at a point in the future. If God introduced new types of order erratically, unpredictably cutting off the expression of morally responsible freedom, human beings would not be able to tell which alternatives would produce better consequences in the future and therefore be better choices. In order to have morally responsible freedom the chooser must know which alternative is better and worse.[75]

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[74] MT, pp. 144 f.; PR, pp. 275, 411, 512; S, p. 31.

These three reasons answer the criticism of the free-will solution to the problem of evil made by Madden and Hare when they suggest that a good God should intervene in a "stop-gap" fashion to prevent the more destructive consequences of morally responsible evil such as Auschwitz and Hiroshima.[76] Cultural and historical man functioning in large societies measured in time and space needs to live in a world in which intended outcomes can really occur or he would not really have morally responsible freedom. It is just as important that societies of men learn the consequences of genocide as that one man learn the consequences of homicide. Predictable regularity is needed in order for man to deal with problems involving vast reaches of time such as ecology and stop-gap divine intervention would destroy such predictability.

The far reaching expression of morally responsible freedom is insured through the continuing necessary action of efficient causation producing comprehensive finite relativity. The opportunity for divine action designed to overcome evil with good is insured through the reception of initial ideal aims in the mental pole. The implementation of both of these factors is insured in interactive synthesis where each is expressed without excluding the other. The metaphysical situation in which self-causation and interactive synthesis occurs is good.

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[75] See p. 153. [76] ECG, p. 75.

The only type of evil which cannot be justified is that produced by responsible freedom. We are best acquainted with that responsible freedom for which we are morally responsible. When a human being knows which alternative is better and which is worse and is able to choose either and then chooses the worse alternative, the whole universe sustains a permanent loss. Discord is introduced which is not required for some greater good. This discord will effect every occasion in the whole universe through comprehensive finite relativity. The ability to make morally responsibly free choices is justifiable since it makes possible voluntary love. The possibility of voluntary love does not require any wrong morally responsible free choices.

The Concept of a Persuasive God Should Produce Persuasive People

In the chapter on Whitehead's criticisms I have noted some comments which suggest that a theology which describes God as despotic tends to encourage despotism in people whose worship is permeated with these ideas.[77] These observations cited historical evidence indicating despotic consequences of entertaining ideas of a despotic God.

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[77] See pp. 36-39.

In the chapter "The New Reformation" in Adventures of Ideas Whitehead announces that "a new Reformation is in full progress."[78] This reformation is based on a new conception of God. Plato first conceived the idea that God is persuasive and not coercive. Then Jesus Christ presented a "revelation in act" showing that the divine agency in the world is persuasive and not coercive. The Alexandrian theologians showed that God's persuasive agency is realized in immanence.[79] He suggests that it has taken over a thousand years to get these ideas clothed with emotion so as to become effective in society. He found the action of Mahatma Gandhi and Lord Irwin, Viceroy of India, avoiding a bloodbath of violence in 1931 through turning to reasonable persuasion a signal evidence that a new era was being ushered in.[80] It may be necessary to wait a few more years to determine whether a very large number of the citizens of the world will use their morally responsible freedom to give the conception of a persuasive God a chance to demonstrate what kind of people it will produce.

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[78] AI, p. 206. [79] AI, pp. 213-217. [80] AI, p. 205.

CHAPTER VIII

CRITICISMS OF WHITEHEAD'S SOLUTION

It is the purpose of this chapter to select some representative criticisms of Whitehead's thought related to the problem of evil and then show how these criticisms may be answered. Unfortunately some of those most interested in the problem of evil have not taken Whitehead's solution into account. John Hick's book Evil and the God of Love is considered one of the more complete surveys of thought on the problem of evil. He connects the popularity of internal dualisms which locate the "opposition to good within the divine nature itself" with the process philosophy of Whitehead. He says that the complexities of Whitehead would lead too far afield so he gives four pages of analysis to Edgar Sheffield Brightman.[1] There is no criticism of Whitehead's solution here other than the implication that the opposition giving rise to evil is within God. We have seen that one of Whitehead's major purposes in his thought on this problem was to show that the cause of excess evil is other than God.

Madden and Hare are interested in the problem of evil and they have made a number of criticisms of Whitehead's thought. In the first chapter it is noted that the problem of evil is a major factor in Ely's charge that Whitehead's God is not religiously available. Several other thinkers have made criticisms of aspects of Whitehead's thought which are related to the problem of evil in the course of discussing other issues.

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[1] EGL, p. 36.

Since several writers have made similar criticisms, I have decided to avoid repetition by classifying these criticisms under four main types. There are objections that Whitehead's God is not good enough and not powerful enough. Pols' claim that there is no provision for responsible freedom should be noticed. There is finally a brief sketch of Hartshorne's criticism of Whitehead's concept of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God as it is related to the rise of the good.

Is Whitehead's God Good Enough?

The criticisms of the goodness of Whitehead's God may be organized in two groups. There has been the charge that his God exploits the evil experience of occasions in the world for his own advantage. It is also claimed that Whitehead emphasizes the aesthetic at the expense of goodness. Both of these criticisms are included in the charge that his God is not holy enough and good enough to be religiously available.

Does God exploit evil?

It is ironic that Whitehead who was so pained by ruthless despotism in the traditional concept of God and who therefore expended so much effort to describe how excess evil arises in opposition to the will of God, is charged with describing a God who is not good because he exploits the evil experiences of finite occasions in the world. Ely comes to this conclusion by taking a statement of Whitehead only slightly out of context. He quotes the following from Process and Reality:

> He, in his primordial nature, is unmoved by love for this particular, or that particular. . . . In the foundations of his being, God is indifferent alike to preservation and to novelty. He cares not whether an immediate occasion be old or new, so far as concerns derivation from its ancestry. His aim for it is depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step towards the fulfilment of his own being. His tenderness is directed towards each actual occasion, as it arises.[2]

Ely introduces this quote with the comment, "God as primordial is not only unconscious and impersonal, but he has no concern for us as individuals."[3] He follows the quote with the explanation, "That is, he is tender toward it only because it may give him some satisfaction."[4] Although he acknowledges that the primordial nature is not God and that God is a unity of the primordial and the consequent natures, the emotional impact of his language is to treat this aspect of God which is unconcerned with preservation in itself as if it were the totality of God.

When Ely treats the consequent nature he finds characteristics similar to those he found in the primordial nature. He complains that it does not help us in our sufferings to know that God can transform them into good for himself. When human beings treat the suffering of others in this manner we regard it as "a peculiarly callous and offensive type of selfish optimism. We can hardly suppose that many will take pleasure in the reflection that God enjoys himself by making mental additions to one's pain and grief and frustration."[5] He charges that "God's feelings alone are considered of importance, and that the actualities of the world can at best be but instruments of God's joy. Thus the individuality of finite things does not seem to count; they are only tiny fragments of a pattern that they cannot ever appreciate."[6]

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[2] PR, pp. 160-161. [3] RAWG, p. 31. [4] RAWG, p. 32.

[5] RAWG, p. 41.

Ely appears to acknowledge contrary evidence while he sweeps the reader along with opposite assertions. We have seen that one of Whitehead's achievements is to show the reality and value of individual processive occasions. Ely holds that Whitehead's position implies that "whatever happens is of no account in itself, since it is valuable only insofar as it contributes an element to God's experience. Such an implication sucks all the vital juices from Whitehead's basic metaphysical contention that every actuality is something for its own sake."[7]

He summarizes his discussion of evil and the goodness of God by saying that Whitehead "does not give a satisfactory solution to the problem of evil because he has not shown that God is good in the important sense that he cherishes individuals and their values." He charges God with exploiting evil in the world. "Not even in his Consequent Nature any more than in his Primordial Nature does God care for individuals as such; he is interested only in conserving and producing values that he alone can enjoy."[8] An extreme example of the type of argumentation he uses building conclusions on conditional suppositions brings to a climax the section dealing with the goodness of God.

> Perhaps World Wars are the black spots necessary for the perfection of the divine painting. If they are, God may have lured us to courses of action that to us are unmitigatedly bad. If this has occurred, perhaps it would be just to refer it to another metaphysical aspect of God--his Diabolic Nature.[9]

It is clear that Ely charges that Whitehead's God is not good because he exploits evil experiences of occasions in the world.

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[6] RAWG, p. 48. [7] RAWG, p. 50. [8] RAWG, p. 50.

[9] RAWG, p. 51.

Although Madden and Hare do not cite Ely in their book they reflect many of the arguments he uses. They think that God introduces evil into the world so as to bring advantage to himself. "God envisages all pure possibilities and desires their realization and consequently desires the realization of evil experiences, decisions and deeds, as well as indifferent or good ones."[10] They then charge that a God who would do this "cannot be said to be, in any obvious sense of the word, unlimited in goodness."[11]

They explain their exploitation charge by saying that God receives evil from the world into his consequent nature transforming it into his own good. They dramatize their accusation with an illustration. "Suppose Smith were to say to his friend Jones that he is not concerned with his present pains because he is gifted with an extraordinary memory, remembers all his friend's past experiences, and will include them all harmoniously in his own consciousness, without the slightest loss of immediacy."[12] They say that a God who is "willing to pay any amount in moral and physical evil to gain aesthetic value is an unlovable being."[13] This God lacks goodness because "he is not concerned about the cost in human feeling."[14]

Ely as well as Madden and Hare argue that God exploits evil to his own advantage. They find support for their argument in Whitehead's explanation that the consequent nature receives every experience in the world adjusting his own conceptual feelings so as to bring the worldly evil experiences into a harmonious whole. They then charge that God through his ability to influence initial aims leads occasions into experiences which are evil to themselves but will produce good in him.

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[10] ECG, p. 116. [11] ECG, p. 117. [12] ECG, p. 123.

[13] ECG, p. 124. [14] ECG, p. 124.

Does God prefer aesthetic beauty to goodness?

Ely says that the "reason for this dubiousness about God's moral character lies deep in the philosophy of organism."[15] It consists in the elevation of the aesthetic above truth and goodness. In so doing truth and goodness "lose their independent or co-ordinate status, and become valuable only insofar as they contribute to Beauty."[16] This subordination of truth and goodness in God makes it easier to understand why God "is not concerned with our finite sufferings, difficulties, and triumphs--except as material for aesthetic delight." Such a God should be challenged with Plato's statement that honouring beauty above goodness "is nothing else than a literal and total dishonouring of the soul."[17]

The charge that God is not good because he elevates the aesthetic above goodness is closely related to the claim that he exploits evil. There is the belief that evil is required in the world in order to provide contrasts for the larger aesthetic harmony. God's primordial nature unconsciously impels the production of evil for its valuable contrast. And then Ely says, "Goodness can hardly be identified with unconscious predilection for an aesthetic enjoyment which does not count the cost to the rest of the universe."[18]

In one of his footnotes Gilkey assumes that Whitehead's solution to the problem of evil includes the objectionable features of the aesthetic theme. He includes Whitehead among those who try to solve the problem of evil with a "transcendent harmony." In such systems "disharmonies on the finite level become harmonious from the divine perspective." Gilkey criticizes this position because it denies the reality of evil by making what appears to be evil in finite occasions an illusion since it is really good from the divine perspective and because it fails to express God's concern with each finite creature here and now.[19]

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[15] RAWG, p. 51. [16] RAWG, p. 52.

[17] RAWG, p. 52, quoting Laws, 727D, tr. Bury. [18] RAWG, p. 32.

Madden and Hare think that Whitehead's emphasis on aesthetic value above goodness reveals the "worst deficiencies" in his conception of God.[20] They object to his reinterpretation of ordinary notions of good and evil making "moral value subordinate to aesthetic value."[21] They think that for Whitehead evil in the world makes a positive contribution to good in God. "Therefore what appears as gratuitous evil is really just the makings of aesthetic value in the Consequent Nature."[22] They protest that earthquakes and other physical evils should not really be necessary in order to provide contrasts for God's aesthetic harmony. "Certainly a God who is willing to pay any amount in moral and physical evil to gain aesthetic value is an unlovable being."[23] They charge that a God who pursues an "aesthetic end" without concern for "the cost in human feeling" seems to "lack goodness." A God who experiences all the pain of each occasion in the world "as his own" and then uses that pain to his own benefit cannot be good even if he is not selfish. "But it can still be objected that a being who sacrifices human feeling to aesthetic ends, however selflessly, is not totally good."[24]

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[19] Langdon Gilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth: A Study of the Christian Doctrine of Creation (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1959), p. 206, n. 2. Hereafter MHE.

[20] ECG, p. 122. [21] ECG, p. 117. [22] ECG, p. 123. [23] ECG, pp. 123 f.

The power of the aesthetic argument against the goodness of Whitehead's God rests on the belief that his God needs evil in the world to furnish contrasts for his aesthetic harmony. There is also great rhetorical appeal in contrasting hedonistic vividness of the aesthete with the goodness of morality. We will want to examine Whitehead carefully to see if either of these characteristics are advocated in his writings.

We will first examine the charge that Whitehead's God exploits evil in occasions in the world. This charge is based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of Whitehead's statement that God's aim for each occasion is "depth of satisfaction as an intermediate step towards the fulfilment of his own being. His tenderness is directed towards each actual occasion, as it arises."[25] Ely applies a distorted emphasis on the reference to a "step towards the fulfilment of his own being" and almost ignores the mention of tenderness and concern for "each actual occasion, as it arises."

The distortion arises from the belief that the experience of intrinsic evil in occasions in the world can be beneficial to God. In the section entitled "Unavoidable discord as instrumental to good"[26] it is explained that the aesthetic destruction of intrinsic evil never makes a contribution in itself to the occasion in which it occurs or to any subsequent occasion. This means that God cannot profit from intrinsic evil in any occasion. It is also explained in that section that when there is a shift of aim to a more complex and greater strength of beauty there is sometimes an unavoidable increase in discordant aesthetic destruction. It is the positive harmonious feelings that produce the increase of strength of beauty for the occasion and not the increase in discord. Discord always destroys because its presence indicates that the feelings involved cannot be compatibly integrated and are therefore being eliminated. If a responsibly free occasion introduces intrinsic evil into its own becoming, there is a loss to that occasion and in some sense a disappointment to God who immediately prehends it. If a responsibly free occasion refuses to introduce intrinsic evil, there is a beneficial effect on the occasion itself and God's qualitative pattern of physical feeling reflects this achievement.

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[24] ECG, p. 124. [25] PR, p. 161. [26] See pp. 122-126.

There are circumstances in which God's aim for an occasion is for less strength of beauty than is possible for that occasion. Such situations are discussed in the section on "Evil from morally wrong decisions."[27] God aims at a lower strength of beauty in an occasion only when the general good of occasions in its causal future are enhanced. God only aims at less strength of beauty for an occasion when that decreased strength of beauty is what is morally good for that occasion. That which is morally good for an occasion in the present is what produces the maximum strength of beauty in the occasions in its causal future. Both the occasions in the world in the causal future and God will benefit from this greater general good. Surely there is no exploitation on the part of God in such actions.

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[27] See pp. 75-80.

The charge that Whitehead's God is indifferent to individuals is refuted in the very quotation he cites. He acts individually and tenderly toward each occasion as it arises. One of the outstanding advantages of Whitehead's system is that he provides for the reality of processive individual occasions rather than swallowing them up in some larger whole that is the only eminent reality. I have cited evidence in Whitehead's writings to show that God presents a unique aim which is the best for that impasse for each occasion.[28] This action of God represents the maximum individual attention which any God could give to any occasion.

In answering the charge of divine exploitation we have given the basis for answering the charge that there is an immoral elevation of the aesthetic over the good. The harmonious reception of every occasion that has reached satisfaction in the world into the consequent nature of God does not profit from the aesthetic harmonization of incompatible evil. The aesthetic destruction that occurs in intrinsic evil in occasions in the world is lost forever. God's aesthetic strength of beauty receives contributions only from that aesthetic strength of beauty which has been achieved in the world.

Whitehead does not give a detailed explanation why he uses the term "strength of beauty" instead of the term "good" to refer to the most comprehensive aim of each occasion in the world. It should be of interest that when I attempt to define intrinsic good in Whitehead's terms I define strength of beauty. It is probable that Whitehead wanted to avoid common misconceptions that are attached to the word good. In the section on moral evil I cite a number of references to conventional norms which obstruct the ongoing achievement of good and these conventional norms are frequently referred to as morally good. An understanding of Whitehead's moral goodness as that strength of beauty which will produce the greatest possible general strength of beauty in occasions in the causal future cannot be set over against the aesthetic in such a way as to imply that the elevation of the aesthetic excludes morality. Whitehead has given us conceptual tools which will be much more effective in identifying and promoting the achievement of the real good than are the traditional static conceptions.

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[28] See pp. 209-211.

Whitehead's God is good because he is the ground of the definition of good. The graded relevance of eternal objects in his primordial nature is the basis for the determination of what is morally good in any situation. This God is in addition good in a way which is not true of traditional conceptions of a static God. The traditional God created occasions in such a way as to cause them to give rise to evil and then punished them for doing what he had caused them to do. It seems to me that the goodness of Whitehead's God is one of his most valuable contributions.

Is Whitehead's God Powerful Enough?

Whitehead's God is usually classified with those in which power is qualified in order to insure goodness. It is therefore to be expected that many criticisms of this concept of God will find that he has inadequate power. We may loosely group representative criticisms of the power of Whitehead's God as those which regard his God as finite and those which say that his God is unable to guarantee the triumph of good.

Is Whitehead's God finite?

Professor A. E. Taylor is a representative of those who very early expressed uneasiness with the limitations which Whitehead placed on the power of God. In a review of Process and Reality he wondered if Whitehead ought not to reconsider some of his statements about God in view of the fact that he "is as much the King of Saints as the 'Source of all being, throned afar.'" He was particularly concerned about the series of statements in which "the world is declared to be necessary to God, to transcend God, and to be in some sort creative of God." He also felt that the relation between "creativity and God" may have led Whitehead "into unconscious tampering with his own sound principle that all possibility is founded on actuality."[29] In these two respects he thought he saw the influence of Spinoza and Bergson. In the final sentence of his review he says, "I seriously believe that Dr. Whitehead's work would be even better than it is if it were influenced a little more by St. Thomas and a little less by Spinoza."[30] It is clear that if God requires a world which transcends him and in some sense is creative in relation to him, there are some limitations on his infinity.

Ely notes that God is not totally powerful but does not seem to be very critical of this characteristic. "God, therefore, is not all-powerful. He cannot repeal fundamental metaphysical laws."[31] He further says, "Since Whitehead's God is infinite only in that his Primordial Nature grasps all possibilities, he is on the whole a finite God."[32] Although he says that the idea that omnipotence is not required for divinity "is no longer a novel opinion,"[33] he seems to feel that a satisfactory solution to the problem of evil must provide for a totally powerful God. He says, "The problem demands that, if the denial of the existence of evil be ruled out, some sort of explanation be given of how God can be both all-powerful and all-good."[34] Even though the solution to the problem of evil may require a totally powerful God, a being need not be that powerful to deserve the title God. "We cannot say that Whitehead's use of the term God is out of place merely because his God is not an omnipotent creator."[35] Ely seems to regard Whitehead's God as finite and limited in power but he places the greatest emphasis on his deficiencies in goodness.

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[29] A. E. Taylor, "Some Thoughts on Process and Reality," Theology 21 (August 1930): 78.

[30] Ibid., p. 79. [31] RAWG, p. 24.

Mascall thinks that Whitehead has developed the concept of a finite God because he asked the wrong question. We may ask the fundamental question for theology, "Why do any finite beings exist at all?" or we may ask, "Why has the realm of finite beings the particular characteristics which we observe in it?" He holds that the "common modern notions of a finite God or of a God to whom the creation of the world is necessary arise precisely from concentrating on the second question rather than the first." This failure to ask the right question and its consequences is "one of the main points of our discussion of the works of Whitehead and Tennant."[36] He explains that "Whitehead's adoption of 'creativity' as the fundamental characteristic of finite beings was seen to have diverted his attention away from the existence of things to their behaviour, and so to have caused him to be satisfied with the notion of a purely immanent deity, while his neglect of the concept of analogia entis left him at last with only a finite God."[37]

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[32] RAWG, p. 53. [33] RAWG, p. 53. [34] RAWG, p. 32. [35] RAWG, p. 54.

[36] E. L. Mascall, He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1958), p. 179. Hereafter HWI.

He argues that a finite God is not adequate because there is then no answer to the question why there is anything at all. He says that "a God who is limited by the world no more provides a reason for his existence than the world does for its own."[38] On the other hand he maintains that "nothing less than a strictly infinite God can provide the explanation of the world's existence, and that, in consequence, the world must be in the fullest sense, contingent and altogether unnecessary to God."[39]

Gilkey refers to what he regards as an objectionable finitude of Whitehead's God in the context of what may be "roughly called the 'dualistic' view." In mythical form "a God of order subdues some monster or principle of chaos." He notes the presence of this dualistic feature in Plato, Aristotle, the Gnostics and then says, "It has reappeared in our own time in perhaps its most impressive form in the philosophy of Whitehead." In this dualistic view reality is made up of two opposing ingredients. "First, there are the principles of organization in things, the formal structure of an object that makes it what it is. . . ." Second there is something to be structured and formed, "there is in existence a passive, material principle: that which itself has no shape but which receives form and shape." In all dualistic views there are "two equal primary principles in the universe, and existing things are made 'out of matter' by the imposition on that material of pre-existent form."[40]

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[37] HWI, pp. 194 f. [38] HWI, p. 159. [39] HWI, p. 112.

Gilkey objects to a finite dualistic God because such a God is not free. "Furthermore, if God depends upon some other principle of equal stature to create the world, if He is finite, then again He is not 'free.'" He clearly includes Whitehead's God in this category because he identifies the equal principle as a principle "of chaos, of matter, or of creativity." Such a dependent God is "like the gods of Greece, who were under the ultimate rule of Fate, or like Whitehead's God who is 'in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground.' The will of such a God is not the sovereign principle of existence but only one conditioned voice in a chorus that transcends Him." For Gilkey such a "restricted" being is not God.[41]

Gilkey's concept of freedom with reference to God requires that there be nothing outside or inside of God which conditions his acts of freedom. "If God needs the world in order to complete or enrich His being, then His creation of the world is not 'free.' It is a necessitated and therefore impersonal act, to which God is compelled by His own unfulfilled nature."[42] He not only rejects the possibility of God being conditioned by self-caused events in the world but also by patterns and ideals within his own nature. God does not create because this expression brings fulfilment of his creative nature. The only reason why God creates is because it is good.[43] There are no patterns of order within God which guide his free action. He is not bound by laws within his own nature. This makes it possible for him to abrogate law in his action of salvation. "This is perhaps the most fundamental reason why belief in a finite God of order, rather than in the free transcendent God of all being, cannot provide the framework within which the gospel of salvation by grace through faith can live."[44] The reason why Gilkey rejects a finite God is that such a God is conditioned by events that occur in the world and this means that he is not free. A God who is not free cannot save by grace.

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[40] MHE, pp. 48 f. [41] MHE, p. 97. [42] MHE, pp. 96 f.

Madden and Hare report that Whitehead and Hartshorne as quasi-theists "reject the unlimited power of God among the traditional theistic notions, although they do not talk about a finite God in the straightforward way that Brightman does."[45] After noting that Whitehead and Hartshorne make a distinction between limited and relative, saying that God is relative but not limited, they say that the "distinction between God being 'limited' versus being 'relative' seems spurious, not a real distinction at all." They believe that Whitehead's God is "still limited in the sense that he neither creates nor wholly controls actual occasions."[46]

Each of the men mentioned in this section in varying ways charges that Whitehead's God is finite. Taylor feels that the subordination of God in relation to creativity gives a misplaced concreteness to creativity which would not be present if creativity were an action of God. Ely merely notes that Whitehead's God is not totally powerful and claims that this lack makes him religiously unavailable. Mascall holds that Whitehead was so concerned about the relation between God and the behaviour of things that he ended up with a finite God who cannot answer the question why there is anything at all. Gilkey says that Whitehead has described a God of order who is finitely dependent on an equal and opposite creativity as a material cause functioning in the world. Madden and Hare say that Whitehead's God is finite in that he does not create and totally control all occasions. The common element in these criticisms is that there should be no limitation on the power of God in the sense that how God acts should not be conditioned by something other than God for which God is not totally responsible. Some would hold that how God acts should not be conditioned by his own nature or by how he has acted in the past.

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[43] MHE, pp. 71-73, 97. [44] MHE, p. 233. [45] ECG, p. 115.

[46] ECG, p. 117.

Is Whitehead's God able to guarantee the triumph of good?

The traditional God whose omnipotence totally determined every event could guarantee that his will would prevail. His power was coercive. Whitehead's God who exercises persuasive power is criticized by some for not being able to guarantee the triumph of good.

Ely calls attention to the shift from a coercive to a persuasive God in the course of his claim that there is not enough power and goodness to function religiously as God. "Thus by limiting God's power, by allowing him not an imperative but only a persuasive function, we can clear him of the responsibility for evil."[47] He connects the reduction of power to the presence of real freedom in actual occasions in the world. "The growing actualities of the world, however, have wills of their own and are free to reject the ideals offered them. Hence God's power is limited to persuasion."[48] Ely says that in some sense the problem of evil "is disposed of, for we now have a God who is neither all-powerful nor all-good."[49] He goes on to explain that those who take the problem seriously will not accept this solution because this God is not powerful enough and not good enough.

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[47] RAWG, p. 37.

Gilkey holds that Whitehead's God who is conditioned by free actions in the world does not have sufficient power to fulfil the promises of salvation to which the Bible witnesses. Evil presents itself in the guise of "fate, sin, and death."[50] He explains that "the unconditioned nature of God as Creator is required for the Gospel victory over each of the three guises of evil."[51] We could not unconditionally trust God "if the powers of nature, of culture, and of time itself are not instruments in His providential hand, used by Him to develop His purposes." In this respect he argues that Whitehead's God falls short. "A God in the 'grip' of these impersonal forces, cannot save us from fate; He himself will need help if His purposes are to be achieved."[52]

Madden and Hare assert that in order to have a theism of any kind it is necessary to have a God "who is thought to guarantee the growth of value."[53] If it is admitted that God is infinite in the sense that he is the "repository of all eternal objects," we must nevertheless see that there is here "no guarantee of the growth of value."[54] Such a God is limited in the sense that he "neither creates nor wholly controls actual occasions. Moreover, if God does not wholly control actual occasions, it is difficult to see how there is any real assurance of the growth of value." In an adequate theism total control and the guarantee of the growth of value reinforce each other. "The unlimited power of God insures the growth of value, and the latter requires the notion of God's unlimited power."[55]

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[48] RAWG, p. 45. [49] RAWG, p. 53. [50] MHE, p. 208.

[51] MHE, p. 230. [52] MHE, p. 231. [53] ECG, p. 118.

They further argue that just as the unlimited characteristic of the primordial nature is not able to guarantee the growth of value neither is the unlimited characteristic of the consequent nature able to do so. The consequent nature has an unlimited capacity to receive and preserve each actual occasion without loss. They wonder what good it does to preserve past achievement if evil goes on occurring in occasions in the world in the present. "To be sure, God is doing a superb job of saving everything of value, but he is doing nothing to insure the growth of value or to insure that divine providence uses evil in the production of greater good, or that the good will outlast evil, and so on."[56] They are critical of the unlimited features of the primordial and consequent natures because they are not able to control future occasions guaranteeing the growth of value.

Madden and Hare believe that a theistic God should have total control. They say that a theistic God should be able "to insure the ultimate triumph of an end of his choice." They suggest that he should be able to move the world "inexorably toward a goal of his choice."

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[54] ECG, pp. 115 f. [55] ECG, p. 117. [56] ECG, p. 120.

They complain that Whitehead's God is "so weak that he cannot guarantee his own welfare." He does not have enough power "merely to jam the mechanism of creation."[57]

The question about the degree to which God can guarantee good outcomes of events in the world is closely connected with the question of the degree to which God is finite. It would seem to me that there are at least three senses in which the word finite has been used in discussions by these authors to describe Whitehead's God. Sometimes God is said to be finite if definite patterns of order are included in his nature. Another kind of finitude has to do with the degree to which God is conditioned by anything other than himself. Finally God may be said to be finite if he derives something positive needed for his reality from something not ultimately derived from himself.

We would have to agree that Whitehead's God is finite in the sense that he has a definite nature which includes patterns of order. The primordial nature of God is the static, non-derivative, complete basis of change furnishing corrective and developmental novelty for occasions in the world. Whitehead explains that goodness in God requires limitation. "It is not true that God is in all respects infinite. If He were, He would be evil as well as good. Also this unlimited fusion of evil with good would mean mere nothingness. He is something decided and is thereby limited."[58] In another connection he says that "all reality is in some way finite."[59] The static, non-derivative forms of definiteness in grades of relevance in the primordial nature of God which constitute him the principle of limitation would make God finite in one sense of the word finite.

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[57] ECG, p. 125, emphasis theirs. [58] RM, p. 153. [59] AI, p. 372.

The total inclusiveness of this primordial nature which constitutes it the "infinitude of possibility"[60] is one of the features of God which makes him infinite. The actuality of the supreme being is founded on the "infinitude of its conceptual appetition, and its form of process is derived from the fusion of this appetition with the data received from the world-process."[61] The primordial nature is "limited by no actuality which it presupposes. It is therefore infinite, devoid of all negative prehensions."[62] The primordial nature is finite in that there is definite structure. Every eternal object is graded in degrees of relative compatibility with every other eternal object.[63] The primordial nature is infinite in the sense that it constitutes the infinitude of possibility.

Of those who criticize Whitehead's God because he is finite Mascall and Gilkey most obviously reject a primordial nature with definite patterns of order. For Mascall the freedom of God is impaired if he has a definite primordial nature with appetitions toward certain types of actions under certain conditions.[64] Gilkey is critical of the idea that the purpose of God's creation of novel forms of actuality is to "complete or enrich His being." He thinks such creative action would not be free since it would be "compelled by His own unfulfilled nature."[65]

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[60] Imm., p. 691. [61] MT, p. 128.

[62] PR, p. 524; cf. pp. 525, 528, 529, 532.

[63] See pp. 197 f.

[64] HWI, pp. 97, 103, 108, 110. [65] MHE, pp. 96 f.

The concept of freedom implied in these criticisms by Mascall and Gilkey is quite different from the concept of freedom which I have described. This freedom is the ability to produce something different from what has been without depending on what has been. In God this ability could be described as an unstructured infinite capacity to create structure. In man this ability could be described as an unstructured finite capacity to create structure. The primary characteristic of structure created by this freedom is its divergence from all past structure. The responsible freedom which I have described is the ability to accept or reject the creation of the best coherent development which is dependent on what has been. The possibility of a best coherent development is dependent on standards of coherence which have been. A development which is coherent is coherent with something. A coherent development is dependent on the good of the past to which it is coherently connected. The first concept of freedom is more consistent with a concept of becoming in which ongoingness is dependent on contrariety. The second concept of freedom is consistent with a concept of becoming in which processive ongoingness is dependent on coherence. Sometimes the word dialectical is used to describe process which requires contrariety. Process which is based on coherence requires prior standards of coherence.

If we assume that the ongoingness of process is based on contrariety, a conception of God with an unstructured infinite capacity to create contrary structure would be superior to a conception of God with a structured primordial nature. If we assume that the ongoingness of process is based on coherence, it is possible to give several reasons why a definitely structured primordial nature with infinite possibilities is superior to an unstructured infinite capacity to create structure. If God does really have a structured primordial nature and if man sometimes has some access to that structure in consciousness, it might be possible to know whether one conception of God were better than another. If creativity is characterized more by contradiction than by coherence, the attempt to formulate coherent conceptions of God and the world would be more difficult and less useful.

There may be some value in stating some reasons why a structured primordial nature has advantages in order to examine and develop the implications of the assumption that the ongoingness of process is based on coherence. One reason is that a God with a structured primordial nature is able to initiate novelty which is maximally harmonious with present conditions by selecting those novel eternal objects which have the highest degree of relevance with the eternal objects already in realization in the world. A God who has no structured forms of definiteness in ordered grades of relevance would have no way to determine compatibility of novelty and would therefore on chance occasions introduce novelty which would be discordant and destructively evil. Mascall seems to deny structure so that God can be free and affirm structure so that God can be morally good. "We shall indeed maintain, against the late medieval voluntarists, that God's will must act in accordance with his own moral nature, but that is all that we can say."[66] It would seem that a moral nature would have to have structure in order to be a nature. Whitehead and Hartshorne argue that if God were in all respects infinite, that is without definite determination, he would consist in a chaos hardly distinguishable from nothing.[67] A structured primordial nature makes it possible for God to introduce novelty without introducing evil.

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[66] HWI, p. 104.

A second advantage of a structured primordial nature is that God is able to initiate just the right kind of novelty to overcome the running down effect of comprehensive finite relativity. This dissertation has devoted considerable attention to the value of the primordial nature as a basis for divine action initiating vibration and other compensatory action which overcomes the loss of differentiated definiteness which results from relativity. An unstructured infinite capacity to create structure would not be able to differentiate between those situations which called for compensation to maintain a structure and those which called for the initiation of a very new structure. An unstructured creator of structure would not be able to assess what is, compare it with what ought to be, and then initiate structure that would compensate for loss through entropy. One of the problems that needs solution is the need to provide for an integral relationship between new structure and old structure. One alternative would be the creation of a relationship by synthesizing old structure with new structure. If the new structure for such a synthesis emerges from an unstructured infinite capacity to create structure, it could not avoid introducing discordant evil producing structure on chance occasions. If in order to avoid introducing discordant evil, the divine initiative does not create any novel structure for inclusion in the new synthesis so that there would be a synthesis between old structure and no structure, there would be a tendency for structure to run down. The conception of a complete set of eternal objects ordered in relative relevance makes it possible for us to understand how God could differentiate between those situations that need a completely new pattern of order and those that need compensation for entropy and then introduce sequences of novelty which are able to overcome entropy.

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[67] RM, p. 153; Charles Hartshorne, "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," in The Relevance of Whitehead, ed. Ivor Leclerc (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 109.

A third reason why a structured primordial nature is valuable is an extension of the first. Autonomous responsibly free beings sometimes need to know in advance the conditioned alternatives under which various types of novel order will be initiated by God in order for them to cooperate during the change. If God has no structured character to his nature, his future acts are not predictable to himself and much less so to free beings in the world. Whitehead's God with a structured primordial nature is able to communicate to free beings in the world an "intuition of an intrinsic suitability of some definite outcome from a preuspposed situation."[68] This prediction is not from induction from efficient causes already operating in the world but is an intuition of the probability of the emergence into actuality of novel forms of definiteness relevant to various conditions which may develop in the world. Where God has a structured primordial nature it is possible for free beings in the world to anticipate and cooperate with the introduction of novelty into the world by the action of God.

A fourth reason why a structured primordial nature is valuable also has to do with the cooperation of morally free beings in the world.

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[68] PR, p. 315.

Responsibly free beings are able to actualize or refuse to actualize some aspects of the aims given them by God. Sometimes a group of free human beings might reject God's ideal for them and then cooperate in the implementation of a form of order which does not produce as much strength of beauty as that envisaged in God's ideal. When some person or a group introduces a new form of order, others need to be able to make some judgment whether the new form represents God's ideal or a free rejection of that ideal. People need to be able to differentiate novel order which results from free rejection of God's ideal from novel order which results from free actualization of God's ideal. They need to be able to know whether to cooperate or oppose. Where God has a structured primordial nature and makes available intuitions of aspects of his ordering of eternal objects, responsibly free human beings are able to differentiate between desirable and undesirable novel order. They are therefore better able to cooperate with one another and with God.

If we say that any God is finite who has a fixed and structured pattern of ideality as an aspect of his nature, then we must admit that Whitehead's God is finite. I have offered four reasons why such a structured primordial nature seems to me to be a superior way of conceiving of God. It is clear that Whitehead applies the term "infinite" to this definitely structured God. Acknowledgement that Whitehead's God has a structured primordial nature should not be taken to mean that he is a finite God in the usual sense of the term.

The second type of finitude in which God is conditioned by something other than himself, and the inability of God to guarantee the triumph of good, both have to do with the reality of responsible freedom.

The belief that God can will all his actions from eternity unconditioned by anything in time is based on the idea that free actions are somehow totally controlled by God. We have seen how Madden and Hare demand that a theism which is adequate must include total control. This total control would make possible a guarantee of the triumph of good as well as the divine action from eternity unconditioned by anything in time which is demanded by Gilkey and Mascall.

Madden and Hare sometimes use the word freedom to refer to actions which are in effect totally controlled by God. When they criticize the free-will solution to the problem of evil, they seem to assume that how the will acts is ultimately caused by the way God has created the world. "God could have avoided the more ghastly consequences of misused freedom by creating man with a disposition to act rightly even though he might choose occasionally to do evil."[69] In this argument they suggest that some evil is beneficial. Some evil, for example, is needed in order to develop the virtues of patience and endurance. God should have originally created man so that he would initiate only enough evil to be an occasion for patience and endurance and not any evil that would not be instrumentally good. If the way a man freely chooses is caused by his disposition, God could create man originally with a disposition which would cause him to act in such a way that there could be a guarantee that no more evil than would be instrumentally good would ever occur. With this concept of freedom there could be total control and action from eternity without needing to be conditioned by anything that happens in the world.

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[69] ECG, p. 74.

The type of morally responsible freedom that is described in this paper is not caused by disposition or anything which has been created in the past.[70] If the outcome of a free decision is in principle unpredictable, it is not possible for God to will all his actions from eternity unconditioned by anything that happens in the world. It has been repeatedly emphasized that God acts differently depending on how responsibly free occasions have used their freedom. God's subsequent acts are conditioned by the degree to which responsibly free occasions have accepted or rejected their initial ideal aims. In one place Madden and Hare seem to agree that guaranteed total control and responsible freedom are incompatible. They profess to agree with Hartshorne that "it is 'double talk' to say that 'God decides my decisions . . . yet they are truly mine.'"[71] A decision that is truly mine is not decided by God and therefore cannot be totally controlled. Since my decision is not totally controlled, God's response in order to be the best for the new impasse must be conditioned by my decision.

Mascall's denial that God receives anything from free occasions in the world which conditions his action puts in question the significance if not the reality of human occasions. Mascall says that if the world and free actions in the world are thought of as being required conditions of the divine action, then religion will emphasize "fellowship and co-operation with the Deity" as in Whitehead. Mascall thinks it would be better to conceive of God as "strictly infinite and the world as adding nothing to his inherent perfection." Whether a human occasion acts one way or another makes no difference to God. Mascall thinks this understanding of God is superior because it tends toward a religious attitude of "adoration and self-abandonment, and of supplication for a union with God which only God can confer."[72] The attitude here lauded is criticized by Whitehead as encouraging passive renunciation in the face of evil in the world and is connected with a derogation of the reality of occasions in the world.

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[70] See pp. 151, 156 f. [71] PS, 2/1, 45.

It is true that Whitehead's God is conditioned in his actions by the free actions of responsible agents in the world. If responsible free choices made no difference in God's future actions, they would not be of eternal significance. If following a decision God could act appropriately from eternity without being conditioned by that decision, the decision could not be free in the sense that there were at least two alternatives really open with the outcome produced neither by external nor prior internal causes. If God is conditioned by human action, it means that prayer and commitment make a difference to a God who responds.

We have acknowledged that in the first two senses of the word Whitehead's God may be thought of as finite. The third use of the word finite with reference to God is more problematic. Gilkey charges that in Whitehead's thought there is a factor in the universe "of equal stature" with God upon which God is dependent for positive contributions and this other factor is not ultimately derived from God.

I have argued[73] that Whitehead does not describe a Manichaean or any other type of dualism represented in the history of thought. His thought is dualistic in that every actual entity including both God and the occasions of the world has conceptuality and physicality. Whitehead criticizes classical dualisms because they elevate an abstraction such as conceptuality or physicality to the status of a final concrete fact. If the static, complete order of eternal objects in the primordial nature is by itself concretely real, then any processive modification of that conceptuality is a departure from reality and evil. Whitehead's duality provides that processive actualization is intrinsically good and not evil, that physicality is good and not evil, and that intrinsic evil in itself makes no contribution to good.

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[72] HWI, p. 182. [73] See pp. 217-219.

If we adopt Christian's position that the intensity of God's satisfaction is unaffected by fluctuations in the aggregate strength of beauty in the world,[74] God is not finitely dependent on the world for the intensity of his own reality. There will be enough effect in God to provide for modifications in initial aims that should be made in order to correct for and further the developments that arise out of the use of responsible freedom, but there will not be a dependence of God on the occasions of the world for contributions to the magnitude of his own reality. God's strength of beauty would be as infinite as the infinity of his primordial nature and would be independent of losses in the world for its reality.

There are expressions in Whitehead which may be interpreted to say that God is dependent on an opposite factor of equal stature. "It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God."[75] "God and the World stand to each other in this opposed requirement."[76] Metaphysics must exhibit "the World as requiring its union

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[74] IWM, pp. 358-359. [75] PR, p. 528. [76] PR, p. 529.

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with God, and God as requiring his union with the World."[77] The question is whether God requires that there be a world which is needed for the full realization of his character or whether God requires a world which possesses non-derivatively a power to create something positive which is needed for God's reality.

Leclerc seems to say that God and the world are equivalently and oppositely derivative. "The world requires God as the ultimate source or principle of order, for unless there be order there can be no existence."[78] The important question is why God requires the world. "But God also requires the world. A source of order as a mere principle would be an abstraction; God is concretely actual as a source of order only in an ordering relation with the world. Thus the world is necessary to the actuality of God."[79] In the remainder of this article he seems to be saying that the world supplies something positive that makes it possible for God to become an actual reality. This world derives mentality as a source of order from God. God derives physicality as a source of actuality from the world.

There are at least two ways in which the world could be thought of as necessary to God. It could be that the world has non-derivative power to generate positive factors needed for the full reality of God. It could also be that some world is needed in order for God's reality to receive expression. The second alternative does not necessarily require that the world possess non-derivatively the power to generate positive factors needed by God to achieve reality.

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[77] AI, p. 215.

[78] Ivor Leclerc, "Whitehead and the Problem of God," Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (Winter 1969-1970): 452.

[79] Ibid.

We have explained that God possesses eternally and nonderivatively the ordered realm of eternal objects. The eternal reality of God is an adequate ground for the derivation of order. There is some difficulty in establishing an equivalently real basis for the derivation of physical reality. There is no entity called the world which is non-derivative in the same sense that God is non-derivative. One possibility would be to imagine a fixed amount of non-derivative physicality eternally existing in varying patterns of order in successive actual entities in the world. This physicality would be somewhat similar to Aristotle's matter. It is difficult for me to work out the details of a system in which there is a fixed amount of physicality. In the first place such physicality would cease to be an abstraction. In the second place there seems to be a conflict between the need to retain the physicality unifying the many into one so that each occasion may be objectively immortal as a one and the need for the physicality to be passed on from each past to each new present. In the third place there is no provision for a growth in the amount of physicality if all physicality is passed on to the present from the past. God's aim is "the intensification of 'formal immediacy.'"[80] An increase of intensity would require an increase in the number of eternal objects realized as actual in an occasion. A complex intense occasion would seem to have more physicality than a simple occasion of empty space. If there were a fixed amount of physicality, an increase in the intensity of one occasion in a route of occasions would seem to require a corresponding reduction of intensity of some other contemporary occasion so as to provide additional physicality from a fixed supply. It seems to me that God's aim toward intensity applies to many or even most occasions in a duration so that an increase in the total amount of physicality is needed. This would require some non-derivative ability to create more physicality where there had been none.

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[80] PR, p. 135.

One way to provide an increase in the aggregate total of actual physicality without that increase emerging out of less or out of nothing is to say that each occasion in its self-causation produces more physicality wherever and whenever it is needed. Perhaps the power operating in self-causation should be regarded as a non-derivative power for the creation of physicality. I have some difficulty understanding how self-causation in a particular occasion can be non-derivative. It is easy to see that the primordial nature of God is non-derivative. If God is one actual entity, the primordial nature has no beginning and is self-existent. If God is a personally ordered society, the primordial nature in one occasion of the route of occasions is a hybrid prehension of that nature in the previous occasion in the route in such a way that the primordial nature is changeless, non-derivative, eternal, and self-existent. We could not say that any particular occasion in the route of occasions which is God non-derivatively possesses the primordial nature. Each occasion in God derives the promordial nature from the preceding occasion in the route. There is no entity or society called the world which could non-derivatively possess the power of self-causation in analogy to God's possession of the primordial nature. Each actual occasion has a temporal standpoint with a beginning boundary before which it is not and after which it is in process of becoming. If we say that the decision of the occasion, its subjective form, and its actuality are all positive factors not derived but created by the occasion itself we seem to be saying that the occasion non-derivatively has the power to create new physicality.

For me it is better to think that everything positive that an occasion possesses after its beginning boundary has been derived from something else. For such a conception freedom is the ability to accept or reject positive elements derived from the past not the ability to create new elements. I would be satisfied if we could say that the "power" to act is derived from God and the past actual entities in the world. This for me would mean that the ability to accept or reject elements is derived but whether there is acceptance or rejection is the non-derivative decision of the occasion itself. If in this situation an increase in physicality were to occur, it would have to come from the only factor which has elements not derived from anything else, which is God. Such a conclusion is at variance with a number of features of standard Whitehead interpretation. I will not press this conclusion since many interpreters of Whitehead seem to be satisfied with the explanation that it is the nature of the metaphysical situation that each actual entity non-derivatively possesses the power of self-causation. They seem to mean by this that if there is an increase in the total physicality, the increase is produced by actual entities which non-derivatively have the power to create such new physicality.

I will need more study of creativity and self-causation before I can give a very definite answer to the question whether Whitehead's God is finite in the sense that he is dependent on occasions in the

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world for positive factors needed for his becoming actuality. Christian seems to reject such dependence[81] and Leclerc seems to affirm it.[82] I am sympathetic with Christian when he tries to avoid a situation in which God's power to act in the world could be weakened by what he failed to receive from the world.

I have agreed that God is finite in the sense that he has a definite nature including eternal objects in grades of relevance. He is also finite in the sense that his actions are conditioned by the way occasions in the world use their freedom. Many Whitehead interpreters agree that God is dependent on occasions of the world for the creation of positive factors needed for the full realization of his actuality. None of these senses of finitude detract from that infinity of God which consists in his being the source of infinite possibility.

We turn now to the question whether God can guarantee the triumph of good. There seems to be a logical contradiction in saying that an occasion is responsibly free to actualize either the ideal good or discordant evil and that God can guarantee that that free choice will issue in the triumph of good. If an occasion is free to actualize either good or evil, God cannot guarantee that the occasion will actualize good. The impossibility of guaranteeing a good outcome from a responsibly free choice does not spring from the weakness of God but from the nature of responsible freedom. A person cannot voluntarily love God unless he is able either to love or not love with all causal factors from God remaining constant.

It is possible to describe a type of freedom in which God could guarantee desired outcomes. An occasion may be thought of as free in the sense that which alternative is chosen is not determined by causes applied from the outside but is determined by the internal character of the will of the subject. God could then create and maintain each subject with the type of character which would choose desired alternatives. Such freedom is in principle predictable. This seems to be the type of freedom advocated by Augustine. He says that all the angels were created with a good will and explains the right decisions of the good angels with the continued causal action of God and the wrong decisions of the evil angels with the absence of this divine action. Speaking of the angels who fell he says, "These angels, therefore either received less of the grace of the divine love than those who persevered in the same; or if both were created equally good, then, while the one fell by their evil will, the others were more abundantly assisted, and attained to that pitch of blessedness at which they became certain they should never fall from it. . . "[83]

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[81] IWM, p. 359. [82] See footnote 78.

I have chosen to use the word "responsible" to apply to those causes which are not caused by something else. By this definition an agent who chose wrongly because he was either created with less grace or not given additional grace when it was needed is not responsible for his choice. If we say that his choice was a free choice in that it was an expression of his own will, we must deny that it was responsible freedom. This is not responsible freedom because the outcome is caused by the prior character of the self which is in turn caused by God.

There is another conception of freedom in which God can guarantee the triumph of good. When the ongoingness of process is provided by an action of freedom in which there is an emergence of opposition which may then be gathered up in a new more creative synthesis, all free opposition contributes to the triumph of good. For such a system it would be possible to say that no free opposition can inhibit the good but is made to contribute to the triumph of good. Whitehead's system provides the ongoingness of process through free actions which are coherent with the past and with each other. For him opposition is destructive and evil. God does not benefit from evil actions such as the destruction of six million Jews in Europe and the dropping of nuclear bombs on Japan so that he may bring about a more creative synthesis. A system in which opposition impels process has the disadvantage that there is no real evil in the sense of permanent loss. All pain and suffering is required for its contribution to the developing good and is not therefore in the larger view evil.

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[83] Augustine City of God 12.9.

God's inability to guarantee the triumph of good is not the result of weakness. Whitehead's God is not weaker but stronger than the traditional God who omnipotently determines every event. Cobb points out that every child has enough power to lead and totally determine the actions of an army of tin soldiers but only a few men have enough power to lead a group of men who wield power of their own.[84] A God who persuades those who exercise power of their own has more power than one who totally determines every event.

Does God guarantee the triumph of good? The answer is No. It seems to me that the possibility of voluntary love is mutually exclusive with guaranteed right free actions.

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[84] GW, p. 89.

Even if more work needs to be done on the nature of creativity and self-causation, Whitehead's system solves the major problems in dealing with evil. He provides for the reality of processive occasions in the world and the reality of evil. He shows how evil can arise in a way that monistic systems cannot. He explains how good emerges when in the same situation materialism is helpless. He provides reasons and motivation for human action to overcome evil. He describes a God who must have more power than the God of traditional systems who is accused by him of being a tyrant. He shows that God is not responsible for excess evil.

Is Whitehead's God powerful enough? He is more powerful than the traditional God who ultimately determines every aspect of every event. Whitehead's God is able to overcome evil and persuade the world toward greater strength of beauty even though there are responsibly free agents in the world who wield power of their own with which they may rebel against God's ideal. There is a qualified sense in which we may say that Whitehead's God is finite. He is finite in the sense that he has a definitely structured primordial nature including all possible eternal objects in grades of relevance. He is finite in the sense that his action introducing ideality into the world is conditioned by the way in which responsible agents have used their freedom. Many Whitehead interpreters regard him as finite in the sense that he receives something positive from occasions of the world which is not ultimately derived from himself. To say that God cannot guarantee that all responsibly free choices actualize his ideal does not detract from God's power. If voluntary love is really valuable, its value must take into account the fact that it can only exist where God does not guarantee that the agent will choose rightly.

Is Whitehead's God Religiously Available?

Most of the arguments against the religious availability of Whitehead's God are integrally related to criticisms of the goodness or the power of his God. The popularization of this issue by the writing of Ely may require separate treatment. Perhaps the real basis of the appeal of this charge lies in the discomfort that occurs when any person finds it necessary to change a cherished conception. Discomfort and worship do not go well together. This analysis will not emphasize so much comfort and familiarity as explicitly stated reasons why it is thought that Whitehead's God is not religiously available.

A. E. Taylor felt that the implications of God's dependence on creativity and the world qualified his power enough to interfere with his religious functions. "An account of what we mean by God which is unexceptional, so long as we are concerned merely with the question what God must be to be the source of all possibilities and all facts, may prove quite inadequate when we go on to consider what God must be to be the inspiration and sustainer of the 'life hid with Christ in God.'"[85]

Ely states that it is the purpose of his book "to describe the nature of Whitehead's 'God' and to inquire whether such a 'God' can serve religious ends."[86] We have already considered his arguments that Whitehead's God is not good enough and not powerful enough to be religiously available. "This leaves it for theologians to decide whether the 'timeless source of all order' which is neither omnipotent nor benevolent can furnish men with 'refreshment and companionship.'"[87] He thinks that Whitehead has given no reason to suppose that God "would or could take any interest in either the prayers of men or the rites of churches."[88] He says that the God attained by Whitehead's metaphysics is such a "dessicated metaphysical principle"[89] that he "has no religious value and presumably ought not to be called God."[90] He finds that the only features of Whitehead's God which make him worthy of worship are aspects that Whitehead "intuits, guesses at, or has faith in," and if this is the final outcome of the investigation why should not worshipers "intuit, or guess at, or have faith in a God who is more of a God?"[91]

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[85] Taylor, ibid., p. 78. [86] RAWG, p. 3.

Mascall complains that Whitehead's God is only a final cause and not "the creative efficient cause of the total being of everything other than himself." It is not surprising therefore that Whitehead's attitude toward God "is not one of adoration so much as of sympathy."[92] He finds that the failure of Whitehead's God to evoke "adoration" is a major defect.[93]

Gilkey complains that "an immanent, finite God, conditioned by the same categories and forces as we are, subject to the same perils and mysteries and frustrations, is not holy." It is possible to respect or even fear a God who is not holy, but "we would never radically surrender ourselves to him." He cannot be holy unless he "transcends our finitude in unconditionedness." It is for this reason that "the esoteric God of process philosophy" is not holy enough to be an object of "genuine religious concern."[94]

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[87] RAWG, p. 55. [88] RAWG, pp. 11 f. [89] RAWG, p. 57.

[90] RAWG, p. 56. [91] RAWG, p. 57. [92] HWI, p. 157.

[93] HWI, p. 197.

Madden and Hare hold that Whitehead's God is "hardly personal enough" to qualify as being quasi-theistic. They complain that what insures the realization of value is the principle of creativity. "To have a theism of any kind there must be a personal being who is thought to guarantee the growth of value. Whatever it is that guarantees is considered worthy of worship, but here we are asked to worship a principle or a characterless stuff."[95] They admit that the primordial nature has infinite characteristics but they complain that "insofar as one finds an infinite aspect of God compatible with his other limitations and capable of guaranteeing at least a serial realization of value, one has a God without personality and without even status as a distinct entity."[96] They object that Whithead's God is not personal enough to be worthy of worship.

These critics seem to agree that Whitehead's God does not have enough power to inspire religious awe. One can readily understand that a person would not be inspired to worship if he viewed his God as weak. Critics have a tendency to describe Whitehead's God as having less power than the traditional God and therefore he is not responsible for not removing excess evil because he does not have the power.

We have mentioned Cobb's argument showing that Whitehead's God is not weaker but stronger than the traditional God who omnipotently determines every event.[97] It takes more power to persuade those who wield power of their own than it does to move those who are powerless. A child who totally determines every move of his tin soldiers is not more powerful than a general who persuades autonomous men.

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[94] MHE, p. 89. [95] ECG, p. 118. [96] ECG, p. 119.

[97] See footnote 84.

In addition to having more power than the traditional God, Whitehead's God personally responds to each actual occasion in the world. It seems to me that a God is more religiously available who differentially responds to man's prayer and commitment than one who is unconditioned by any event which occurs in the world. The claim that God does not need to be conditioned by events in the world in order to act with an appropriate difference for those who accept and those who reject the divine ideal is open to the charge that there is no responsible freedom. A God who would omnipotently cause men to sin and then punish them is not good. A God who is not good is certainly not worthy of worship.

Most of these critics do not seem concerned about the religious availability of a God who omnipotently determines every event in the world and who therefore punishes those whom he causes to sin. They are rightly insistent on a God who is not weak. They are confused about the exercise of power in conditions where there is responsible freedom.

Even though familiar traditions and ceremonies have not made Whitehead's God psychologically available for religious use, his God is more worthy of worship. He has more power than the traditional God because he persuades those who wield power of their own. He really responds to their acts, commitments, and worship. His goodness is worthy of adoration because he suffers with and saves sinners.

Does Whitehead Provide for Responsible Freedom?

Pols has written an entire book concerned with an analysis of Whitehead's concept of freedom.[98] There are two primary criticisms. First, he claims that if the mental pole is really indivisible, the only process that occurs in concrescence is the elimination of certain features of the initial data as determined by the fixed initial aim.[99] If there were no modification of the subjective aim there would be a radical finalism with God determining every event through his envisagement of eternal objects.[100] Pols admits that Whitehead did not intend to describe a radical finalism.[101] While protesting the paradoxicality of claiming indivisibility of the subjective aim and at the same time asserting real modification,[102] he announces that he will act as if there is real modification so as to move on to the second criticism. In this other charge he holds that even though there may be modification, it cannot be produced by responsible freedom since it is not produced by the subject. He arrives at this conclusion by considering all the possible alternatives and showing that they have to be rejected. If there were modification of the aim, it would have to be produced either "as the effect of determinate components one upon the other, or as a modification more properly called a free one." The first alternative could not be true since Whitehead rejects a radical finalism and affirms freedom. In order for the second alternative to be applicable creativity must produce an indeterminate active power which is able to modify the subjective aim. Careful analysis, he says, shows that "creativity did not appear to be the source of any (active) power to bring about the modification of the subjective aim."[103] He concludes that modification of the aim must be produced by arbitrary chance.[104] If this modification does emerge out of nothing in a radical chance manner, it cannot be produced by the subject.[105] If the modification of the subjective aim is not produced by the subject it does not qualify as responsible freedom according to the first requirement for responsible freedom.[106]

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[98] Edward Pols, Whitehead's Metaphysics: A Critical Examination of Process and Reality (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), pp. v, 3. Hereafter WM.

[99] WM, pp. 101-125. [100] WM, pp. 136, 138, 141, 157, 189, 193.

[101] WM, p. 137. [102] WM, pp. 102, 106, 108.

The first criticism of Pols has been answered by Cobb who shows that the temporal indivisibility of the subjective aim is compatible with processive freedom. He has demonstrated the reality of the modification of the subjective aim by showing that there is a "temporal all-at-onceness" to the modification of the aim in relation to events in time.[107]

Cobb has also presented in his article arguments to show that creativity in conjunction with the other elements in concrescence is able to provide for responsible freedom thus answering the second criticism. I have been dependent on his answer in my lengthy defense of responsible freedom in Whitehead.[108]

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[103] WM, p. 142.

[104] WM, pp. 122, 131, 134, 136, 138, 140 f., 142, 157, 193.

[105] WM, pp. 121 f., 126, 131, 134, 138, 192.

[106] See p. 150.

[107] John B. Cobb, Jr., "Freedom in Whitehead's Philosophy: a Response to Edward Pols," Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (Winter 1969): 409-413; see also Lewis S. Ford, "On Genetic Successiveness: A Third Alternative," ibid., 421-425.

A description of Pols's alternative concept of freedom will be helpful for the explanation and evaluation of his criticism. He seems to assume that in the action of creativity character is imparted to the subject which is at the same time the determining character which acts when a subject freely modifies its subjective aim. He says that there is a kind of "simultaneity" of cause and effect in this action.[109] His solution seems to require that creativity consist in emerging divergence and that it be a function of God. He approves of Bergson who designates God as the source of radical divergence from present forms of order. He quotes Bergson who describes God as the "center from which worlds shoot out like rockets in a fire-works display." In this God there is "nothing of the already made." He apparently does not have a structured primordial nature in grades of order. He is not a thing but a "continuity of shooting out." We experience this creative continuity of shooting out "in ourselves when we act freely."[110] In his own system Pols has individual being derive its free divergence from present order by participation in "common Being."[111] This common Being is the fountain of freedom. Each entity gains "ontic power"[112] from an "ontological center, in Bergson's sense, out of which this unrest flows."[113]

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[108] See pp. 155-165.

[109] Edward Pols, "Freedom and Agency: A Reply," Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (Winter 1969): 415.

[110] WM, p. 132, quoting Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1913), p. 248.

[111] Edward Pols, The Recognition of Reason (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1963), pp. 42, 46 ff., 219 f. Hereafter RR.

[112] RR, pp. 196, 198 f., 204, 216.

Pols identifies three functions which I have separated. He wants the origination of novel forms of ideal definiteness, creativity, and responsible freedom to be a single action flowing out from one ontological center. He has an unstructured "common Being" endlessly giving rise to novel forms of definiteness in the action in which particular beings freely choose to constitute themselves as a whole which is more than the sum of their causal parts. The contribution made by the causal parts is similar to Whitehead's efficiently caused data from past actuality. The "more" comes from common Being.[114] Which aspects of the possible "more" are realized is decided by ontic power. The ontic power of particular being is an expression of participation in common Being. "Power even as embodied in individuals has its common or general aspect . . . . It was implicit in our earlier discussion of the common aspect of Being's formative power that the ontic power of an individual is a sharing or participating in it."[115]

From this description of ontic power, we can better understand the nature of Pols's criticism. He thinks that Whitehead does not provide for responsible freedom because that which selects the alternatives in a choice is not determined by the character of the substantial subject which gets that character from its participation in common Being. I have argued that a decision is not responsibly free unless with a given subjective character either of at least two alternatives can be chosen. He is saying that which of two alternatives is chosen is decided by the character of the ontic power of the subject. The subject gets this power by participation in common Being. He says that if the deciding character does not come from the outcome of determinate components or from common Being, it has to come from nothing or from chance. This chance determination cannot be determination by the subject. I hold that a responsibly free decision can be determined by the subject without being determined by the character of the subject which it has gotten from common Being or from any other source.

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[113] WM, p. 133. [114] RR, pp. 45 f. [115] RR, p. 204.

The first objection to Pols's conception of freedom is that it makes common Being the decider which is responsible for every free decision. In Whiteheadian language this would make God responsible for every free decision including those that introduce massive evil. Whitehead's system should not be revised to be more like Pols's in this respect because it would make God responsible for evil freely initiated by men. It is necessary for the action in which ideal forms of definiteness are originated to be a different action from that in which a being freely accepts or rejects one of these ideal forms in order for God not to be responsible for any evil which may arise in responsible freedom.

A second difficulty with Pols's position is that God needs a structured primordial nature in order to produce relevant novelty which will overcome evil and develop good without accidentally introducing new evil. How could a God with an unstructured Being introduce relevant novelty if he had no nature in which grades of relevance are established? Even if each new divine act were the synthesis of present structures with infinite possibility, there would be a tendency for forms of definiteness to run down. If God tried to extend present

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trends indefinitely there would be a massive pile up of discord. God needs a determinate nature which is the basis of action initiating vibration and other measures to overcome the running down effect of comprehensive finite relativity. Hartshorne has shown that where there is the emergence of unstructured and unpredictable novel determinations of definiteness, the initiation of evil is inevitable.[116] How could God avoid the introduction of discordant novel ideality if he had no primordial nature with an infinity of possibility structured in an order of ideal relevance so as to avoid discord?

A third difficulty with Pols's conception of freedom is that it does not furnish a basis for attributing moral responsibility to the occasion itself. By saying that every occasion participates in common being he shows how each occasion could acquire power for variable determination, but he does not show how an occasion could consciously control that variation so that it could accept or reject ideality with all other factors remaining constant. Each occasion in a route of occasions possesses a thrust toward variation but not an ability to actualize the highest ideal or the lowest possibility consistently if it so chooses. A power for unpredictable variation is not enough to provide for morally responsible freedom.

The concept of freedom in Pols's system has difficulties for the solution of the problem of evil which are not present in Whitehead's system. He could not show that God is not responsible for evil. His God would not be able to overcome the evil of running down without an occasion accidentally introducing new evil himself. His system shows how derivative occasions could have power but does not show how they could control that power with moral responsibility. His system fails at the very point where he is most critical of Whitehead's system.

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[116] WP, pp. 94, 108, 186.

It is clear that Whitehead bases his doctrine of freedom on the immediate experience of responsible freedom consciously accepting or rejecting ideal potentiality. Future research on the nature of freedom should develop this theme.

Do Eternal Objects Permit Process?

At first thought it might seem that Hartshorne's difference with Whitehead over the status of eternal objects has little to do with the problem of evil and its solution. This study has based its discussion of the rise of good, the cause of evil, and the means by which evil is overcome on a conception of the primordial nature of God which includes a complete set of eternal objects in a fixed order of orders. Hartshorne believes that what is eternal in God is much less extensive than what I have described. He would prefer to limit the eternal in God to the "categories, those utterly general dimensions of reality."[117] Whatever is applicable to every possible actual occasion in the world is eternal in God. Specific qualities which apply to some and not all occasions are creatively produced in process. This shift in the status of eternal objects makes a greater difference in the character of the rise of good, the cause of evil, and the method of overcoming evil than would appear on the surface.

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[117] Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead's Idea of God," Paul Arthur Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1951), p. 557.

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Hartshorne's thought has been very influential in the development of what is understood as Whitehead's solution to the problem of evil. For him what I have called conceptual origination, interactive synthesis, and responsible freedom are all included in creativity which is equated with freedom.[118] This freedom is also called chance.[119]

Hartshorne calls attention to the fact that his conception of chance is analogous to the idea of "firstness" in Peirce.[120] Peirce speaks of chance "by virtue of which the general vague nothing-in-particular-ness that preceded the chaos took a thousand definite qualities."[121] Chance is the process in which patterns of definiteness emerge from characterless potentiality. "Law is developed out of pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy."[122] Most of the time Peirce refers to the basic "firstness" in which differentiated definiteness comes to be as chance.[123] Sometimes he refers to firstness as God.[124] To say that "God determined so and so" is a symbolic and perhaps incautious way to represent "ideas as springing into a preliminary stage of being by their own inherent firstness."[125] It is evident that in Peirce God does not have an eternally structured primordial nature.

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[118] Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead's Philosophy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), p. 185. Hereafter cited as WP. Charles Hartshorne, "Metaphysics and the Modality of Existential Judgments," Ivor Leclerc, ed., The Relevance of Whitehead (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1961), p. 114.

[119] LP, pp. 169, 179, 206 f., 209 f.; WP, pp. 94, 177, 186.

[120] LP, pp. 179, 209; WP, p. 177.

[121] Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, 8 vols., eds., Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1965), 6:132. Hereafter cited as CP.

[122] CP, 1:223; cf. 6:15. [123] CP, 1:224; cf. 6:136-138.

[124] CP, 1:187. [125] CP, 6:136.

It would be well to consider some reasons why Hartshorne believes that the primordial nature of God should not contain eternal objects which are specific forms of definiteness applicable only to some actual occasions in the world. He thinks that a structured complete set of eternal objects in the primordial nature of God would make it impossible to develop a sound doctrine of God as creator. "One may well hesitate to base a doctrine of divine creation upon an axiom that there is no creation, save as mechanical passing about of pre-existent predicates."[126] Hartshorne approves of Berdyaev who would complain that a primordial multitude of eternal objects is too Platonic and "misses the truth that creation is the 'production of new images,' not the mere actualization of eternal patterns."[127] Instead of taking Whitehead's position that God does not create any novel forms of definiteness Hartshorne holds that "'essences' may perfectly well emerge in the universe, not merely in the world of actuality but in the total universe of actuality and possibility." If creation does not refer to the production of new forms of definiteness it must refer merely to the selective inclusion or exclusion of eternal objects. In this shuffling of eternal objects "creation in the proper sense is denied."[128]

A second reason why Hartshorne rejects Whitehead's doctrine of eternal objects is that where all forms of definiteness are eternal, actualization loses its meaning. "If all the 'forms of definiteness,' each perfectly definite in itself, are eternally given to God, it is not altogether clear to me what actualization accomplishes."[129] The claim that the "whole form is already in the cause" attempts to explain the difference between cause and effect by saying that to possible form "actuality" is added. This means that "to the form as in one thing is added the same form as in another. But this duplication itself must add some form or quality not in the cause, or it is useless."[130] Actualization must add form to what has been actualized in the past. Actualization is an increase in determinateness or definiteness. Griffin explains that Hartshorne "equates 'definiteness' and 'determinateness.' But Whitehead distinguishes them, applying the latter only to actual entities."[131] This distinction is made in the twentieth category of explanation where he says that "'Determination' is analysable into 'definiteness' and 'position,' where 'definiteness' is the illustration of select eternal objects, and 'position' is relative status in a nexus of actual entities."[132] Whitehead says that actualization adds determination but not definiteness. Hartshorne holds that in order for actualization to be meaningful it must "really add something, namely, definiteness."[133] He thinks that if all forms of definiteness are eternally present in God the process character of God is in question.

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[126] Charles Hartshorne, Man's Vision of God and the Logic of Theism (Chicago: Willett, Clark & Company, 1941), p. 246. Hereafter MVG.

[127] WP, pp. 186 f. [128] WP, p. 32.

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[129] WP, p. 95. [130] MVG, p. 246.

[131] David R. Griffin, "Hartshorne's Differences from Whitehead," in Two Process Philosophers, ed. Lewis S. Ford (Tallahassee, Florida: American Academy of Religion, 1973), p. 37, note 13.

[132] PR, p. 38. [133] WP, p. 95.

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"Whitehead seems to be trying to deduce the specific from the generic, to show that the primordial nature of existence involves all species of quality. Is this any more credible than that all things follow from the nature of substance?"[134] The only meaningful account of actualization involves an increase in definiteness. "The distinction between possible and actual is that between the relatively indefinite and the relatively definite, the determinable and the determinate; or it is a distinction of which no intelligible account has ever been given."[135]

A third reason for rejecting a structured primordial nature with a complete set of eternal objects is that the meaning and significance of time is lost. When the process of actualization is reduced "to a mere shuffling (Whitehead's 'selection' is all too suggestive of this view) of primordial qualitative factors," the nature of time is "denied."[136] When actualization is seen as an increase in definiteness, time is meaningful. "Each moment of time will add a little to the definiteness of qualities, even as envisaged by deity, but only a little."[137] This makes time unsymmetrical. Free creativity processively gives rise to emergent quality.

Griffin reports that Hartshorne believes that his position "would remove a major basis for opposition to the Whiteheadian philosophy by adjusting it to the elements of truth in nominalism." He further explains that a "more nominalistic" view would be more coherent in that it would be more consistent with the process character of Whitehead's thought.[138]

It seems to me that a God with a primordial aspect which contains forms of definiteness in structured relations is a better basis for a doctrine of creation than one in which there is an ability to create forms but no ability to control the character of such forms so as to produce harmonious development over long reaches of time. The creation of complex structures sometimes requires long periods of development during which the outcome may appear to be more evil than good. The ability to persist in such development is dependent on a stable appetition toward a remote goal of maximum good. A creating God would need a structured system of ideality in order to pursue such goals with stability.

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[134] WP, p. 96. [135] WP, p. 32. [136] WP, p. 32.

[137] WP, p. 96. [138] Griffin, ibid., pp. 39 f.

At first one might think that the ability to create forms where there were none exhibits more creative power than the ability to bring forms already real to bear creatively in a given situation. There is a certain type of emphasis on the doctrine of creation out of nothing which seems to suggest that the less a creator has with which to do his creating the more creative he is. If we extend this type of thinking it would mean that a God is more creative the closer his character approaches to nothing. At the point where absolutely nothing creates itself into a creating God the deficiency in this type of thinking becomes obvious. This concept of creativity seems to say that an action is really creative if the creator does not have the character which is required to produce the creative action. A God could create forms where there were none only if there were a form creating factor in his nature. If new forms created by this form creating factor were relevant to the ongoing situation produced by efficient causation, there must also be guidance of the form creating factor by some type of ideality in grades of relevance. I do not see a significant difference between a God who creates forms guided by ideality in grades of relevance and a God who creatively makes available relevant forms from his primordial nature which possesses all forms in grades of relevance. If the form creating factor is not guided by ideality in grades of relevance it would not be possible to avoid producing forms that are discordantly evil on chance occasion. Mascall criticizes the "late medieval voluntarists" because they do not provide for control of God's will by his moral nature.[139] A God who can provide forms that are relevant for the conditions in the world is a better creator than one which creates forms without any guidance from his ideality in grades of relevance. In this respect Whitehead's God with a complete set of eternal objects in grades of relevance is better able to create than Hartshorne's God with no patterns of ideality graded in conditioned alternatives.

A system which provides for nonderivative pure potentials and entry of these pure potentials into that which becomes concrete, forms a better basis for the explanation of the difference between potentiality and actuality and of the process of actualization than a system in which there are no pure potentials in existence prior to the becoming of determinate actuality. In Hartshorne's system there is not an adequate differentiation between ideality and actuality. For him as soon as forms are definite, they are actualized. Definite forms of ideality must exist before they are actualized in order to provide a basis for morally responsible freedom.

It is easy to see that with Hartshorne's concept of actualization

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[139] HWI, p. 104.

God must not possess a complete set of eternal objects in grades of relevance. For him actualization consists in a process of becoming definite. If all forms of definiteness are non-derivatively and eternally present in the primordial nature there is nothing left for actualization to accomplish. It seems to me that the problem here is not with Whitehead's concept of eternal objects but with Hartshorne's concept of actualization.

For Whitehead actualization consists in a process of physical origination in which forms of definiteness which are eternal enter into the concrete as the many are unified into one actual entity. For him "full actuality is attained" when there is "physical origination" as actual occasions become in the world.[140] Eternal objects though definite and real in the sense of belonging to existence[141] are not fully real until they are actualized in an occasion of formed value.[142] In concrescence there is a development from this qualified reality so that it may be said that there is a "growth from the real to the actual."[143] In this growth there is the origination of physical feeling so that an eternal object which had been entertained only as a conceptual feeling becomes involved in a physical feeling. "'Actuality' means nothing else than this ultimate entry into the concrete" in which there is the creation of physical feeling.[144] The development of actuality "realizes form and is yet more than form."[145] Creativity is the many becoming one and in so doing new physical feeling is created. Actuality is a term which "merely indicates this ultimate type of composite unity."[146] "Actual fact always means fusion into one, perceptivity."[147] "In other words, an actuality is a complex unity, which can be analysed as a process of feeling its own components."[148] We may conclude that "'actuality' is in its essence 'composition'."[149] "Actuality is through and through togetherness--togetherness of otherwise isolated eternal objects, and togetherness of all actual occasions."[150] An actual occasion is more than the sum of the objectifications of actual occasions and the eternal objects of which it is composed. The many become one. This synthesized whole is what is actual.

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[140] PR, p. 532. [141] PR, p. 32. [142] RM, pp. 156 f.

[143] PR, p. 327. [144] PR, p. 321. [145] MT, p. 95.

There are statements in Whitehead which could be interpreted to support a concept of actualization which consists in an increase of definiteness. An actual entity is said to be actual in the sense that it "has significance for itself" or that it "functions in respect to its own determination."[151] Decision "constitutes the very meaning of actuality."[152] "Actuality in its essence is aim at self-formation."[153] If no distinction is made between definiteness and determination, these statements could be interpreted to say that actualization is an increase in definiteness. If, however, there are no eternal objects graded in relevance, it is very difficult to understand how there could be standards of compatibility which are needed in order to produce the excluding action in mutual sensitivity and to form the basis of the objective distinction between better and worse which is essential for morally responsible freedom. The dynamics of decisive self-formation are much more understandable if there are forms already definite in grades of relevance which are selected in interactive synthesis according to their compatibility and in morally responsible freedom by the responsible self. "Thus actualisation is a selection among possibilities."[154] It seems to me that Whitehead's concept of actualization is superior to Hartshorne's.

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[146] PR, p. 223. [147] RM, p. 157. [148] FR, p. 25.

[149] MT, p. 162. [150] SMW, p. 251. [151] PR, p. 38.

[152] PR, p. 68. [153] MT, p. 131.

When Hartshorne fears that a complete set of eternal objects in ordered relations in the primordial nature of God would deny the reality of time, he is concerned about process and the irreversibility of time. In the universe of Laplace which was composed of non-processive matter moving in space from necessary causes it was in principle possible to predict the future and recount the past from the location and movement of matter in the present. When matter moves there is the appearance of process, but nothing really changes and this amounts to a philosophy of being or of substance. Hartshorne thinks that a system which has a God who includes a complete set of eternal objects in grades of relevance would not be processive but would have the problems of a philosophy of substance.[155]

Three prominent features of Whitehead's system insure process and make time irreversible. Even though none of the eternal objects which are introduced into the mental pole are created in process, there are emergent physical feelings which have processive particularity. Creativity is the many becoming a novel one. This one includes physicality which is more than the sum of its parts. The creation of a one where there were many is not merely the automatic result of the many being there in a standpoint. Novel physicality is created. Once the creativity occurs, that one is objectively immortal. It is irreversibly one.

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[154] SMW, p. 229. [155] WP, p. 96.

A second feature of Whitehead's system which makes reality irreversible is unique interactive synthesis. In interactive synthesis incompatible elements are excluded and compatible elements are included in a unique combination in grades of relevance making up a unified one. Even though there may be other actual occasions with the same eternal objects in the mental pole, they will not have an identical intensity in relation to each other. The coming together of the many into one is a one directional process that produces unique grades of relevance of eternal objects in an actual occasion.

A third feature of Whitehead's system which insures irreversible process is the freedom of responsibility. When a responsibly free occasion is able to choose to accept or reject a possible eternal object for inclusion in its own becoming, genuinely unpredictable alternatives are involved. The whole history of the universe in the causal future of a responsibly free decision will be different depending on whether that occasion accepts or rejects a given eternal object. There are aspects of the effects for which no cause can be found in the causal past. Whitehead's system with a God who has a primordial nature including a complete set of eternal objects in ordered relations is an adequate basis for a concept of time which is processive and irreversible.

The superiority of Whitehead's God which is evident on the examination of Hartshorne's criticisms becomes even more persuasive when Hartshorne's conception is criticized from Whitehead's perspective. In Hartshorne there is inadequate provision for the existence or reality of potentiality in contrast with actuality. He speaks of potentiality as if it were in some sense real, but his system does not provide for the existence or the reality of potentiality. He says that "the potentiality of the form" is temporally earlier than the actuality which is later. This seems to imply something in existence which changes from potentiality to actuality. He parenthetically explains that the potentiality of the form is "a less determinate form" than the actuality.[156] This could mean that potentiality exists in the form of definiteness which has so far been achieved. If it does, potentiality is equal to the comulative total actuality. There is no potentiality here which can later be actualized. There is only actuality which could limit the kind of novel actuality which could be added in the future. Of course, the limitation of past actuality on the type of future actuality can only occur if there is some structured ideality establishing standards of compatibility and Hartshorne's system does not offer such standards. He again speaks as if potentiality exists when he says that "before an essence emerges, there must be a possibility of which its appearance is the actualization."[157] He goes on to explain that the possibility is not as definite as the quality which actualizes it. This suggests that possibility exists only in the sense that there is a range of possible definiteness which can be actualized which is determined by the presently actualized definiteness. There is not here a something that is potential which can become actual. The denial of potentiality which is in some sense real or existent is clear from his discussion of the status of blue before it was actualized. Prior to actualization "no such item was included in the whole of reality, or in the content of omniscience. Not that it was then true that 'blue is not included in reality,' but that it is now true that the whole of what was then real failed to contain blue, since no color which then was real was what we now know as blue."[158]

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[156] MVG, p. 246. [157] WP, p. 32.

There is one passage in which Hartshorne may speak of existing potentiality. He complains that Whitehead's theory of eternal objects compromises the "principle of process" and then says, "In Peirce's theory that definite abstract forms evolve from a primordial continuum of indefinite potentiality, I have hoped one could see a corrective of Whitehead on this point."[159] If there is in existence a "primordial continuum of indefinite potentiality" which is a form creating factor, there is something which exists to which the term potentiality may be applied. If this factor is one and consists in God as firstness as it appears in Peirce, it would be difficult to show that God is not the cause of all evil. If we were to attempt to make this primordial continuum of potentiality external to God in order to avoid implicating God in the cause of excess evil, we would have to keep it external to actual occasions in the world in which it operated. This would in turn give to creativity an agency which would violate the ontological principle. To satisfy the ontological principle creativity must be an activity of an actual entity. To be primordial a continuum of potentiality would need to be non-derivative and could not therefore emerge in each totally derivative actual occasion as it came into being without appearing to emerge out of nothing.

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[158] MVG, pp. 245 f. [159] RASP, p. 20.

We may summarize this argument by saying that Hartshorne does not provide an adequate basis for the existence of potentiality so that there is a difference between potentiality and actuality. Most of the time potentiality consists in the pattern of actuality which any novel definiteness must build on. When he does speak of potentiality which exists as in the ability of God to create novel forms, he does so in a way which makes it difficult to avoid making God responsible for all evil.

Hartshorne may be criticized, secondly, by pointing out that there is inadequate basis for differentiation between physical and conceptual feeling. In Hartshorne blue is not real at all until it is definite, and as soon as it is definite it is actual. When an eternal object is integrated in the mental pole and not in the physical pole, it is a conceptual feeling. Such an eternal object is real in the sense that it exists as potentiality, but it has not yet been actualized by integration into the physical pole. If a definite eternal object cannot be entertained as a conceptual feeling so that the eternal object has not been actualized, the possibility of differentiating between the mental pole and the physical pole is cast in doubt. Di-polarity in God is of great value to show that God makes the rise of good possible without being responsible for all evil. The differentiation between conceptual and physical feeling is a high priority aspect of Whitehead's system.

A third criticism of Hartshorne's system points out that he has no adequate basis for the determination of relevance. For him potentiality consists in the range of possibilities that grow out of the state of the actual world. This would require a close connection between the forms of definiteness now actualized and certain forms which are relevant to them. In Whitehead's system every possible form of definiteness is graded in relative relevance in the primordial nature of God. In Hartshorne there are no non-actualized forms existing in God and therefore there can be no grading of relevance of non-actualized forms. He, nevertheless, speaks of a range of possibilities as if some forms of definiteness which are abstractly possible are not in this situation possible because they are not relevant to the present determinate actuality. "The conditions decide what can be done and cannot; but what is done is always more determinate than merely what can be done. The latter is a range of possibilities for action, not a particular act."[160] Interactive synthesis in which there is elimination of incompatible elements and inclusion of compatible elements is only possible if there is a non-derivative fixed standard of compatibility. If the standard of compatibility were processively determined by some type of synthetic relativity, there would be a tendency for each form to acquire an average compatibility for every other form which would be the same as saying that any form is just as compatible as any other. There is no basis in Hartshorne for saying that a given actual situation makes possible certain forms which are compatible and excludes other incompatible forms.

A fourth criticism of Hartshorne's system objects to his position that potentiality consists in indefiniteness and that where there is definiteness there is no opportunity for the becoming which is actualization. This view eliminates the possibility of actualizing repeatedly the definite alternatives in vibration. Whitehead explains that God can alternatively apply different definite ideals so as to bring about vibration which is essential to overcome entropy and to maintain stability in physical systems. God can alternatively apply different ideals because he possesses these ideals as definite in his primordial nature and because he has the ability processively to make different ideality available for initiating occasions in the world. God possesses all eternal objects graded in an order of orders in conditioned alternatives. If the conditions in the actual world have "x" character, the ideal will have "r" character. If, on the other hand, the actual world has "y" character, then the ideal will have "s" character. In order to be able to initiate vibration that overcomes entropy and maintains stability but is patient to the expression of freedom, God must possess all eternal objects in an order of orders of grades of relevance.

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[160] LP, p. 231, cf. Charles Hartshorne, "Whitehead and Ordinary Language," Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (Winter 1969-70): 441.

A fifth criticism of Hartshorne's thought points out that he has no adequate basis for an abrupt shift to new patterns of order. If the primordial nature of God includes only the categories as definite and the consequent nature of God accumulates and preserves the definiteness produced in actualization, it would not be possible for God to induce an abrupt shift from one type of order to another which more successfully combined certain features in the actual world and excluded a different pattern of objects. Since Whitehead's God possesses all eternal objects in an order of orders, various types of order are graded in conditioned alternatives so that God can discontinue the introduction of a certain type of ideality in the world and initiate a different type not yet actualized. Whitehead refers to the most extensive shifts of this kind as changes in cosmic epoch. It would seem that Hartshorne's system could only provide cumulative addition of definiteness without radical shifts of ideality.

A sixth criticism of Hartshorne's system questions whether his God can be actively processive without causing evil. If the only definite elements in God's primordial nature determine the categories and his consequent nature receives and preserves actualization achieved in the world, where is there a provision for active divine process? If God's primordial nature includes a form creating factor so that he actively creates novel forms of definiteness without any guidance from ideality, he will on chance occasion create forms that are discordant with the efficiently caused extension of past actuality. In answer it could be said that God presupposes the forms which have already been created so that he creates nothing discordant with the accumulated total of forms. If God's processive creativity of forms always chooses between alternatives left open when the total past is taken into account, why does not the creativity of actual occasions in the world also presuppose and therefore remain harmonious with the past? It might be answered that many contemporary occasions could simultaneously remain harmonious with the accumulated past but choose from among mutually exclusive and mutually discordant possibilities.[161] Since they would have no way of experiencing what other contemporaries are choosing, they could not avoid actualizing discordant definiteness even though their creative action was harmonious with the past. If God's creativity were analogous to that of occasions in the world, it would be arbitrary to say that God's chance determination of definiteness was the standard of good and therefore did not cause evil whereas the chance contemporary determination of definiteness in occasions in the world because they are of less scope are responsible for initiating evil. Hartshorne does seem to affirm chance determination by God. "The only God I think I can conceive is the one Einstein rejected, a 'dice-throwing God.'"[162] If this dice-throwing God kept his action harmonious with his past determinations, the difference between alternatives left open would have progressively less amplitude so that God's freedom would eventually run down. If at the same time occasions in the world continued to experience comprehensive finite relativity, their differentiated definiteness would run down. The only way God could overcome this entropic impasse would be to begin the creation of a new set of forms in discordant relation with some of the forms of the past. If there were no structured ideality in his primordial nature to guide him, he would in his chance action be as subject to the creation of discordant evil forms as occasions in the world. Because Whitehead's God has a primordial nature with all eternal objects in an order of orders in conditioned alternatives, he is not subject to this problem.

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[161] WP, p. 186.

A seventh criticism of Hartshorne's system questions whether he consistently provides for morally responsible freedom. For him freedom in general consists in the chance selection from among alternatives left open when all past definiteness has had its determined effect. "God sets the creatures free, within limits, because there is no other way to have creatures or any world."[163] The limits to freedom are constituted by the causal or determined elements in becoming. "What limits my decision now? The decisions I and others, including atoms and cells among the others, have made in the past. Even the laws of nature are divine decisions made long ago, and freely made."[164] "Causality is crystallized freedom, freedom is causality in the making."[165] The cumulative total of past free actualizations of definiteness is causality in the present and "causality consists in the limits to the randomness."[166] The determined or causal factors always leave a range of possibilities undetermined so that "antecedent conditions only limit the possibilities to a more or less narrow range."[167] The scope of freedom "is an indetermination in the potentialities for present action which are constituted by all the influences and stimuli, all 'heredity and environment,' all past experience."[168] It is reasonable to expect that more complex human occasions "will be less fully determined by their causal antecedents" than less complex occasions.[169] "The conditions decide what can be done and cannot; but what is done is always more determinate than merely what can be done. The latter is a range of possibilities for action, not a particular act."[170] Notice that freedom exists where God's decision or any other decision has not yet determined definiteness. This kind of freedom could not accept or reject a form of definiteness already decided by God. "The control of God over us is the influence of his decisions already made."[171]

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[162] Charles Hartshorne, Beyond Humanism: Essays in the Philosophy of Nature (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1969), p. ix.

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[163] Charles Hartshorne, "A New Look at the Problem of Evil," in Current Philosophical Issues: Essays in Honor of Curt John Ducasse, ed. Frederick C. Dommeyer (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, 1966), p. 208. Hereafter cited as NL.

[164] NL, p. 211. [165] LP, p. 233. [166] LP, p. 223. [167] WP, p. 177.

[168] LP, p. 231. [169] LP, p. 224. [170] LP, p. 231.

Moral freedom is a special type of general freedom. In moral freedom there is a chance selection from among indefinite possibilities when the determined limits include consciousness by the subject of ethical principles.

> Moral freedom, we have held, is a special, high-level case of the creative leap inherent in all process, the case in which the leap is influenced by consciousness of ethical principles. The leap itself always involves "chance"--meaning simply that the causal conditions do not require just the particular act which takes place. They make it possible, but they make other acts also possible. Moral freedom is chance plus something; no one (except a man of straw) identifies the two.[172]

This discussion suggests that a consciousness of ethical principles is one of the determinate causal factors which limits chance. The chance free decision chooses from among alternatives left open after the definite ethical limitation has been realized. Moral freedom is chance determination plus a conscious ethical influence. He reinforces the chance character of the determination of definiteness when he appeals to Peirce. The new definiteness "is an act of no agent unless one internal to the entity, i.e., the entity itself regarded as acting or free. Peirce had almost this idea in his theory of Firstness."[173] It should be remembered that Peirce refers to Firstness as chance.[174]

It is difficult to know just which aspects of Peirce's position to retain and which to reject since it is clear that not all of his idea is to be affirmed. It might be that the implication of chance that I have emphasized is the rejected element. Perhaps what emerges in the becoming occasion is the ability to choose to accept or reject better or worse alternatives. He does say in an incidental aside that moral evil is "evil deliberately chosen."[175] This sounds as if a responsible moral decision is one in which the self chooses to accept or reject a conscious moral ideal which is already definite. Such a conception requires Whitehead's treatment of potentiality and actuality so that a definite form of ideality may be accepted or rejected for actualization in physical origination. Since Hartshorne criticizes this position of Whitehead, I find it difficult to understand what he means by "evil deliberately chosen."

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[171] NL, p. 211. [172] LP, p. 169. [173] WP, p. 177.

[174] See footnote 123.

Hartshorne brings multiple possible outcomes into the freedom experienced by all occasions and furnishes this multiple potentiality by an emergent chance factor. He makes room for this freedom by eliminating those specific forms of definiteness from the primordial nature of God with regard to which there is freedom. He then describes "rational freedom" as "a special, high-level form of freedom in general, and this as inherent in the category of individuality as such, whether atomic, human, or divine."[176] This would suggest that the chance factor in freedom in general is operative in rational freedom.

If Hartshorne's moral freedom is interpreted as the chance selection from among indefinite possibilities where there is consciousness of definite ethical ideals, there is a failure to meet the first and the sixth requirements for morally responsible freedom. The first requirement is that the free decision must be made by the self and not in a chance manner.[177] The fifth requirement for responsible freedom is met in that there is a consciousness of better and worse alternatives but the sixth requirement is not met because the self is not able to choose either the better or the worse alternative since freedom operates in the range of possibilities left indefinite after the ethical determination is conscious.[178]

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[175] LP, p. 206; cf. pp. 183, 232. [176] NL, p. 205.

When Hartshorne says that God's primordial nature does not include eternal objects in ordered relations, he makes it difficult to furnish standards for better and worse alternatives prior to responsibly free decisions. If we were to say that in the process of time God makes free decisions determining ethical norms which are then accepted or rejected in responsible freedom, it will be necessary to revise his concept of actualization. For him actualization consists in making definite what is indefinite and does not consist in a change from already definite mentality to physicality formed by that definite mentality. If Hartshorne makes this change in order to meet our requirements for responsible freedom, there is no reason for him not to apply this conception of actualization throughout the system. He would then be able to affirm a complete set of eternal objects in structured relations in the primordial nature of God.

I have argued that Whitehead's conception of God with a primordial nature which includes the totality of eternal objects in an order of orders of relevance is superior to Hartshorne's conception for the solution of the problem of evil. A God with a structured primordial nature forms a better basis for a doctrine of creation. The difference between potentiality and actuality and the process of actualization is more cogent. The reality of process and the significance of time is just as clear in Whitehead as it is in Hartshorne. There is a better basis for the differentiation of physical and conceptual feeling which is essential for di-polarity. In Hartshorne's system there is no basis for the determination of relevance and compatibility which is essential for perspective elimination in the freedom of whole response. Hartshorne's concept of actualization which can only operate where there is indefiniteness makes it impossible for him to explain vibration which is essential for overcoming the evil produced by the running down effect of comprehensive finite relativity. Hartshorne's system makes it difficult to explain how God could shift to new patterns of order which are already definite but relevant. When Hartshorne equates freedom, creativity, and chance, I do not see how it is possible to avoid making God responsible for the excess evil produced by his own chance determination of definiteness. Whitehead's system with a structured primordial nature provides a superior explanation of morally responsible freedom. It is obvious that the concepts of creativity, freedom and responsibility should be centers of inquiry for process studies so as to build on the solid foundations which Whitehead has provided.

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[177] See p. 150. [178] See pp. 153 f.

It is my conclusion that Whitehead's conception of God with a primordial nature containing the complete set of eternal objects in an order of orders of grades of relevance is superior to Hartshorne's conception of the primordial aspect which provides only for the definiteness of the categories. A structured primordial nature furnishes a better basis for process and for the solution of the problem of evil.

CHAPTER IX

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

My thesis is that the thought of Alfred North Whitehead perceptively criticizes traditional solutions to the problem of evil and then offers a solution which meets these criticisms and in principle makes sense of the facts of evil in the world. I have discussed the following criticisms made by Whitehead of philosophical and theological ideas bearing on the problem of evil.

First, Whitehead charges that in many earlier systems what is involved in process and becoming is not quite real. Regarding what is processive as deficiently real leads to confusion about what is good and what is evil. Plato's static realm of ideas, for instance, was regarded as eminently real and the realm of process and becoming was degraded to mere appearance which is not quite real. In this system the good is at rest and any process and movement is evil because it involves departure from that good. Augustine's conception of the good as at rest has probably been an influential factor contributing to the permeation of this Platonic conception throughout western Christian culture. Whitehead believes that processive becoming should not be regarded as evil but as good.

Second, Whitehead holds that static monistic thought is not able to account for the rise of evil. It is difficult to understand how an unreal world could frustrate an all powerful absolute or why a unified, totally good absolute would generate opposition to itself.

Third, materialistic philosophy cannot explain the rise of good. Where there is only chance movement of static bits of matter there is no way to differentiate good from evil. Where there is only an accidental change in the location of changeless matter there can be no purposeful progress. Materialism is not able to explain the rise of good because it cannot differentiate good from evil and denies final cause.

Fourth, idealist philosophy in which the good is at rest tends toward a renunciation of committed action in the world. He sees a tendency in some Christianity and in Buddhism to withdraw from action in the world of process designed to overcome evil in the world.

Fifth, much Christian and Jewish theology has described a God who is a despotic tyrant. Whitehead objects to a God who as Lord of History determines every event coercively and then punishes the participants for acting the way he has caused them to act. He holds that a God who irrationally and arbitrarily wills exceptions to metaphysical principles is an immoral despot.

Subordinate to the fifth criticism but worthy of independent emphasis is the sixth criticism that when God is made omnipotently to determine every event, he is made responsible for all evil. A God who could act from eternity without needing to adapt his response to the free actions of occasions in the world would have to determine omnipotently and mechanistically all events in the world. An omnipotent God-determinism makes God responsible for all evil.

Seventh, Whitehead believes that the picture of a coercive God imposing his will has encouraged Jewish, Christian, and Mohammedan cultures to participate in war with a ruthless "holy" zeal. He thinks that we tend to become like what we admire and worship. Holding to the conception of a despotic God tends to produce despotic people.

The attempt to state these criticisms with concise brevity could very easily convey a misconception about Whitehead. He is not dismissing all prior philosophical and theological achievements in preparation for his own final solution. I am impressed with his responsible use of history. He is aware of balance, counter tendencies, and qualifications. He further claims that he proposes no doctrine which has not been held by thinkers who have preceded him.[1] He probably accepts more than he rejects from the thought of Plato and Augustine. He is aware that there are elements of Plato's thought which portray processive reality,[2] but he is critical of those elements which favor a static reality and which have been more influential in the philosophical and theological tradition.

It seems to me that these criticisms focus on aspects of widely accepted thought which are in need of revision. Significant changes will occur in theology when there is a shift from a conception of static reality to processive reality. In our time Newtonian fixity has been replaced with relativity and quantum mechanics. A conception of God which seemed adequate for a fixed reality will not be satisfactory for a world of change. Good and evil defined in terms of static reality will not be satisfactory when reality is seen to be in motion.

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[1] PR, p. v. [2] AI, p. 355.

Madden and Hare charge that process thought is not able to make sense of the facts of evil. They point to excess evil in the world which is not instrumentally good and say that process thought cannot explain the presence of this evil.

Advantages of Whitehead's Solution

Whitehead's thought not only makes it possible to explain the presence of excess evil but also meets the criticisms of various features of traditional thought which he has made. This dissertation has discussed a number of features of his thought which have superior explanatory power.

First, he is able to explain process and becoming so that it is real. The di-polar conception of God is one of the most helpful aspects of his thought for this explanation. God has fixed, non-derivative features which make creative process possible and he also has processive features through which he responds to the changing conditions brought about by free actions of occasions in the world. Reality consists in occasions of experience. Occasions in the world are not less real because they become. All reality is processive.

Second, the conception of processive reality makes it possible to describe processive good. The good is the process of composite actualization in which compatible physical and mental feelings are united in becoming one occasion of experience. The good is graded by intensity of satisfaction ranging from God down to faint puffs of existence in empty space. The good is the processive experience of static forms of definiteness and static past physicality in coherent aesthetic construction.

Third, Whitehead's thought makes it possible to explain the rise of evil. Evil is the destruction of aesthetic construction which might have been. Four aspects of process which give rise to evil were discussed in the chapter on the cause of evil. (1) Efficiently caused transition produces the evil of running down. (2) Sometimes the divine initiative in the provision of the initial ideal aim introduces factors which are incompatible with some of the initial data giving rise to aesthetic destruction. (3) The freedom of whole response deviates from the divine ideal. (4) Sometimes morally responsible freedom consciously deviates from the initial aim and therefore introduces evil.

It is possible to justify the features of the metaphysical situation which give rise to these types of evil. (1) The relationship between occasions of experience which are required in order to permit the expression of voluntary love cannot be maintained without producing the evil of entropy. I know of no better way to provide for universal finite relativity which is in turn necessary for the expression of voluntary love than Whitehead's provision that each occasion experiences every occasion in its causal past. This dependable responsive matrix of efficient causation in which voluntary love can be expressed is only possible where there is also the evil of running down. Whitehead's system provides a way in which this entropic loss may be overcome without losing the dependability and plasticity of the matrix of efficient causation. The physical pole of each occasion dependably carries on the cumulative outcome of the efficient causation from all past occasions. The mental pole is the structure in which corrective and developmental divine initiative may be introduced to overcome the effect of entropy without arbitrarily cutting off the far reaching consequences of the decisions of past occasions. (2) The

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divine action leading to new good sometimes introduces unavoidable evil. This divine initiative is an expression of a stable, non-derivative primordial nature which is not subject to erosion through entropy and therefore through its infinite variety can overcome entropy. Frequently the divine initiative introduces factors which are incompatible with certain factors of the causal past which are producing evil. The evil for which God is responsible in this manner is always unavoidably connected with a more valuable good. (3) The evil produced by interactive synthesis is also unavoidably connected with the possibility of expressing voluntary love. We have seen how the physical pole of each occasion dependably carries the outcome of the decisions of all past occasions. The mental pole provides an opportunity for the introduction of the divine initiative of corrective and developmental novelty. The synthesis of the two poles in whole response brings together the dependable expression of past decisions and the divine initiative. (4) Voluntary love is not possible without morally responsible freedom. I have described a morally responsible free decision as one which is made consciously by a self from a better or a worse alternative without having been caused to make that choice either by external or prior internal causes. There is no way to provide for voluntary love without at the same time providing for the possibility of the choice of the worse alternative.

If we say that providing for voluntary love makes sense, we can make sense of the facts of experienced evil in the world with Whitehead's system. Hare and Madden seem to agree that voluntary love is desirable when they say that the "idea of God's power as totally coercive is morally repugnant as well as conceptually incoherent."[3] Whitehead's system provides an explanation for the rise of evil without making God responsible for any evil which cannot be justified. The excess evil which cannot be justified results from the wrong use of responsible freedom.

A fourth feature exhibiting superior explanatory power is that the system is able to give a rational explanation of the rise of the good. Whitehead criticizes materialism for not being able to explain the rise of good because it cannot differentiate good from evil and denies final causation. In his system the primordial nature of God furnishes a basis for the differentiation between good and evil and for final causation. He is further concerned about the anti-intellectualism exhibited in Nietzsche, Bergson and American Pragmatism.[4] Bergson is commended for recognizing the opposing tendencies of emerging good and slow decay, but he is criticized for not giving "any explanatory insight."[5] When Whitehead sought to give a rational explanation he was attempting to give expression to his faith that "the ultimate natures of things lie together in a harmony which excludes mere arbitrariness. It is the faith that at the base of things we shall not find mere arbitrary mystery."[6] One of his preoccupations in writing Process and Reality was to rescue the type of thought represented by Bergson, William James, and John Dewey "from the charge of anti-intellectualism, which rightly or wrongly has been associated with it."[7] His description of God with a primordial nature in which there is an order of orders of eternal objects provides a base for the emergence of good which is not merely an arbitrary mystery. In Whitehead's system novel good is coherently connected with the good of the past. Intrinsic evil in itself does not make any contribution to good.

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[3] PS, 2/1, p. 45. [4] AI, p. 287. [5] FR, p. 23.

[6] SMW, p. 27. [7] PR, p. vii.

A fifth advantage of the system is that there is a basis for turning away from despair toward active effort to overcome evil in the world. Since intrinsic evil makes no contribution to subsequent good, there is no basis for arbitrary experimentation with evil in order to make a possible contribution to later good. The social nature of reality encourages cooperative effort to overcome evil. The possible misuse of morally responsible freedom and the social nature of reality means that some social structures may develop which contribute to evil. It is even possible that socially induced moral norms may have factors in them which tend toward evil. The coherent connection of new good with old good encourages careful research in order to differentiate those aspects of norms for good which are socially induced resistance to the divine initiative from those which are the divine initiative. The findings of social science that intuitive norms frequently reflect past social experience would suggest that intuitive conceptions of the ideal should not be uncritically accepted as constituting the divinely given initial ideal aim. The active cooperative modification of the environment so as to promote collective good is a pervasive characteristic of all higher forms of life.

A sixth advantage of Whitehead's system is that his conception of God has removed those features that have given rise to the charge of despotism and tyranny. God is persuasive and not coercive so that there is real freedom of occasions in the world.

A seventh desirable feature of the system is that God is not responsible for any evil which cannot be justified in principle. God does introduce initial ideal aims which unavoidably involve some evil, but the good that is thereby gained makes such evil justifiable.

Problems Needing Further Study

At various points in the course of this study the need for more careful analysis of various issues has been mentioned. Some of these issues should be noted in a summary statement. At some points alternative interpretations of Whitehead are possible with no one interpretation exhibiting total consistency with other statements in the system. In such a situation it would be natural for a person to choose that interpretation which is more consistent with his own predispositions. On such issues it is especially important that other students with other predispositions work out the implications of alternative interpretations. The mutual correction and supplementation of alternative interpretations will lead to an explanation of the problem of evil that will receive wider acceptance for Whitehead's thought in the religious world.

The nature of freedom in Whitehead's system is worthy of extensive study working out the implications of the various alternatives which have developed. I have argued that Hartshorne's concept of freedom is vulnerable to the criticisms of Pols. Because of my respect for Hartshorne's work I would like to request critical scrutiny of my criticisms and proposals on this issue.

Closely related to the concept of freedom is the concept of creativity. Hartshorne equates freedom and creativity. I have differentiated responsible freedom as the acceptance or rejection of ideality without having been caused to do so by something else from creativity which is the many becoming one. The concept of creativity needs further study.

A third suggestion for further study grows out of a comparison of the findings of this dissertation with those of a recent study in the same department on a similar topic. Adam Herbert Smith in his thesis, "The Problem of Theodicy in the Thought of Paul Tillich," says that in the line of thought represented by Boehme, Schelling, and Tillich contrariety and opposition is required for its contribution to creativity and process.[8] Contrariety contributes to the movement of process. Smith argues that in Tillich's system falling or estrangement is metaphysically required.[9] In my description of Whitehead's system the movement of process is provided by the creative combination of coherent particulars. The contradiction of intrinsic evil in itself makes no contribution to processive good. This suggests that what coherence does in Whitehead's system, contrariety does in Tillich's system. I think that it would be fruitful to compare the system of Whitehead and that of Tillich with reference to the role of coherence and contrariety. Which system is more adequate to the facts of the experienced world and which system is more likely to contribute to successfully overcoming evil in the world?

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[8] Adam Herbert Smith, "The Problem of Theodicy in the Thought of Paul Tillich" (Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School, 1972), pp. 66-69, 148, 196, 251, 258, 260.

[9] Ibid., pp. 117, 127, 209, 260.

I find that Whitehead perceptively criticizes traditional solutions to the problem of evil and then offers a solution which meets these criticisms and in principle makes sense of the facts of evil in the world. I would like to see a refinement in his system with regard to the nature of creativity so that it is easy to see that God is the ground of being. Without this change his di-polar conception of God makes a great advance over traditional conceptions of God. This di-polar conception of God seems to me to be the best available basis for future development of the solution to the problem of evil.

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